Eyeballing the NSA 036

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  1. Eyeballing the NSA 036
  2.  
  3. VIEW FULL @ paste.itunix.eu/view/d933a052
  4.    
  5.    
  6.  “Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.”
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. ¤ NSA’s Foreign Partnerships ::
  14.  
  15. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  16. _______________________________________
  17. ¤ Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  18.  
  19. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  20.  
  21. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  22.  
  23. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  24.  
  25. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  26. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  27. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  28. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  29. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  30. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  31. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  32. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  33. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  34. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  35. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  36. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  37. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  38.  
  39. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  40.  
  41. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  42. _______________________________________
  43. ¤ How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  44.  
  45. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  46.  
  47. ¤ NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  48.  
  49. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  50. _______________________________________
  51. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  52.  
  53. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  54.  
  55. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  56.  
  57. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  58.  
  59. ¤ NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  60.  
  61. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  62. _______________________________________
  63. ¤ Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  64.  
  65. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  66.  
  67. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  68.  
  69. ¤ Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  70.  
  71. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  72.  
  73. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  74. _______________________________________
  75. ¤ Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the “Now-Discontinued” (?)
  76. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  77. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  78.  
  79. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  80. _______________________________________
  81. ¤ GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  82.  
  83. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  84.  
  85. ¤ Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  86.  
  87. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  88. _______________________________________
  89. ¤ Barack Obama’s Secret “Terrorist-Tracking” System ::
  90.  
  91.  Nearly half of the people on the US government’s widely shared
  92. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  93. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  94. obtained by The Intercept.
  95.  
  96. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  97.  
  98. ¤ NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  99.  
  100. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  101.  
  102. ¤ Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  103.  
  104.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  105. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  106. secret process that requires neither “concrete facts” nor
  107. “irrefutable evidence” to designate an American or foreigner
  108. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  109. by The Intercept.
  110.  
  111. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  112. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  113. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  114. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  115. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  116.  
  117. NOBODY notes
  118.  
  119.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  120. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  121. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  122. only these “dirty tricks” are now fully digitalized.
  123.  
  124. ¤ Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  125.  
  126.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  127. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  128. and his approach to dissent. “Before I left the State
  129. Department, I filed a complaint with the department’s
  130. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  131. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  132. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  133. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,”
  134. Tye explained. “I have also brought my complaint to the
  135. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  136. inspector general of the NSA.”
  137.  
  138.  These steps — which many say Snowden should’ve taken —
  139. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  140. wouldn’t be garnering attention at all if not for
  141. Snowden’s leaks.
  142.  
  143. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  144.  
  145. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  146. _______________________________________
  147. ¤ Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  148. Israeli Attack ::
  149.  
  150.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  151. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  152. crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  153. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  154. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  155. enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza.
  156.  
  157. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  158.  
  159. ¤ ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  160.  
  161. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  162.  
  163. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  164.  
  165. ¤ US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  166.  
  167. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  168.  
  169. ¤ (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  170.  
  171. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  172. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  173. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  174.  
  175. ¤ (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  176.  
  177. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  178. _______________________________________
  179. ¤ USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  180.  
  181. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  182.  
  183. ¤ NSA’s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia’s Brutal State Police ::
  184.  
  185.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  186. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  187. one of the world’s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  188. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  189. Snowden details the agency’s plans “to provide direct analytic and
  190. technical support” to the Saudis on “internal security” matters.
  191.  
  192.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior—referred to in the document as MOI
  193. — has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  194. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  195. that “Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  196. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,” specifically
  197. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly “poured an
  198. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat” of one human rights
  199. activist. The report also notes the MOI’s use of invasive surveillance
  200. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  201.  
  202.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  203. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  204. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  205. Administration’s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  206. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes “a
  207. period of rejuvenation” for the NSA’s relationship with the Saudi
  208. Ministry of Defense.
  209.  
  210.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  211. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  212. where the US “has [an] interest in regime continuity.”
  213.  
  214. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  215. _______________________________________
  216. ¤ Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  217.  
  218. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  219. _______________________________________
  220. ¤ NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  221.  
  222. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  223.  
  224. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  225. _______________________________________
  226. ¤ Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  227.  
  228.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  229. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  230. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  231.  
  232. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  233.  
  234. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  235. _______________________________________
  236. ¤ NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  237.  
  238.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  239. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  240. “Raw Take” Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  241. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  242. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  243. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  244. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  245.  
  246. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  247.  
  248. ▲ FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  249.  
  250. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  251. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  252. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  253.  
  254. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  255.  
  256. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  257.  
  258. ▲ DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  259.  
  260.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  261. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  262.  
  263. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  264.  
  265. ▲ USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  266.  
  267. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  268.  
  269. ▲ FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  270.  
  271.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  272. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  273. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  274. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  275.  
  276. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  277.  
  278. ▲ Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  279.  
  280. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  281.  
  282. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  283.  
  284. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  285.  
  286. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  287.  
  288. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  289.  
  290. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  291.  
  292. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  293.  
  294. NSA’s FOIA Release » http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  295.  
  296. ▲ NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  297.  
  298. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  299.  
  300. ▲ NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  301.  
  302. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  303. _______________________________________
  304. ¤ NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  305.  
  306. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  307.  
  308. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  309. _______________________________________
  310. ¤ The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  311. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  312.  
  313.  The contents of the surveillance files — almost half of which
  314. contained information from US citizens or residents — “tell
  315. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  316. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  317. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.”
  318.  
  319. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  320. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  321. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  322.  
  323. ¤ Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  324. Been Spying On ::
  325.  
  326.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  327. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans—including
  328. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  329. academics, and lawyers—under secretive procedures intended
  330. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  331.  
  332.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  333. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  334. own government includes:
  335.  
  336.  • Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  337. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  338. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  339. Security under President George W. Bush;
  340.  
  341.  • Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  342. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  343.  
  344.  • Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  345. international relations at Rutgers University;
  346.  
  347.  • Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  348. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  349. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  350.  
  351.  • Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  352. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  353. rights organization in the country.
  354.  
  355. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  356. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  357. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  358.  
  359. ¤ NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  360.  
  361. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  362.  
  363. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  364.  
  365. ¤ Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  366.  
  367. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  368.  
  369. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  370.  
  371. ▼ NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  372.                               ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  373.  “The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  374. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  375. crime to law enforcement authorities.”
  376.  
  377. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  378.  
  379. ▲ US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  380.  
  381. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  382.  
  383. NOBODY responds
  384.  
  385.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  386. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  387. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  388.  
  389. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  390.  
  391.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  392. back in 2004 up till today.
  393.  
  394. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  395.  
  396.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  397. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  398.  
  399. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  400.  
  401.  Just like those in the “Department of Justice” they
  402. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  403. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  404. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  405.  
  406. ¤ Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  407.  
  408. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  409.  
  410.  “So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  411. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  412. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  413. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  414.  
  415.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  416. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  417. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  418. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  419. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  420. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  421. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  422. first place.  Realistically, it’s not one or the other, it’s
  423. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  424. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  425. On one hand: it’s evidence, on the other, it’s private information
  426. on many thousands of people.
  427.  
  428.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  429. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  430. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  431. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  432. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  433. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  434. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  435. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  436. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  437. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  438. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  439. happen now. The US government’s dealings with brutal regimes
  440. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  441. their own people.
  442.  
  443.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  444. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  445. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  446. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  447. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  448. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  449. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  450. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  451. the Post’s story as a dud, it’s the first page of the next
  452. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  453. unpredictable consequences.”
  454.  
  455. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  456. _______________________________________
  457. ¤ Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  458.  
  459. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  460. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  461. ¤ Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  462. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  463.  
  464.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  465. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  466. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  467. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  468. “amplify” sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  469. content judged to be “extremist.” The capabilities, detailed
  470. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  471. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  472. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  473. together in a call.
  474.  
  475.  The tools were created by GCHQ’s Joint Threat Research
  476. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  477. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  478. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  479. documents have detailed JTRIG’s use of “fake victim blog
  480. posts,” “false flag operations,” “honey traps” and
  481. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  482. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  483. Facebook users.
  484.  
  485. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  486.  
  487. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  488.  
  489. ¤ GCHQ’s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  490.  
  491. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  492. ---------------------------------------
  493. ¤ More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  494.  
  495. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  496.  
  497.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  498. program run by the US Agency for International
  499. Development to create “a Twitter-like Cuban
  500. communications network” run through “secret shell
  501. companies” in order to create the false appearance
  502. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  503. to the service’s Cuban users was the fact that
  504. “American contractors were gathering their private
  505. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  506. purposes”–specifically, to manipulate those users
  507. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  508. government. According to top-secret documents
  509. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  510. operation is frequently discussed at western
  511. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  512. covertly use social media for “propaganda,” “deception,”
  513. “mass messaging,” and “pushing stories.” ...
  514.  
  515. ¤ GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  516.  
  517. “Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect”
  518.  
  519. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  520.  
  521.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  522. NSA document published today by The Intercept, “enables
  523. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  524. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  525. Intelligence communities.” The 2009 Conference, held at
  526. Fort Meade, included “eighty-six representatives from
  527. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  528. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  529. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  530. Space Intelligence Center.”
  531.  
  532.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  533. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  534. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  535. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  536. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  537. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is “to
  538. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  539. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.”
  540.  
  541.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  542. released GCHQ document is dubbed “Royal Concierge,” under
  543. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  544. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  545. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  546. how to “influence the hotel choice” of travelers and
  547. to determine whether they stay at “SIGINT friendly”
  548. hotels. The document asks: “Can we influence the hotel
  549. choice? Can we cancel their visit?” ...
  550.  
  551. ¤ NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  552.  
  553. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  554. ---------------------------------------
  555. ¤ GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  556.  
  557. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  558.  
  559. ¤ GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  560.  
  561. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  562.  
  563. ¤ GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  564.  
  565.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  566. of the NSA), titled “The Art of Deception: Training
  567. for Online Covert Operations,” were given to the
  568. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  569. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  570. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  571. “the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  572. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  573. attacks they accuse “hacktivists” of using, the
  574. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  575. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.”
  576.  
  577.  The goals of the JTRIG program are “(1) to inject
  578. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  579. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  580. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  581. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  582. generate outcomes it considers desirable.”
  583.  
  584. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  585. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  586. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  587. ---------------------------------------
  588. ¤ GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  589.  
  590. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  591.  
  592. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  593.  
  594. ¤ GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  595.  
  596. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  597.  
  598. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  599.  
  600. ¤ GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  601.  
  602. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  603.  
  604. ¤ GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  605.  
  606. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  607. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  608. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  609.  
  610. ¤ British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  611. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  612.  
  613. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  614. ---------------------------------------
  615. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  616.  
  617. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  618. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  619. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  620. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  621.  
  622. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  623.  
  624. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  625.  
  626. ¤ Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  627.  
  628. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  629.  
  630. ¤ GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  631.  
  632. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  633. ---------------------------------------
  634. ▲ Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  635.  
  636. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  637. _______________________________________
  638. ¤ Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  639.  
  640.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  641. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  642. Binney – that’s a “totalitarian mentality.”
  643.  
  644. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  645. _______________________________________
  646. ¤ NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  647.  
  648. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  649.  
  650.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  651. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  652. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  653. Ausspähprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  654.  
  655.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  656. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  657. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  658. investigate.
  659.  
  660.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  661. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  662. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  663. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  664. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  665. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  666.  
  667. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  668.  
  669. MP4 Video Format » http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  670.  
  671. ¤ XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  672.  
  673. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  674.  
  675. ¤ NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  676.  
  677. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  678. ---------------------------------------
  679. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  680.  
  681. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  682.  
  683. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  684.  
  685.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  686. using Tor.”
  687.  
  688. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  689.  
  690. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  691.  
  692. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  693.  
  694.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t mean that your
  695. browser isn’t storing cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman,
  696. a colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes in browser
  697. vulnerabilities.
  698.  
  699.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  700. aware of Tor’s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  701. wide surveillance.
  702.  
  703.  “The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  704. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  705. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  706. other Web users,” he wrote.
  707.  
  708.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  709. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  710. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,”
  711. he said.
  712.  
  713. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  714.  
  715. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  716. Traffic From Machines ::
  717.  
  718.  “Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  719. out large-scale ‘staining’ as a means to identify individual
  720. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  721.  
  722.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  723. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  724. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  725. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  726. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  727. session.”
  728.  
  729. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  730.  
  731. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  732.  
  733. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  734.  
  735. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  736. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  737. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  738. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  739.  
  740. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  741.  
  742. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  743. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  744. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  745. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  746.  
  747. ¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  748.  
  749.  “We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  750. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  751. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  752. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  753. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  754. which allows the user finer control.” ... ...
  755.  
  756.  “This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  757. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  758. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  759. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  760. server can be used to hide one’s location, but a single-hop
  761. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  762. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  763. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  764. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  765. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  766. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  767. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  768. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  769. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  770. order to trace requests back to the originating client.”
  771.  
  772. ... ...
  773.  
  774.  “In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  775. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  776. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  777. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  778. of Tor.”
  779.  
  780. ... ...
  781.  
  782.  “We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  783. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  784. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  785. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  786. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  787. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  788. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  789. be tried.”
  790.  
  791. ... ...
  792.  
  793.  “It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  794. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  795. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  796. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  797. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  798. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  799. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  800. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  801. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  802. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  803. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  804. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  805. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  806. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  807. who inspecting the directories.”
  808.  
  809. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  810. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  811. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  812.  
  813. ¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  814.  
  815. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  816.  
  817. ¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  818.  
  819. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  820.  
  821. ¤ Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  822.  
  823.  “This document doesn’t give much insight into capabilities
  824. the IC has developed against Tor. It’s apparently quite common
  825. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  826. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  827. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  828. investment. I’d expect there are other programs with more
  829. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.”
  830.  
  831. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  832. _______________________________________
  833. ¤ UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  834.  
  835. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  836.  
  837. ¤ UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  838. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  839.  
  840.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  841. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany’s
  842. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  843. as a double agent for the US.
  844.  
  845.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  846. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  847. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country’s
  848. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  849. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  850.  
  851.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  852. week’s arrest of a 31-year-old BND “double agent” who spent
  853. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  854. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  855. of €10,000 (£7,940) per document. ...
  856.  
  857.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin’s
  858. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  859. in “co-operation”. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  860. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  861. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  862.  
  863.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  864. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin’s Russian
  865. embassy. The Germans had considered it “impossible” that one
  866. of their own intelligence men could be working as a “double agent”
  867. for the Americans.
  868.  
  869. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  870. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  871. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  872. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  873.  
  874. ¤ Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  875.  
  876. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  877.  
  878. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  879.  
  880. ¤ NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  881.  
  882. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  883.  
  884. ¤ Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  885.  
  886. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  887.  
  888. ¤ Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  889.  
  890. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  891.  
  892. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  893.  
  894. ¤ NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  895.  
  896. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  897.  
  898. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  899.  
  900. ¤ Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  901.  
  902. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  903.  
  904. ¤ Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  905.  
  906. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  907.  
  908. ▲ FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  909.  
  910.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  911. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  912. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  913. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  914. where she grew up.
  915.  
  916. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  917. _______________________________________
  918. ¤ NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  919.  
  920. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  921. _______________________________________
  922. ¤ Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  923.  
  924. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  925. _______________________________________
  926. ¤ Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  927.  
  928. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  929. _______________________________________
  930. ¤ NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  931.  
  932. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  933. _______________________________________
  934. ¤ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  935.  
  936. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  937. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  938. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  939. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  940.  
  941. ¤ Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  942.  
  943. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  944.  
  945. ¤ Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  946.  
  947. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  948.  
  949. ¤ Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  950.  
  951. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  952.  
  953. ¤ Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  954.  
  955. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  956.  
  957. ¤ Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  958.  
  959. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  960. _______________________________________
  961.  Keith Alexander’s talking points for strategic meeting
  962. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  963. Service (DDIS).
  964.  
  965. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  966. _______________________________________
  967. ¤ FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  968.  
  969. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  970.  
  971. ¤ NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  972.  
  973. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  974. _______________________________________
  975. ¤ Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  976.  
  977. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  978. _______________________________________
  979. ¤ GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  980. of Residents’ Facebook and Google Use ::
  981.  
  982. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  983. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  984. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  985.  
  986.  Britain’s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  987. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  988. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  989. user in the UK.
  990.  
  991. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  992.  
  993. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  994. _______________________________________
  995. ¤ THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  996. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  997.  
  998. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  999. ---------------------------------------
  1000. ¤ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1001.  
  1002. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1003. _______________________________________
  1004. ¤ PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1005.  
  1006. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1007. _______________________________________
  1008. ¤ DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1009.  
  1010. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1011.  
  1012. Mirrored » http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1013. _______________________________________
  1014. ¤ How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1015. Snowden’s Revelations ::
  1016.  
  1017. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1018. _______________________________________
  1019. ¤ GCHQ’s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1020.  
  1021. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1022.  
  1023. ¤ GCHQ’s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1024.  
  1025. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1026. _______________________________________
  1027. ¤ UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1028. to Tap Phones ::
  1029.  
  1030. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1031. _______________________________________
  1032. ¤ Some Numbers About NSA’s Data Collection ::
  1033.  
  1034. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1035. _______________________________________
  1036. ¤ NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1037. Documents “Above Top Secret” and Many Are Burned
  1038. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1039.  
  1040.  “Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1041. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1042. information from 40 years ago – from spying on Frank
  1043. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1044. they were spying on – was hidden?
  1045.  
  1046.  Now do you think they’re going to put that information
  1047. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1048. everybody what they’re doing?
  1049.  
  1050.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1051. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1052. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1053. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1054. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1055. the collection. That’s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1056. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1057. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1058. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1059.  
  1060.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they’re taking
  1061. the information and they’re putting it in a much higher
  1062. security level. It’s called “ECI” – Exceptionally Controlled
  1063. Information – and it’s called the black program … which I
  1064. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1065.  
  1066.  I specialized in black world – DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1067. Community) – programs, operations and missions … in “VRKs”,
  1068. “ECIs”, and “SAPs”, “STOs”. SAP equals Special Access
  1069. Program. It’s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1070. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It’s
  1071. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1072.  
  1073.  Now in that world – the ECI/VRK world – everything in that
  1074. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1075. computer systems that house it. It’s totally separate than
  1076. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1077. the “JWICS”: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1078. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1079. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1080. for the JWICS.
  1081.  
  1082.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1083. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as “code word”
  1084. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1085. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1086. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1087. that [clearance].
  1088.  
  1089.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1090. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1091. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1092. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1093.  
  1094.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1095. 100 year or until death, ’till the person first being “read in”
  1096. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1097. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1098. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that – when Tice
  1099. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying – he
  1100. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1101. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1102.  
  1103.  It’s very compartmentalized and – even with stuff that they had
  1104. – you might have something at NSA, that there’s literally 40
  1105. people at NSA that know that it’s going on in the entire agency.
  1106.  
  1107.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1108. spying story, which broke in 2005] – and I was a source of
  1109. information for the New York Times – that’s when President Bush
  1110. made up that nonsense about the “terrorist surveillance program.”
  1111. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1112.  
  1113.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up … to try
  1114. to placate the American people.
  1115.  
  1116.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) – who was not cleared for this –
  1117. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1118. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1119.  
  1120.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1121. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] – just
  1122. a few – and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1123. investigation.”
  1124.  
  1125. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1126. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1127. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1128. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1129. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1130. _______________________________________
  1131. ¤ NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1132.  
  1133. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1134.  
  1135. ¤ NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1136.  
  1137. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1138.  
  1139. ¤ SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1140.  
  1141. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1142.  
  1143. ¤ MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1144.  
  1145. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1146.  
  1147. ¤ Toward the Identity of “Country X” in MYSTIC ::
  1148.  
  1149. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1150.  
  1151. ¤ Wikileaks Releases Identity of “Country X” ::
  1152.  
  1153. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1154.  
  1155. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1156.  
  1157. ¤ Google Idea’s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1158. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1159.  
  1160. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1161.  
  1162. ¤ Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1163. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1164.  
  1165. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1166.  
  1167. ¤ UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1168. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1169.  
  1170. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1171. _______________________________________
  1172. ¤ NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1173.  
  1174.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1175. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1176. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1177. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1178. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1179.  
  1180. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1181.  
  1182. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1183.  
  1184. ¤ NSA Identity Spying ::
  1185.  
  1186. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1187. _______________________________________
  1188. ¤ 10 Things (Most People) Didn’t Know Before Snowden ::
  1189.  
  1190. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1191. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1192. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1193. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1194. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1195. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1196. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1197. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1198. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1199. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1200.  
  1201. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1202.  
  1203. And a few more to think about,
  1204.  
  1205. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1206. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1207. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1208. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1209. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1210. _______________________________________
  1211. ▼ Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1212.  
  1213.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1214. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1215. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  1216. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1217. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  1218. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  1219.  
  1220.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  1221. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1222. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  1223. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  1224. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  1225. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1226. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1227. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1228. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  1229. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  1230. attention.’”
  1231.  
  1232.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  1233. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1234. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  1235. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1236. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1237.  
  1238. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1239.  
  1240. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1241. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1242.  
  1243. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1244. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1245. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1246. ---------------------------------------
  1247. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1248.  
  1249. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1250.  
  1251. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1252. _______________________________________
  1253. ¤ What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don’t? ::
  1254.  
  1255. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1256.  
  1257. ¤ A Hint? ; “Flashdrive Cache Paths” (Repost) ::
  1258.  
  1259. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1260. _______________________________________
  1261. ¤ Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1262. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1263.  
  1264.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1265. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1266. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1267. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1268. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1269. It doesn’t require setting up a server on the
  1270. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1271. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1272. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1273. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1274. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1275. download the file from you.
  1276.  
  1277. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1278. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1279.  
  1280. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1281.  
  1282. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1283.  
  1284. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1285.  
  1286. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1287. _______________________________________
  1288. ¤ Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1289. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1290.  
  1291. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1292.  
  1293. ¤ The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  1294.  
  1295. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  1296. _______________________________________
  1297. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (EPUB) ::
  1298.  
  1299. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  1300.  
  1301. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  1302.  
  1303. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (PDF) ::
  1304.  
  1305. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  1306.  
  1307. ▼ NSA Documents From “No Place To Hide” ::
  1308.  
  1309. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  1310.  
  1311. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  1312.  
  1313. ▲ An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  1314. Online Next Week ::
  1315.  
  1316. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  1317. ---------------------------------------
  1318. ¤ NSA’s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  1319.  
  1320. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  1321.  
  1322. ¤ Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  1323.  
  1324. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  1325. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  1326.  
  1327. ¤ New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  1328. Israel’s Security Ahead of America’s ::
  1329.  
  1330. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  1331.  
  1332. ¤ New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  1333. Infiltration by NSA ::
  1334.  
  1335. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  1336.  
  1337. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  1338.  
  1339. ¤ Leaked Photos of the NSA’s TAO Factory ::
  1340.  
  1341.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  1342. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald’s book
  1343. “No Place To Hide” details how the agency’s Tailored
  1344. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  1345. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  1346. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  1347. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  1348. they’re delivered.
  1349.  
  1350. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  1351.  
  1352. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  1353.  
  1354. ¤ Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  1355.  
  1356. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  1357.  
  1358. ¤ No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  1359.  
  1360. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  1361. ______________________________________
  1362. ¤ House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  1363. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  1364.  
  1365. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  1366. _______________________________________
  1367. ¤ US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  1368. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  1369.  
  1370. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  1371. _______________________________________
  1372. ¤ The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  1373.  
  1374. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  1375. _______________________________________
  1376. ▼ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1377.  
  1378. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1379.  
  1380. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  1381.  
  1382. ▲ Obama’s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden’s
  1383. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  1384.  
  1385.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  1386. national security and other government officials will no
  1387. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  1388. news reporting that is based on “unauthorized leaks.”
  1389.  
  1390. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  1391. _______________________________________
  1392. ¤ Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  1393.  
  1394. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  1395.  
  1396. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  1397. ______________________________________
  1398. ¤ NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  1399.  
  1400. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  1401. ______________________________________
  1402. ¤ United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  1403. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  1404.  
  1405. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  1406. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  1407.  
  1408. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  1409.  
  1410. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  1411. ______________________________________
  1412. ¤ NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  1413.  
  1414. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  1415.  
  1416. ¤ NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  1417.  
  1418. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  1419.  
  1420. ¤ Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  1421.  
  1422.  “Keep in mind that social media survives by
  1423. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  1424. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  1425. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  1426. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  1427. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  1428. industry which generates something in the
  1429. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.”
  1430.  
  1431.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  1432.  
  1433. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  1434. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  1435. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  1436. _______________________________________
  1437. ¤ GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  1438.  
  1439. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  1440. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  1441.  
  1442.  “PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  1443. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  1444. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  1445. ensure each partner is aware of the other’s
  1446. activities and future plans.” … …
  1447.  
  1448.  “Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  1449. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish
  1450. list and is something its leadership still desires.”
  1451.  
  1452. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  1453.  
  1454. ¤ GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  1455.  
  1456. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  1457.  
  1458. ¤ NSA Spied “Suspected Terrorists” At 2012 Olympics ::
  1459.  
  1460. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  1461.  
  1462. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed “Suspected Terrorists” Before,
  1463. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  1464.  
  1465.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  1466. GCHQ’s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  1467. “supportive” of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  1468. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  1469. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  1470. communicated at “leadership” level, according to
  1471. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  1472. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. … …
  1473.  
  1474.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  1475. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. … …
  1476. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  1477. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  1478. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  1479. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  1480. archive, “100s of billions of entries.”
  1481.  
  1482. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  1483. _______________________________________
  1484. ¤ NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  1485.  
  1486. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  1487. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  1488. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  1489.  
  1490.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  1491. system capable of recording “100 percent” of a foreign
  1492. country’s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  1493. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  1494. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  1495. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  1496. Edward Snowden.
  1497.  
  1498.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  1499. machine — one that can replay the voices from any call
  1500. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  1501. for surveillance.
  1502.  
  1503.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  1504. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for “retrospective retrieval,”
  1505. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  1506. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  1507. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  1508.  
  1509.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  1510. “every single” conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  1511. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  1512. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  1513.  
  1514.  The call buffer opens a door “into the past,” the summary
  1515. says, enabling users to “retrieve audio of interest that
  1516. was not tasked at the time of the original call.” Analysts
  1517. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  1518. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  1519. millions of voice clippings, or “cuts,” for processing
  1520. and long-term storage.
  1521.  
  1522. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  1523.  
  1524. ¤ Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  1525.  
  1526.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  1527. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  1528. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  1529. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  1530. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  1531. it’s actually doing this now–the Post knows where,
  1532. but they won’t say.
  1533.  
  1534. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  1535.  
  1536. ¤ NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  1537.  
  1538. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  1539.  
  1540. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  1541. _______________________________________
  1542. ¤ NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  1543.  
  1544.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  1545. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  1546. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  1547. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  1548. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  1549. already been published previously. The second was
  1550. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  1551.  
  1552. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  1553.  
  1554. ¤ NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  1555.  
  1556.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  1557. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  1558. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  1559. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  1560. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  1561. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  1562. The document, marked “top secret” is a summary of
  1563. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  1564. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  1565.  
  1566.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  1567. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  1568.  
  1569.  “NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  1570. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  1571. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  1572. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  1573. benefit” the document says.
  1574.  
  1575.  “Windsor Blue” is the name of a program for
  1576. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  1577. company is working towards creating a so-called
  1578. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  1579. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  1580. per second.
  1581.  
  1582. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  1583. _______________________________________
  1584. ¤ Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  1585.  
  1586. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  1587. _______________________________________
  1588. ¤ NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  1589.  
  1590. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  1591. _______________________________________
  1592. ¤ Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  1593.  
  1594. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  1595. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  1596. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  1597. _______________________________________
  1598. ¤ NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  1599.  
  1600.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  1601. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  1602. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe’s
  1603. top human rights body.
  1604.  
  1605.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  1606. Snowden said the National Security Agency – for
  1607. which he worked as a contractor – had deliberately
  1608. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  1609. Human Rights Watch.
  1610.  
  1611. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  1612.  
  1613. ¤ Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  1614. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  1615.  
  1616. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  1617. _______________________________________
  1618. ¤ EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  1619.  
  1620.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  1621. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  1622. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  1623.  
  1624.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  1625. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  1626. countries to “transpose” it into their own national
  1627. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  1628. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  1629. high as two years. ... ...
  1630.  
  1631.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  1632. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  1633. by domestic courts.
  1634.  
  1635. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  1636. _______________________________________
  1637. ¤ Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  1638.  
  1639. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  1640. _______________________________________
  1641. ¤ US Whines - ‘Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair’ ::
  1642.  
  1643.  “Recent proposals from countries within the
  1644. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  1645. network (dubbed a ‘Schengen cloud’ by advocates) or
  1646. to create national-only electronic networks could
  1647. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  1648. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  1649. offering network services, or dependent on them,”
  1650. the USTR said in its annual report.
  1651.  
  1652. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  1653. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  1654. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  1655. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1656. ¤ ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  1657.  
  1658. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  1659.  
  1660. ¤ ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  1661.  
  1662. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1663. _______________________________________
  1664. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  1665.  
  1666.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  1667. and documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks
  1668. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I’m still collecting
  1669. any information that comes out and will provide an
  1670. updated archive from time to time.
  1671.  
  1672.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  1673. “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and it holds a total of
  1674. 927MB decompressed.
  1675.  
  1676.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  1677. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  1678. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1679.  
  1680. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1681. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  1682.  
  1683. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  1684. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1685. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  1686. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1687. _______________________________________
  1688. ¤ It’s Finally Admitted! ::
  1689.  
  1690. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  1691. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  1692. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  1693. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  1694. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  1695. _______________________________________
  1696. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  1697.  
  1698. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  1699.  
  1700. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  1701.  
  1702. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  1703.  
  1704. ¤ GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  1705.  
  1706. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  1707. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  1708. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  1709. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  1710.  
  1711. ▲ UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  1712. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  1713.  
  1714. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  1715. _______________________________________
  1716. ¤ Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  1717.  
  1718. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  1719.  
  1720. ¤ Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  1721.  
  1722. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  1723.  
  1724. ¤ IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  1725.  
  1726. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  1727.  
  1728. ¤ Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  1729.  
  1730. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  1731. _______________________________________
  1732. ¤ NSA’s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  1733.  
  1734.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  1735. also promises the NSA will “build privacy into
  1736. new technologies” to “protect privacy and civil
  1737. liberties” and “to be as transparent with the
  1738. public as possible” as well helping the public
  1739. “understand how we’re protecting their privacy,
  1740. how we’re protecting national security.”
  1741.  
  1742. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  1743. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1744. ¤ NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  1745.  
  1746. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  1747.  
  1748. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  1749.  
  1750. ¤ Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  1751.  
  1752. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  1753.  
  1754. ¤ Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  1755.  
  1756. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  1757.  
  1758. ¤ NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  1759.  
  1760.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  1761. offensive against China, with targets including the
  1762. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  1763. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  1764. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  1765. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  1766. service’s targets were former Chinese President
  1767. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  1768. well as telecommunications companies.
  1769.  
  1770.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  1771. With 150,000 employees and €28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  1772. in annual revenues, the company is the world’s second
  1773. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  1774. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  1775. to internally as “Shotgiant,” against the company, which
  1776. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  1777. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  1778. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  1779. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA’s
  1780. battle for data supremacy.
  1781.  
  1782.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  1783. in infiltrating Huwaei’s network and copied a list of
  1784. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  1785. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  1786. among other things.
  1787.  
  1788. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  1789. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  1790. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  1791. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  1792.  
  1793. ¤ Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  1794.  
  1795.  “We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  1796. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  1797. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  1798. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  1799. has lodged representations with the American side on
  1800. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  1801. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.”
  1802.  
  1803. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  1804. _______________________________________
  1805. ¤ NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  1806.  
  1807.  The document consists of several posts – one of
  1808. them is titled “I hunt sys admins” – that were
  1809. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  1810. hosted on the agency’s classified servers. They
  1811. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  1812. agency’s effort to break into foreign network
  1813. routers, the devices that connect computer
  1814. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  1815. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  1816. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  1817. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  1818. that flow over their networks.
  1819.  
  1820.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  1821. aspired to create a database that would function
  1822. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  1823. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  1824. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  1825. activity – they are targeted only because they
  1826. control access to networks the agency wants to
  1827. infiltrate. “Who better to target than the person
  1828. that already has the ‘keys to the kingdom’?” one
  1829. of the posts says.
  1830.  
  1831.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  1832. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  1833. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  1834. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  1835. and, the author jokes, “pictures of cats in funny
  1836. poses with amusing captions.”
  1837.  
  1838. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  1839. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  1840. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  1841. _______________________________________
  1842. ¤ NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  1843.  
  1844. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  1845. _______________________________________
  1846. ¤ CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  1847.  
  1848. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  1849.  
  1850. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  1851.  
  1852. ¤ Default Le Monde Report ::
  1853.  
  1854. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  1855.  
  1856. ¤ Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  1857.  
  1858. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  1859. _______________________________________
  1860. ¤ DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  1861.  
  1862. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  1863. _______________________________________
  1864. ¤ TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  1865.  
  1866. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  1867.  
  1868. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  1869. _______________________________________
  1870. ¤ SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  1871.  
  1872. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  1873. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  1874. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  1875. _______________________________________
  1876. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  1877.  
  1878. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1879.  
  1880. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1881. _______________________________________
  1882. ¤ NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  1883.  
  1884. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  1885. _______________________________________
  1886. ¤ Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  1887.  
  1888. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  1889.  
  1890. ¤ Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  1891.  
  1892. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  1893. _______________________________________
  1894. ¤ NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  1895.  
  1896. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  1897. _______________________________________
  1898. ¤ NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  1899.  
  1900. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  1901.  
  1902. ▲ FBI’s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  1903.  
  1904. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  1905.  
  1906. ▲ FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  1907.  
  1908. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  1909. _______________________________________
  1910. ¤ STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  1911.  
  1912. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  1913.  
  1914. ▲ NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  1915.  
  1916. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1917. _______________________________________
  1918. ¤ FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  1919.  
  1920. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  1921. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  1922. _______________________________________
  1923. ¤ How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  1924. With Malware ::
  1925.  
  1926.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  1927. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  1928. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  1929. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  1930. level of human oversight in the process.
  1931.  
  1932.  The classified files – provided previously by NSA
  1933. whistleblower Edward Snowden – contain new details
  1934. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  1935. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  1936. of computers worldwide with malware “implants.” The
  1937. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  1938. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  1939. Internet and phone networks.
  1940.  
  1941. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  1942. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  1943. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  1944. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  1945. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  1946. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  1947. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  1948. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  1949. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  1950.  
  1951.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  1952. efforts operates from the agency’s headquarters in
  1953. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  1954. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  1955. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  1956. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  1957.  
  1958.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  1959. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  1960. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  1961. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  1962. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  1963. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  1964. handled by humans. The automated system – codenamed TURBINE
  1965. – is designed to “allow the current implant network to
  1966. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  1967. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  1968. instead of individually.”
  1969.  
  1970. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  1971.  
  1972. ¤ “Thousands of Implants” ::
  1973.  
  1974.  “Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  1975. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  1976. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  1977. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  1978. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  1979. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  1980. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  1981. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  1982. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  1983. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  1984. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  1985. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  1986. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  1987. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  1988. execute endpoint operations.”
  1989.  
  1990. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1991.  
  1992.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  1993. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  1994. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a “back-door
  1995. implant” infects their computers within eight seconds.
  1996.  
  1997.  There’s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  1998. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  1999. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2000. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2001. looks suspicious.
  2002.  
  2003.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2004. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2005. “man-in-the-middle” and “man-on-the-side” attacks, which
  2006. covertly force a user’s internet browser to route to NSA
  2007. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2008.  
  2009.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2010. target’s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2011. “accesses” to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2012. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2013. is able to exploit, the agency’s surveillance sensors alert
  2014. the TURBINE system, which then “shoots” data packets at the
  2015. targeted computer’s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2016.  
  2017.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2018. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2019. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2020. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target’s
  2021. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2022. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2023. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2024. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2025. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2026. in action.
  2027.  
  2028. ¤ How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2029. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2030.  
  2031. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2032.  
  2033. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2034.  
  2035. Mirrored » http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2036.  
  2037.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2038. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2039. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2040. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2041. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2042. of the NSA’s automated TURBINE system.
  2043.  
  2044. ¤ NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2045.  
  2046. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2047. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2048. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2049. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2050. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2051. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2052. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2053. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2054. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2055. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2056.  
  2057. ¤ Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2058.  
  2059. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2060.  
  2061. ¤ NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2062.  
  2063. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2064. _______________________________________
  2065. ¤ NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2066.  
  2067. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2068. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2069. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2070. _______________________________________
  2071. ¤ Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2072.  
  2073. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2074. _______________________________________
  2075. ¤ NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2076.  
  2077.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2078. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2079. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2080. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2081. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2082. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2083. internet traffic.
  2084.  
  2085.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2086. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2087. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled ‘Netherlands
  2088. – 30 days’, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2089. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2090.  
  2091.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2092. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2093. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2094. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2095. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2096. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2097.  
  2098.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2099. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2100. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2101. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2102. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2103. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2104. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2105.  
  2106. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2107.  
  2108. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2109. _______________________________________
  2110. ¤ NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2111.  
  2112. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2113.  
  2114. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2115. ---------------------------------------
  2116. ¤ Tech Firms Spy ::
  2117.  
  2118. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2119.  
  2120. ¤ NSA Spies Too ::
  2121.  
  2122. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2123. _______________________________________
  2124. ¤ GCHQ “OPTIC NERVE” Spy Programme ::
  2125.  
  2126. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2127.  
  2128. ¤ GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2129.  
  2130.  The documents show that images were collected
  2131. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2132. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2133. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2134. programs.
  2135.  
  2136. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2137. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2138. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2139. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2140.  
  2141. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2142.  
  2143. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2144. _______________________________________
  2145. ¤ NSA Director Alexander’s Phones ::
  2146.  
  2147. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2148. _______________________________________
  2149. ¤ NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2150.  
  2151. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2152.  
  2153. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2154. _______________________________________
  2155. ¤ NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2156. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2157.  
  2158. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2159.  
  2160. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2161. _______________________________________
  2162. ¤ NSA Observer ::
  2163.  
  2164. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2165. _______________________________________
  2166. ¤ Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2167.  
  2168. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2169.  
  2170. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2171. _______________________________________
  2172. ¤ NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2173.  
  2174. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2175.  
  2176. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2177. _______________________________________
  2178. ¤ NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2179.  
  2180. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2181.  
  2182. 01 “MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010”
  2183.  
  2184. 02 “Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices”
  2185.  
  2186. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2187. _______________________________________
  2188. ¤ NSA’s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2189.  
  2190.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2191. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2192. Intercept — a new publication helmed by
  2193. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2194. NSA revelations last year — that the US military
  2195. and CIA use the NSA’s metadata analysis and
  2196. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2197. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2198. the ground.
  2199.  
  2200. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2201. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2202. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2203. _______________________________________
  2204. ¤ ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2205.  
  2206.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2207. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2208. shows that an American law firm was
  2209. monitored while representing a foreign
  2210. government in trade disputes with the
  2211. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2212. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2213. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2214. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2215. interest because lawyers in the United
  2216. States with clients overseas have
  2217. expressed growing concern that their
  2218. confidential communications could be
  2219. compromised by such surveillance.
  2220.  
  2221. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2222. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2223. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2224.  
  2225. NOBODY comments
  2226.  
  2227. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2228.  
  2229.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2230. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2231. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2232. _______________________________________
  2233. ¤ NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2234.  
  2235. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2236.  
  2237. ¤ NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2238.  
  2239. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2240. _______________________________________
  2241. ¤ Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2242.  
  2243. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2244. _______________________________________
  2245. ¤ Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder Allegedly
  2246. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2247.  
  2248.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2249. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2250. that Merkel’s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2251. was added to the NSA’s National Sigint
  2252. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2253.  
  2254. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2255. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2256. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2257.  
  2258. ¤ New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2259. the German Chancellor ::
  2260.  
  2261. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2262. _______________________________________
  2263. ¤ Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2264. Phone Call Spying ::
  2265.  
  2266. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2267.  
  2268. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2269. _______________________________________
  2270. ¤ First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2271.  
  2272. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2273. _______________________________________
  2274. ¤ Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2275.  
  2276. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2277. _______________________________________
  2278.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2279. Guardian’s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2280. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2281. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2282. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2283. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2284.  
  2285. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2286. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2287. ¤ CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2288.  
  2289. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2290.  
  2291. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2292.  
  2293. ¤ CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2294.  
  2295. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2296.  
  2297. ¤ CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2298.  
  2299.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2300. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2301. that Canada’s electronic spy agency used information
  2302. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2303. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2304. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2305. left the terminal.
  2306.  
  2307.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada’s
  2308. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2309. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2310. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2311. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2312.  
  2313.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2314. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2315. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2316. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2317.  
  2318.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2319. “game-changing,” and said they could be used for
  2320. tracking “any target that makes occasional forays
  2321. into other cities/regions.”
  2322.  
  2323. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2324.  
  2325.  CSEC concluded: “Can then take seeds from these
  2326. airports and repeat to cover whole world.”
  2327.  
  2328. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2329.  
  2330. ¤ More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2331.  
  2332. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2333.  
  2334. ¤ How Canada’s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2335.  
  2336. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2337. _______________________________________
  2338. ¤ NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2339.  
  2340. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2341.  
  2342. ¤ ... And Now It’s Personal ::
  2343.  
  2344. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2345. _______________________________________
  2346. ¤ GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2347.  
  2348.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2349. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2350. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  2351. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  2352. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  2353. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  2354. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  2355. information, for analysis. At the time the
  2356. documents were printed, they were also able to
  2357. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  2358.  
  2359.  Called “Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV”
  2360. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  2361. a section that spells out “Broad real-time
  2362. monitoring of online activity” of YouTube videos,
  2363. URLs “liked” on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  2364. visits. The monitoring program is called
  2365. “Squeaky Dolphin.”
  2366.  
  2367.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  2368. British had to have been either physically able
  2369. to tap the cables carrying the world’s web
  2370. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  2371. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  2372. and would be able to extract some key data
  2373. about specific users as well.
  2374.  
  2375. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  2376. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  2377. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  2378. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  2379. _______________________________________
  2380. ¤ NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  2381.  
  2382. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  2383. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  2384. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  2385.  
  2386. ¤ GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  2387.  
  2388.  “Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  2389. on the iPhone alone.”
  2390.  
  2391. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  2392.  
  2393. ¤ NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  2394.  
  2395. “Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.”
  2396.  
  2397. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  2398. _______________________________________
  2399. ¤ Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  2400.  
  2401.  The National Security Agency program that
  2402. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  2403. isn’t legal, a privacy review board said
  2404. Thursday in a newly released report.
  2405.  
  2406. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  2407.  
  2408.  “We have not identified a single instance
  2409. involving a threat to the United States in
  2410. which the program made a concrete difference
  2411. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  2412. investigation,” the board wrote in the
  2413. report released Thursday.
  2414.  
  2415.  Despite Obama’s promise to reform the NSA,
  2416. domestic spying will continue.
  2417.  
  2418. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  2419. _______________________________________
  2420. ¤ Snowden Speaks ::
  2421.  
  2422. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  2423. _______________________________________
  2424. ▼ Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story “Absurd” ::
  2425.  
  2426. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  2427.  
  2428. ▲ NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  2429.          ¯¯¯
  2430. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  2431.  
  2432. NOBODY’s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  2433.  
  2434.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  2435. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  2436. will come from peoples’ change of online use ;
  2437. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  2438. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  2439. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  2440. hardcopy backups rather than “the cloud” - and
  2441. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  2442. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  2443. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  2444. of users’ modems when not actually being used. The
  2445. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  2446. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  2447. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  2448. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  2449.  
  2450. Reform?
  2451.  
  2452.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  2453. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  2454. say “fuck the corporate platforms” and change it
  2455. whether legal or not?
  2456.  
  2457. The reform will come from people taking action.
  2458.  
  2459.  Here’s what I’d like to know - will “big government”
  2460. follow up reform with their “internet kill switch?”
  2461. _______________________________________
  2462. ¤ NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  2463.  
  2464. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  2465. _______________________________________
  2466. ¤ NSA’s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  2467.  
  2468.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  2469. three ways NSA is intercepting the world’s
  2470. main internet cables:
  2471.  
  2472.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  2473.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  2474.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  2475.  
  2476. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  2477. ---------------------------------------
  2478. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  2479. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  2480. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  2481. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  2482. _______________________________________
  2483. ¤ 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  2484.  
  2485. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  2486.  
  2487. ¤ FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  2488.  
  2489. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  2490. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  2491. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  2492. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  2493. ---------------------------------------
  2494. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  2495. _______________________________________
  2496. ¤ SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  2497.  
  2498. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  2499.  
  2500. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  2501.  
  2502. ¤ NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  2503.  
  2504.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  2505. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  2506. the metadata of “untargeted and unwarranted”
  2507. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  2508.  
  2509.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  2510. “pretty much everything it can”, according to
  2511. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  2512. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  2513.  
  2514.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  2515. text message database to extract information
  2516. on people’s travel plans, contact books, financial
  2517. transactions and more – including of individuals
  2518. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  2519.  
  2520. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  2521. _______________________________________
  2522. ¤ NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  2523.  
  2524. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  2525.  
  2526. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  2527.  
  2528.  The technology, which the agency has used
  2529. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  2530. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  2531. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  2532. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  2533. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  2534. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  2535. set up miles away from the target.
  2536.  
  2537.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  2538. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  2539. American intelligence agencies for years:
  2540. getting into computers that adversaries,
  2541. and some American partners, have tried to
  2542. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  2543. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  2544. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  2545. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  2546. ---------------------------------------
  2547. Refer to NSA’s Tailored Access Operations
  2548.  
  2549. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  2550. _______________________________________
  2551. ¤ NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  2552.  
  2553. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  2554. ---------------------------------------
  2555. ¤ Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  2556.  
  2557. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  2558. _______________________________________
  2559. ¤ NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  2560.  
  2561. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  2562. _______________________________________
  2563. ¤ NSA’s Organizational Designations ::
  2564.  
  2565. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  2566. _______________________________________
  2567. ¤ Analysis of NSA’s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  2568.  
  2569. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  2570. _______________________________________
  2571. ¤ John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  2572. of Internet Metadata Doesn’t Work ::
  2573.  
  2574. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  2575.  
  2576. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  2577. _______________________________________
  2578. ¤ Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  2579. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  2580.  
  2581. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  2582. _______________________________________
  2583. ¤ NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  2584. All Encryption ::
  2585.  
  2586.  In room-size metal boxes ­secure against
  2587. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  2588. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  2589. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  2590. used to protect banking, medical, business
  2591. and government records around the world.
  2592.  
  2593.  According to documents provided by former
  2594. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  2595. to build “a cryptologically useful quantum
  2596. computer” — a machine exponentially faster
  2597. than classical computers — is part of a
  2598. $79.7 million research program titled
  2599. “Penetrating Hard Targets.” Much of the
  2600. work is hosted under classified contracts
  2601. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  2602.  
  2603. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  2604. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  2605. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  2606. _______________________________________
  2607. ¤ NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  2608.  
  2609. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  2610. _______________________________________
  2611. ¤ Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  2612.  
  2613. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  2614. _______________________________________
  2615. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  2616.  
  2617. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  2618.  
  2619. Mirror » http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  2620.  
  2621. ¤ Jacob’s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  2622.  
  2623. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  2624.  
  2625. ¤ NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  2626.  
  2627. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  2628. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  2629. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  2630.  
  2631. ¤ Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  2632.  
  2633.  The NSA’s TAO hacking unit is considered
  2634. to be the intelligence agency’s top secret
  2635. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  2636. infiltrates computers around the world and
  2637. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  2638. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  2639. it is targeting. ... ...
  2640.  
  2641. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  2642.  
  2643.  The insert method and other variants of
  2644. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  2645. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  2646. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  2647. infrastructure comprised of “covert”
  2648. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  2649. also incorporates routers and servers
  2650. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  2651. network by infecting these networks with
  2652. “implants” that then allow the government
  2653. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  2654.  
  2655.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  2656. to identify and track its targets based on
  2657. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  2658. could include certain email addresses or
  2659. website cookies set on a person’s computer.
  2660. Of course, a cookie doesn’t automatically
  2661. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  2662. additional information like an email address.
  2663. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  2664. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  2665. ---------------------------------------
  2666. ¤ NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  2667.  
  2668. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  2669.  
  2670. ¤ NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  2671.  
  2672.  “YahooBcookie’s are unique to a specific
  2673. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  2674. that are being logged into on that computer
  2675. as long as the user does not clear browser
  2676. cookies.”
  2677.  
  2678. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  2679.  
  2680. ¤ NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  2681.  
  2682. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  2683. ---------------------------------------
  2684. ¤ NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  2685.  
  2686.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  2687. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  2688. could be described as master carpenters for
  2689. the NSA’s department for Tailored Access
  2690. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual
  2691. hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice,
  2692. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  2693. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  2694. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  2695. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  2696. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  2697. considerable role in the intelligence agency’s
  2698. ability to establish a global covert network
  2699. that operates alongside the Internet.
  2700.  
  2701.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  2702. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  2703. allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  2704. on the targeted monitor,” for example, is
  2705. available for just $30. But an “active GSM
  2706. base station” -- a tool that makes it possible
  2707. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  2708. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  2709. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  2710. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  2711. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  2712. over $1 million.
  2713.  
  2714.  The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture
  2715. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  2716. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  2717. clear preference for planting their malicious
  2718. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  2719. computer’s motherboard that is the first thing
  2720. to load when a computer is turned on.
  2721.  
  2722.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  2723. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  2724. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  2725. to virus protection and other security programs.
  2726. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  2727. computer has been completely erased and a new
  2728. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  2729. can continue to function and ensures that new
  2730. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  2731. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  2732. developers call this “Persistence” and believe
  2733. this approach has provided them with the
  2734. possibility of permanent access.
  2735.  
  2736.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  2737. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  2738. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  2739. with the exception of latter, are American
  2740. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  2741. intelligence agency is compromising the
  2742. technology and products of American companies.
  2743.  
  2744. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  2745. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  2746. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  2747. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  2748. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  2749.  
  2750. ¤ NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  2751.  
  2752. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  2753.  
  2754. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  2755.  
  2756. ¤ NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  2757.  
  2758. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  2759.  
  2760. ¤ NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  2761.  
  2762. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  2763.  
  2764. ¤ NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  2765.  
  2766. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  2767.  
  2768. ¤ NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  2769.  
  2770. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  2771.  
  2772. ¤ NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  2773.  
  2774. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  2775.  
  2776. ¤ NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  2777.  
  2778. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  2779.  
  2780. ¤ NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  2781.  
  2782. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  2783.  
  2784. ¤ NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  2785.  
  2786. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  2787.  
  2788. ¤ NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  2789.  
  2790. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  2791.  
  2792. ¤ NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  2793.  
  2794. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  2795.  
  2796. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  2797.  
  2798. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  2799.  
  2800. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  2801. ---------------------------------------
  2802. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  2803.  
  2804. ¤ IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  2805.  
  2806. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  2807.  
  2808. ¤ Foreign Firms Won’t Buy American Tech ::
  2809.  
  2810. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  2811. ---------------------------------------
  2812. ¤ Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  2813.  
  2814. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  2815.  
  2816. ¤ Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  2817.  
  2818.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  2819. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  2820. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  2821.  
  2822. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  2823.  
  2824. ¤ Cyber–Security Experts Ask If Apple “Flaw”
  2825. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  2826.  
  2827.  Following an admission by Apple that a “bug”
  2828. in its operating system had left devices open
  2829. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  2830. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  2831. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  2832. of its mass spying program.
  2833.  
  2834. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  2835. ---------------------------------------
  2836. ¤ Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  2837. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  2838.  
  2839. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  2840.  
  2841. ¤ Dell Inc. Apologizes for the ‘Inconvenience’
  2842. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  2843.  
  2844. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  2845.  
  2846. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  2847.  
  2848. ¤ Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  2849.  
  2850.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  2851. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  2852.  
  2853. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  2854. _______________________________________
  2855. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  2856.  
  2857. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  2858.  
  2859. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  2860.  
  2861. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  2862. _______________________________________
  2863. ¤ Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  2864.  
  2865. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  2866.  
  2867.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  2868. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  2869. in the NSA’s Technology Directorate and
  2870. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  2871. Center’s regional base in Hawaii. For
  2872. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  2873. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  2874. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  2875. color-coded “heat maps” to depict the
  2876. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  2877.  
  2878.  His colleagues were often “astonished to
  2879. learn we are collecting more in the United
  2880. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  2881. in Russia,” he said. Many of them were
  2882. troubled, he said, and several said they
  2883. did not want to know any more.
  2884. ---------------------------------------
  2885. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  2886.  
  2887. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  2888. _______________________________________
  2889. ¤ New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  2890. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  2891.  
  2892. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  2893. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  2894. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  2895. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  2896. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  2897. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  2898. ¤ Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  2899. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  2900.  
  2901. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  2902.  
  2903.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  2904. National Security Agency program which
  2905. collects information on nearly all telephone
  2906. calls made to, from or within the United
  2907. States is likely unconstitutional.
  2908.  
  2909.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  2910. that the program appears to violate the
  2911. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  2912. searches and seizures. He also said the
  2913. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  2914. that collecting the information had helped
  2915. to head off terrorist attacks.
  2916.  
  2917.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  2918. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  2919. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  2920. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  2921. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  2922. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  2923. the order to allow for an appeal.
  2924.  
  2925. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  2926. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  2927.  
  2928.  Leon’s 68-page opinion is the first
  2929. significant legal setback for the NSA’s
  2930. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  2931. in June in news stories based on leaks
  2932. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  2933. For seven years, the metadata program has
  2934. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  2935. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  2936. Court and found constitutional by at least
  2937. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  2938.  
  2939. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  2940.  
  2941. ¤ Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  2942.  
  2943. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  2944.  
  2945. ▼ Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  2946.  
  2947. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  2948.  
  2949. ▲ White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  2950. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  2951.  
  2952. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  2953.  
  2954. ¤ Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  2955.  
  2956. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  2957. ---------------------------------------
  2958. ¤ White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  2959.  
  2960. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  2961.  
  2962. ¤ White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  2963.  
  2964. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  2965. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  2966.  
  2967. ¤ Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  2968. Spying Programs ::
  2969.  
  2970. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  2971. ---------------------------------------
  2972. ▼ FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  2973. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  2974.  
  2975. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  2976.  
  2977. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  2978.  
  2979. ▲ Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  2980. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  2981.  
  2982. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  2983.  
  2984. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  2985. _______________________________________
  2986. ¤ NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  2987.  
  2988.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  2989. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  2990. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  2991.  
  2992. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  2993.  
  2994. “ 1B. Ability to exploit:
  2995.  
  2996.  - Military Information
  2997.  - Economic Information
  2998.  - Information Operations Information
  2999.  - Political Information ”
  3000. _______________________________________
  3001. ¤ Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3002. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3003.  
  3004. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3005. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3006. ¤ NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3007.  
  3008. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3009.  
  3010. ¤ RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3011.  
  3012. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3013.  
  3014. ¤ NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3015.  
  3016. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3017.  
  3018. ¤ List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3019.  
  3020. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3021.  
  3022. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3023.  
  3024. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3025. _______________________________________
  3026. ¤ Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3027. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3028.  
  3029.  In a paper titled ‘The Internet Dark Age’
  3030. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3031. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3032. government access in order to make network
  3033. compromise easier. “BT are directly responsible
  3034. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3035. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3036. the UK,” the paper states.
  3037.  
  3038.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3039. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3040. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3041. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3042. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3043. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3044. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3045. a second IP address for management, except
  3046. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3047. assigned to the United States Department
  3048. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3049. of speculation that this is actually a
  3050. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3051. they can secretly monitor and control
  3052. peoples’ home networks.
  3053.  
  3054.  Maybe, but it’s probably not the case.
  3055. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3056. chose this address space because it’s
  3057. non-routable. While it’s assigned public
  3058. address, it’s only used inside the private
  3059. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3060. that address space, you’ll see that your
  3061. packets go nowhere.
  3062.  
  3063. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3064. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3065. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3066.  
  3067. ¤ Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3068.  
  3069.  “Yes, it’s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3070. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3071. No, BT wasn’t always happy with my writings
  3072. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3073. independent thinker and didn’t try to
  3074. muzzle me in any way. I’m just ready to
  3075. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3076. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3077. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3078. It’s past time for something new.”
  3079.  
  3080. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3081. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3082. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3083. ---------------------------------------
  3084. ¤ NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3085.  
  3086.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3087. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3088. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3089. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3090. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3091. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3092.  
  3093.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3094. explains how the NSA collects information
  3095. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3096. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3097. ‘Computer Network Exploitation’ (CNE) in
  3098. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3099. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3100. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3101. software.
  3102.  
  3103.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3104. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3105. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3106. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ –
  3107. has been installing this malicious software
  3108. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3109. their customers’ telephone and data traffic.
  3110. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3111. through a process of luring employees to a
  3112. false Linkedin page.
  3113.  
  3114. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3115. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3116. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3117. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3118.  
  3119. ¤ NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3120.  
  3121.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3122. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3123. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3124. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3125. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3126. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3127. and citizens.
  3128.  
  3129.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3130. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3131. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3132. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3133. the nettle, and all those making money
  3134. from this deception operation decide to
  3135. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3136.  
  3137.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3138. lists, those participating in standards
  3139. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3140. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3141. those in law firms and public interest
  3142. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3143. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3144. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3145. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3146. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3147. diminish Snowden’s revelations with new
  3148. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3149. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3150. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3151. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3152. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3153. fulfilled.
  3154.  
  3155. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3156.  
  3157. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3158.  
  3159. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  3160.  
  3161. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3162. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3163. ¤ GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3164. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3165.  
  3166. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3167. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3168. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3169. _______________________________________
  3170. ¤ CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3171.  
  3172. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3173.  
  3174. ¤ CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3175.  
  3176. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3177.  
  3178. ¤ NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3179.  
  3180. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3181. _______________________________________
  3182. ¤ Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3183.  
  3184. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3185. _______________________________________
  3186. ¤ EU Data Retention Directive “Unlawful”
  3187. and “Incompatible” with Charter of Rights ::
  3188.  
  3189. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3190.  
  3191. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3192. _______________________________________
  3193. ¤ GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3194.  
  3195. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3196. _______________________________________
  3197. ¤ Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3198. of Public Concerns ::
  3199.  
  3200. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3201.  
  3202. ¤ Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3203.  
  3204. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3205. _______________________________________
  3206. ¤ GCHQ’s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3207.  
  3208.  “FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3209. analysts to query GCHQ’s vast repository
  3210. of metadata about the world’s secure
  3211. communications over TLS/SSL. It’s
  3212. certainly not a program through which
  3213. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3214. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3215. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3216. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3217. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3218. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3219. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3220. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3221. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3222. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3223. That’s not to say the GCHQ doesn’t perform
  3224. MITM attacks, but there’s no evidence to
  3225. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3226. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3227. by providing information about a target.”
  3228.  
  3229. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3230.  
  3231. ¤ NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3232.  
  3233. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3234. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3235. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3236. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3237. ¤ John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3238.  
  3239. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3240.  
  3241. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3242. _______________________________________
  3243. ¤ FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3244.  
  3245. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3246. ---------------------------------------
  3247. ¤ hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3248.  
  3249. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3250.  
  3251.  HDFS stands for “Hadoop Distributed File
  3252. System” which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3253. and later managed by big data corporations
  3254. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3255.  
  3256.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3257. large files across machines in a large
  3258. cluster.
  3259.  
  3260. ¤ Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3261.  
  3262.  “Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3263. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3264. data analysis.” ... “Largest install is at
  3265. Yahoo, a major contributor.”
  3266.  
  3267.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3268. major components, a central metadata server
  3269. and file servers from data.
  3270.  
  3271. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3272.  
  3273. ¤ Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3274.  
  3275.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3276. posted on public domain.
  3277.  
  3278. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3279.  
  3280. ¤ Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3281. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3282.  
  3283. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3284. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3285. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3286.  
  3287. ¤ hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3288.  
  3289. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3290. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3291. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3292. ---------------------------------------
  3293. ¤ CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3294. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3295.  
  3296. “Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.”
  3297.  
  3298. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3299.  
  3300. ¤ CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3301.  
  3302. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3303.  
  3304. ¤ NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3305.  
  3306. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3307.  
  3308. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  3309.  
  3310. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3311.  
  3312. ¤ NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3313.  
  3314.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3315. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3316. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3317. content of all our communications have
  3318. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3319. program since the 1990s.
  3320.  
  3321.  The new details concern how, “The National
  3322. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3323. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3324. of cellphones around the world.”
  3325.  
  3326.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3327. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3328. peddling when it claims that, “The NSA
  3329. does not target Americans’ location data
  3330. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3331. substantial amount of information on
  3332. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3333. “incidentally.”
  3334.  
  3335.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3336. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3337. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3338. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3339. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3340. damage control by the establishment.
  3341.  
  3342. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3343. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3344. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3345. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3346. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3347. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3348. ---------------------------------------
  3349. ¤ NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3350. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  3351.  
  3352.  The National Security Agency is ‘secretly’
  3353. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  3354. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  3355. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  3356. targets for government hacking and to
  3357. bolster surveillance.
  3358.  
  3359. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  3360. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  3361. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  3362. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  3363. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  3364. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  3365. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  3366. ---------------------------------------
  3367. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google’s Cookie ::
  3368.  
  3369. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  3370. ---------------------------------------
  3371. ¤ How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  3372. In a World Without Cookies ::
  3373.  
  3374. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  3375. _______________________________________
  3376. ¤ How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  3377.  
  3378. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  3379. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  3380. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  3381.  
  3382. ¤ SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  3383.  
  3384. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  3385. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  3386. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  3387. _______________________________________
  3388. ¤ Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  3389. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  3390.  
  3391. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  3392. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  3393. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  3394. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  3395. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  3396. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  3397.  
  3398. ¤ NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  3399.  
  3400. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  3401.  
  3402. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship Was “Top Secret” ::
  3403.  
  3404. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  3405.  
  3406. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  3407.  
  3408. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship “Actively Engaged” ::
  3409.  
  3410. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  3411.  
  3412. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  3413.  
  3414. ¤ NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  3415.  
  3416. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  3417.  
  3418. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  3419.  
  3420. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  3421. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  3422. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  3423.  
  3424. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  3425.  
  3426. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  3427. ---------------------------------------
  3428. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  3429.  
  3430. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  3431. ---------------------------------------
  3432. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  3433.  
  3434. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  3435.  
  3436. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  3437.  
  3438. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  3439.  
  3440. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  3441.  
  3442. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  3443.  
  3444. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  3445.  
  3446. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  3447. _______________________________________
  3448.  “Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  3449. worldwide was published by the German
  3450. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  3451. map was put online by accident, but before
  3452. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  3453. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  3454. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  3455. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  3456. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  3457. the names of all other cities were blurred
  3458. by Der Spiegel.”
  3459.  
  3460.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  3461.  
  3462. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  3463.  
  3464. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  3465.  
  3466. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  3467.  
  3468. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  3469.  
  3470. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  3471.  
  3472. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  3473. ---------------------------------------
  3474. ¤ Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  3475.  
  3476. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  3477.  
  3478. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  3479. _______________________________________
  3480. ¤ Five Eyes ::
  3481.  
  3482. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  3483. _______________________________________
  3484. ¤ A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  3485.  
  3486. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  3487. _______________________________________
  3488. ¤ PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  3489. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  3490.  
  3491. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  3492.  
  3493. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  3494. _______________________________________
  3495. ¤ NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  3496.  
  3497. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  3498.  
  3499. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  3500. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  3501. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  3502. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  3503. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  3504. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  3505. _______________________________________
  3506. ¤ Rollingstone Describes NSA’s Influx of Money ::
  3507.  
  3508.  September 11th, which also happened to
  3509. be Drake’s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  3510. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  3511. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  3512. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  3513. “unchained itself from the Constitution,”
  3514. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  3515. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  3516. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  3517. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  3518. itself.
  3519.  
  3520.  “Massive amounts of money were pumped
  3521. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  3522. saying, ‘How big do you want the check?’”
  3523. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  3524. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  3525. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  3526. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  3527. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  3528. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  3529. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  3530. where the NSA’s sprawling 5,000-acre
  3531. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  3532. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  3533. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  3534. its workforce by one-third, to about
  3535. 33,000. The number of private companies
  3536. it depended upon more than tripled during
  3537. that time.
  3538.  
  3539.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  3540. and the increasing reliance on the private
  3541. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  3542. the very heart of America’s intelligence
  3543. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  3544. contractors. “Essentially, 9/11 was a
  3545. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  3546. you needed for the party was your clearance,”
  3547. says Drake. “And tons of people were
  3548. getting those clearances. So you had
  3549. this huge apparatus being built, and
  3550. the government was just managing it.
  3551. And in some cases, they weren’t even
  3552. doing that.” ... ...
  3553.  
  3554.  By the time Snowden joined the agency’s
  3555. workforce, the surveillance he would
  3556. later expose was becoming not just
  3557. institutionalized but very big business.
  3558. “It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  3559. the full flower of that massive, massive
  3560. bubble of money,” says Drake. “And people
  3561. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  3562. could go.” ... ...
  3563.  
  3564.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  3565. leaking government secrets when he was
  3566. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  3567. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  3568. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  3569. system. His optimism didn’t last long.
  3570. “I watched as Obama advanced the very
  3571. policies that I thought would be reined
  3572. in,” he later said. As a result, he added,
  3573. “I got hardened.” The more Snowden saw of
  3574. the NSA’s actual business – and, particularly,
  3575. the more he read “true information,”
  3576. including a 2009 Inspector General’s report
  3577. detailing the Bush era’s warrantless-
  3578. surveillance program – the more he realized
  3579. that there were actually two governments:
  3580. the one that was elected, and the other,
  3581. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  3582. “If the highest officials in government
  3583. can break the law without fearing punishment
  3584. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  3585. powers become tremendously dangerous.”
  3586.  
  3587. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  3588. _______________________________________
  3589. ¤ Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  3590.  
  3591. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  3592. _______________________________________
  3593. ¤ Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  3594.  
  3595. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  3596. _______________________________________
  3597. ¤ Snowden Leaks “Greatest Intelligence
  3598. Failure Since World War 2” Exaggerated ::
  3599.  
  3600.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  3601. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  3602. press claim he stole “up to 20,000.” British
  3603. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  3604. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  3605. is the “greatest intelligence failure since
  3606. World War 2.” High officials and ex-spies
  3607. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  3608. in terrorism.
  3609.  
  3610.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  3611. to exaggerate Snowden’s damage, of betrayal
  3612. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  3613. threatening national security. It is
  3614. successfully restricting release of the
  3615. Snowden material and will likely become
  3616. more forceful as releases continue to the
  3617. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  3618. to criminalize release as a national
  3619. security threat.
  3620.  
  3621. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  3622. _______________________________________
  3623. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  3624.  
  3625.  Includes most reports, slides and
  3626. documents all related to the recent
  3627. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  3628. 4th of 2013. I’m still collecting
  3629. any information that comes out and
  3630. will provide updated archives from
  3631. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  3632.  
  3633.  After decompression - the folder is
  3634. titled “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and
  3635. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  3636.  
  3637. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3638. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  3639.  
  3640. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  3641. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  3642. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  3643. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3644. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3645. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  3646. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  3647. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3648. _______________________________________
  3649. ¤ indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  3650.  
  3651. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3652. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3653. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3654.  
  3655. ¤ Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  3656. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  3657.  
  3658.  Australia’s intelligence apparatus mines
  3659. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  3660. Australians, and hands over the material
  3661. to the US and its closest allies, according
  3662. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  3663. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  3664. Australia web site.
  3665.  
  3666.  The document obtained by the former US
  3667. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  3668. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  3669. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  3670. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  3671. as well as the people and governments of
  3672. many Asian countries.
  3673.  
  3674.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  3675. restricting the ASD’s internal spying,
  3676. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  3677. global partners so-called metadata of
  3678. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  3679. address books and social media posts of
  3680. millions of people.
  3681.  
  3682.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  3683. the recent revelations, also from documents
  3684. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  3685. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  3686. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  3687. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  3688. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  3689. operate as electronic listening posts
  3690. for the US-led spying network.
  3691.  
  3692. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  3693. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  3694. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  3695. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  3696. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  3697. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  3698.  
  3699. ¤ Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  3700. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  3701.  
  3702.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s
  3703. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  3704. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  3705. political figures has been furiously
  3706. denounced by other media outlets for
  3707. breaching “national security” and the
  3708. “national interest.” The reaction
  3709. underscores the extent to which the
  3710. media establishment has been integrated
  3711. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  3712.  
  3713.  On November 18, after being approached
  3714. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  3715. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  3716. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  3717. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  3718. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  3719. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  3720. senior political figures. The report
  3721. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  3722. crisis for the Australian government, with
  3723. the Indonesian president suspending military
  3724. and intelligence cooperation.
  3725.  
  3726. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  3727. _______________________________________
  3728. ¤ NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  3729.  
  3730.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  3731. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  3732. Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s dictatorship
  3733. allowed the largest American spy agency
  3734. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  3735. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  3736.  
  3737.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  3738. by CBC News.
  3739.  
  3740.  The briefing notes, stamped “Top Secret,”
  3741. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  3742. a security command post during a six-day
  3743. spying operation by the National Security
  3744. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  3745. other foreign heads of government were on
  3746. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  3747.  
  3748.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  3749. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  3750.  
  3751.  The world was still struggling to climb
  3752. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  3753. were debating a wide array of possible
  3754. measures including a global tax on banks,
  3755. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  3756. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  3757. eventually scotched.
  3758.  
  3759. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  3760. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  3761. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  3762. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  3763. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  3764.  
  3765. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  3766. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  3767.  
  3768. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  3769.  
  3770.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  3771. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  3772.  
  3773. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  3774.  
  3775. ¤ Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  3776.  
  3777. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  3778.  
  3779. ¤ Ministério de Minas e Energia está na
  3780. mira de espiões americanos e canadenses ::
  3781.  
  3782. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  3783.  
  3784. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  3785.  
  3786. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  3787.  
  3788. ¤ American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  3789. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  3790.  
  3791. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  3792.  
  3793. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  3794.  
  3795.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  3796. believe that they have only “moved on” from discussing
  3797. CSEC’s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  3798. to worry about.
  3799.  
  3800.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  3801. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  3802. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  3803. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC’s
  3804. staff—it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  3805. military personnel assist its work—give an inkling of the
  3806. scale of its activities.
  3807.  
  3808.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  3809. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  3810. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  3811. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  3812. Of especial importance is the CSEC’s partnership with the NSA.
  3813. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  3814. the two organizations “have integrated personnel” i.e. swap
  3815. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  3816. Internet surveillance programs.
  3817.  
  3818.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  3819. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  3820. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  3821. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  3822. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  3823. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates’
  3824. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  3825.  
  3826. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  3827.  
  3828. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  3829.  
  3830. ¤ NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  3831.  
  3832. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  3833. _______________________________________
  3834. ¤ EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  3835.  
  3836. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  3837.  
  3838. ¤ EU Hearings On NSA ::
  3839.  
  3840. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  3841. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  3842. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  3843.  
  3844. ¤ EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  3845.  
  3846. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  3847.  
  3848. ¤ EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  3849.  
  3850. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  3851. _______________________________________
  3852.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  3853. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would –
  3854. in theory – forbid local governments from
  3855. providing services to federal agencies
  3856. that collect electronic data from Americans
  3857. without a personalized warrant.
  3858.  
  3859.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  3860. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  3861. but at least one legislator has committed
  3862. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  3863. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  3864. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  3865. is introduced.
  3866.  
  3867.  “We are still very early in the campaign,
  3868. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  3869. long-term strategy,” says Maharrey, whose
  3870. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  3871. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  3872. and a handful of other groups.
  3873.  
  3874.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  3875. Maharrey adds.
  3876.  
  3877. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  3878. _______________________________________
  3879. ¤ Guardian’s Reporters Face Threats and
  3880. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  3881.  
  3882.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  3883. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  3884. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  3885. US and British intelligence — particularly
  3886. their cooperation in data collection and
  3887. snooping programs involving British citizens
  3888. and close allies on the European continent.
  3889.  
  3890.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  3891. to account by British authorities for
  3892. jeopardizing national security. The
  3893. Guardian’s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  3894. is being forced to appear before a
  3895. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  3896. the news outlet’s actions.
  3897.  
  3898. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3899. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  3900. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  3901.  
  3902. ¤ Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  3903.  
  3904. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3905.  
  3906. ¤ US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  3907. as the British Dictatorship ::
  3908.  
  3909.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  3910. published Edward Snowden’s leaks, was
  3911. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  3912. shining light on the NSA’s abuse of power.
  3913. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  3914. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  3915. seems the United States is reaching the event
  3916. horizon to a police state.
  3917.  
  3918. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  3919.  
  3920. Cryptome noted
  3921.  
  3922.  “There have been no reports of leakage
  3923. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  3924. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  3925. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  3926. UKG), although there could be some which have
  3927. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  3928. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  3929.  
  3930.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  3931. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  3932. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  3933. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  3934. deception, co-optation.
  3935.  
  3936.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  3937. had access, or suspected of access, are
  3938. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  3939. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  3940. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  3941. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  3942. standard coercive means of authorities.
  3943.  
  3944.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  3945. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  3946. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  3947. advised successive cooperators, usually
  3948. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  3949. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  3950. participation.
  3951.  
  3952.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  3953. disputes and disagreements among competing
  3954. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  3955. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  3956. along with threats against families, friends
  3957. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  3958. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  3959. with authorities, including use of rewards
  3960. -- monetary and career -- for informants.”
  3961.  
  3962. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  3963. _______________________________________
  3964. ¤ NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  3965.  
  3966. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  3967. _______________________________________
  3968. ¤ Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  3969. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  3970. Governments ::
  3971.  
  3972. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  3973. _______________________________________
  3974. ¤ NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  3975. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  3976.  
  3977. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  3978. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  3979. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  3980. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  3981. _______________________________________
  3982. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  3983.  
  3984. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  3985.  
  3986. ¤ What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  3987.  
  3988. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  3989.  
  3990. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  3991.  
  3992. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  3993.  
  3994. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  3995.  
  3996. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  3997.  
  3998. ¤ NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  3999.  
  4000. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4001.  
  4002. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4003.  
  4004. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4005.  
  4006. ¤ NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4007.  
  4008. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4009.  
  4010. ¤ NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4011.  
  4012. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4013.  
  4014. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4015. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4016.  
  4017.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4018. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4019. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4020. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4021.  
  4022.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4023. servers around the world, reducing the
  4024. chance of losing your information should
  4025. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4026. with these firms, the data sent between
  4027. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4028. it difficult to snoop – but the internal
  4029. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4030. And because many of the transfers take place
  4031. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4032. isn’t required to tap the information.
  4033.  
  4034.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4035. broken into the main communications links
  4036. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4037. around the world, according to documents
  4038. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4039. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4040. officials.
  4041.  
  4042.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4043. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4044. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4045. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4046. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4047. but it keeps a lot.
  4048.  
  4049.  The NSA’s principal tool to exploit the
  4050. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4051. operated jointly with the agency’s British
  4052. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4053. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4054. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4055. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4056. that carry information among the data
  4057. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4058.  
  4059. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4060. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4061. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4062. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4063. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4064.  
  4065. ¤ NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4066.  
  4067.  In June, President Obama said the NSA’s
  4068. email collecting program “does not apply
  4069. to US citizens.”
  4070.  
  4071.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4072. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4073. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4074. accounts around the world, many of them
  4075. belonging to Americans, according to
  4076. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4077. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4078. Edward Snowden.
  4079.  
  4080.  The collection program, which has not
  4081. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4082. address books and “buddy lists” from
  4083. instant messaging services as they move
  4084. across global data links. Online services
  4085. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4086. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4087. a computer or mobile device with information
  4088. stored on remote servers.
  4089.  
  4090. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4091. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4092. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4093.  
  4094. ¤ Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4095.  
  4096. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4097.  
  4098. ¤ NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4099.  
  4100. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4101. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4102. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4103. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4104. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4105. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4106. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant ::
  4107.  
  4108. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4109.  
  4110. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Collected
  4111. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4112.  
  4113. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4114.  
  4115. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4116.  
  4117. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4118.  
  4119. ¤ Guardian’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4120.  
  4121. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4122.  
  4123. ¤ Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4124.  
  4125. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4126.  
  4127. ¤ Three Boundless Informant “Heatmaps” ::
  4128.  
  4129. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4130.  
  4131. ¤ NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4132.  
  4133. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4134.  
  4135. ¤ US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4136.  
  4137. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4138. ---------------------------------------
  4139. NOBODY comments ▼
  4140.  
  4141.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant document
  4142. differs from the Guardians.
  4143.  
  4144. Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4145.  
  4146. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4147.  
  4148. Guardians’ Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4149.  
  4150. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4151.  
  4152.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4153. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4154. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4155.  
  4156.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant graph
  4157. shows the “aggregate” estimate, both
  4158. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4159. interception ; while the Guardian’s graph
  4160. only shows the digital “DNI” estimate.
  4161. ---------------------------------------
  4162. ¤ DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4163.  
  4164. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4165.  
  4166. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4167.  
  4168.  This was written from a person who purports
  4169. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4170.  
  4171. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4172.  
  4173. ¤ RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4174.  
  4175. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4176.  
  4177. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4178. Misleading ::
  4179.  
  4180. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4181.  
  4182. ¤ DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4183. on NSA Spying ::
  4184.  
  4185. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4186.  
  4187.  “Recent articles published in the
  4188. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4189. inaccurate and misleading information
  4190. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4191. activities. The allegation that the
  4192. National Security Agency collected more
  4193. than 70 million “recordings of French
  4194. citizens’ telephone data” is false.
  4195.  
  4196.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4197. details of our activities, we have
  4198. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4199. United States gathers intelligence of
  4200. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4201. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4202. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4203. from, among other things, threats such
  4204. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4205. weapons of mass destruction.
  4206.  
  4207.  The United States values our longstanding
  4208. friendship and alliance with France and
  4209. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4210. and intelligence matters going forward.”
  4211.  
  4212. James R. Clapper
  4213. Director of National Intelligence
  4214. ---------------------------------------
  4215. ¤ Snowden Responds to Feinstein’s Stupidity ::
  4216.  
  4217. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4218.  
  4219.  “Today, no telephone in America makes
  4220. a call without leaving a record with the
  4221. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4222. or leaves America without passing through
  4223. the NSA’s hands,” Snowden said in a
  4224. statement Thursday.
  4225.  
  4226.  “Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4227. this is not surveillance. They’re wrong.”
  4228. _______________________________________
  4229. ¤ US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4230. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4231.  
  4232.  US and British intelligence officials
  4233. say they are concerned about a “doomsday”
  4234. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4235. encrypted materials they believe former
  4236. National Security Agency contractor
  4237. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4238.  
  4239.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4240. as an “insurance policy” for Snowden
  4241. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4242. other harm. ... ...
  4243.  
  4244.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4245. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4246. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4247. that “if anything happens at all to
  4248. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4249. to get access to the full archives.”
  4250.  
  4251. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4252. _______________________________________
  4253. ¤ (Go Figure) Obama’s “Overhaul” of Spy
  4254. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4255.  
  4256.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4257. government surveillance policies. But he
  4258. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4259. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4260. world leaders? He won’t say. Has he stopped
  4261. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4262. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4263. Fund? He won’t say.
  4264.  
  4265.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4266. to review and recommend changes to his
  4267. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4268.  
  4269. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4270. _______________________________________
  4271. ¤ NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4272.  
  4273.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4274. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4275. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4276. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4277. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4278.  
  4279.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4280. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4281. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4282. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4283. surveillance in what it cited as “the golden
  4284. age of Sigint,” or signals intelligence.
  4285. “The interpretation and guidelines for
  4286. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4287. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4288. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4289. and target environments, or the operational
  4290. expectations levied on NSA’s mission,” the
  4291. document concluded.
  4292.  
  4293. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4294. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4295. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4296. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4297. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4298.  
  4299. ¤ NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4300.  
  4301.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4302. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4303. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4304. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4305. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4306. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4307.  
  4308. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4309. _______________________________________
  4310. ¤ Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4311.  
  4312. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4313. _______________________________________
  4314. ¤ GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4315.  
  4316. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4317.  
  4318. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4319.  
  4320. ¤ GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4321.  
  4322.  Britain’s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4323. diplomats’ travels using a sophisticated
  4324. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4325. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4326. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4327.  
  4328. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4329. _______________________________________
  4330. ¤ Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4331.  
  4332.  “We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4333. collection of solely domestic communications
  4334. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4335. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4336. request each week until we receive your
  4337. response,” EPIC said.
  4338.  
  4339.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4340. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4341. EPIC’s plea. A document began circulating
  4342. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4343. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4344. as denied.
  4345.  
  4346. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4347.  
  4348. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4349. _______________________________________
  4350. ¤ NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  4351.  
  4352. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  4353.  
  4354. ¤ Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  4355. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  4356.  
  4357. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  4358.  
  4359. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  4360.  
  4361. ¤ Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  4362. No Privacy ::
  4363.  
  4364. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  4365.  
  4366. ¤ Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  4367. Spying Programs ::
  4368.  
  4369. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  4370.  
  4371. ¤ John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  4372.  
  4373. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  4374.  
  4375. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  4376. _______________________________________
  4377. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Brief ::
  4378.  
  4379. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4380.  
  4381. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  4382.  
  4383. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Guide ::
  4384.  
  4385. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4386.  
  4387. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  4388.  
  4389. ¤ NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  4390.  
  4391. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  4392.  
  4393.  “(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  4394. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  4395. or indigenous cryptographic information
  4396. security devices or systems in order to
  4397. make them exploitable.”
  4398.  
  4399. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  4400.  
  4401.  “(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  4402. successfully exploits cryptographic
  4403. components of commercial information
  4404. security devices or systems when the
  4405. device or system specified.”
  4406.  
  4407. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4408.  
  4409. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  4410.  
  4411. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  4412.  
  4413. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4414. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4415. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  4416.  
  4417. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  4418.  
  4419.  US and British intelligence agencies
  4420. have successfully cracked much of the
  4421. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  4422. of millions of people to protect the
  4423. privacy of their personal data, online
  4424. transactions and emails, according to
  4425. top-secret documents revealed by former
  4426. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  4427.  
  4428.  Those methods include covert measures
  4429. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  4430. international encryption standards, the
  4431. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  4432. with “brute force”, and – the most closely
  4433. guarded secret of all – collaboration with
  4434. technology companies and internet service
  4435. providers themselves.
  4436.  
  4437.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  4438. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  4439. – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into
  4440. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  4441.  
  4442.  Independent security experts have long
  4443. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  4444. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  4445. confirmed for the first time by another
  4446. secret document. It shows the agency
  4447. worked covertly to get its own version
  4448. of a draft security standard issued by
  4449. the US National Institute of Standards
  4450. and Technology approved for worldwide
  4451. use in 2006.
  4452.  
  4453. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  4454.  
  4455. ¤ Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  4456.  
  4457. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4458.  
  4459. ¤ Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  4460.  
  4461. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  4462.  
  4463. ¤ Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  4464.  
  4465. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4466.  
  4467. ¤ Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4468.  
  4469. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  4470. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  4471. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  4472.  
  4473. ¤ Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4474.  
  4475. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  4476. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  4477.  
  4478. ¤ DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4479.  
  4480. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  4481.  
  4482. ¤ Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  4483.  
  4484. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  4485.  
  4486. ¤ Documents Confirm “Back Doors” Inserted
  4487. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  4488.  
  4489. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  4490.  
  4491. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  4492.  
  4493.  A range of US hardware and software
  4494. companies are in danger of being dragged
  4495. into the widening scandal over internet
  4496. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  4497. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  4498. Security Agency contractor.
  4499.  
  4500.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  4501. that it has collaborated with technology
  4502. companies to plant “back doors” into
  4503. their systems – or ways for the agency
  4504. secretly to penetrate systems without
  4505. the users’ knowledge.
  4506.  
  4507. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  4508.  
  4509. ¤ You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  4510.  
  4511. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  4512. _______________________________________
  4513. ¤ SSL Inspector ::
  4514.  
  4515. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  4516.  
  4517. ¤ Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  4518.  
  4519. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  4520. _______________________________________
  4521. ¤ Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  4522. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  4523.  
  4524. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  4525.  
  4526. ¤ Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  4527.  
  4528. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  4529.  
  4530. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  4531.  
  4532. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  4533.  
  4534. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  4535.  
  4536. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  4537.  
  4538. ¤ A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  4539.  
  4540. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  4541. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4542. ¤ Greenwald’s Partner, David Miranda
  4543. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  4544.  
  4545. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  4546. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4547. ¤ Meet the Spies Doing the NSA’s Dirty Work ::
  4548.  
  4549.  The heart of the FBI’s signals intelligence
  4550. activities is an obscure organization called
  4551. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  4552. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  4553. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  4554. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  4555. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  4556. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  4557. presentation given to journalists by former
  4558. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU’s
  4559. pivotal role in the NSA’s Prism system --
  4560. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  4561. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  4562. be collected, which is then gathered and
  4563. delivered by the DITU.
  4564.  
  4565.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  4566. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  4567. home of the FBI’s training academy and the
  4568. bureau’s Operational Technology Division,
  4569. which runs all the FBI’s technical intelligence
  4570. collection, processing, and reporting.
  4571.  
  4572. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  4573.  
  4574. ¤ More PRISM Slides Published ::
  4575.  
  4576. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  4577. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  4578. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4579.  
  4580.  
  4581. ¤ PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  4582.  
  4583. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4584. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4585. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4586.  
  4587. ¤ Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  4588.  
  4589. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  4590.  
  4591. ¤ NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  4592.  
  4593. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  4594.  
  4595. ¤ Le Monde’s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  4596.  
  4597. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  4598.  
  4599.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  4600. by the NSA.
  4601.  
  4602.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  4603. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  4604. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  4605. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  4606. also now has access to some of these documents.
  4607.  
  4608.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  4609. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  4610. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  4611. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  4612. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  4613. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  4614.  
  4615.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  4616. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  4617. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  4618. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  4619. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  4620. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  4621. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  4622. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  4623. Facebook and Microsoft.
  4624.  
  4625. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  4626.  
  4627.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  4628. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  4629. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  4630. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  4631. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  4632. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  4633. and unilateral access to their servers.
  4634.  
  4635.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  4636. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  4637. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  4638. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  4639. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  4640. diving.
  4641.  
  4642.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  4643. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  4644.  
  4645.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  4646. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  4647. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  4648. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  4649. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  4650. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  4651. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  4652. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  4653. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  4654. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  4655. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  4656. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  4657. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  4658. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  4659. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  4660. major US carriers.
  4661.  
  4662. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  4663.  
  4664.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  4665. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  4666. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  4667. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  4668. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  4669. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  4670. engines.
  4671.  
  4672.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  4673. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  4674. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  4675. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  4676. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  4677.  
  4678.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  4679. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  4680. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  4681. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  4682. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  4683. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  4684. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  4685. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  4686. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  4687. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  4688. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  4689. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  4690. companies have been targeted.
  4691.  
  4692.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  4693. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  4694. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  4695. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  4696. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  4697. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  4698. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  4699. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  4700. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  4701. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  4702. _______________________________________
  4703. ¤ UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  4704.  
  4705. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  4706.  
  4707. ¤ 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  4708.  
  4709. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  4710.  
  4711. ¤ Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  4712. ‘World Leaders’, But Not You ::
  4713.  
  4714. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  4715.  
  4716. NOBODY comments
  4717.  
  4718.  100% expected. They will continue to
  4719. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  4720. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  4721. We must adjust to it by learning how
  4722. to counter their surveillance.
  4723.  
  4724. ¤ UPDATE ; Inside America’s Plan to Kill
  4725. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  4726.  
  4727.  The United States and its key intelligence
  4728. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  4729. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  4730. Nations to promote a universal human right
  4731. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  4732. sources and an internal American government
  4733. document obtained by The Cable.
  4734.  
  4735.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  4736. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  4737. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  4738. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  4739. internet surveillance by the National
  4740. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  4741. services. American representatives have made
  4742. it clear that they won’t tolerate such
  4743. checks on their global surveillance network.
  4744. The stakes are high, particularly in
  4745. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  4746. an international backlash against NSA
  4747. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  4748. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  4749. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  4750.  
  4751. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  4752.  
  4753. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  4754. _______________________________________
  4755. ¤ Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  4756. Public News Coverage ::
  4757.  
  4758. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  4759. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  4760. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  4761. _______________________________________
  4762. ¤ Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  4763. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  4764.  
  4765. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  4766. _______________________________________
  4767. ¤ US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  4768.  
  4769.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  4770. a division for particularly difficult
  4771. missions. Called “Tailored Access Operations”
  4772. (TAO), this department devises special
  4773. methods for special targets.
  4774.  
  4775.  That category includes surveillance of
  4776. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  4777. the division reported its mission
  4778. accomplished. A report classified as
  4779. “top secret” said: “TAO successfully
  4780. exploited a key mail server in the
  4781. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  4782. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  4783. first-ever access to President Felipe
  4784. Calderon’s public email account.”
  4785.  
  4786. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  4787.  
  4788. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  4789.  
  4790. Cryptome comments ▼
  4791.  
  4792.  This spying was apparently done from
  4793. the NSA’s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  4794. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  4795. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  4796. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  4797.  
  4798. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  4799.  
  4800. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  4801. _______________________________________
  4802. ¤ More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  4803.  
  4804. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  4805.  
  4806. ¤ NSA Spies on French Government ::
  4807.  
  4808. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4809.  
  4810. ¤ NSA Spies on Indian Governm