Eyeballing the NSA 034

From Eyeballing the NSA 034, 3 Years ago, written in Plain Text, viewed 796 times.
URL http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/d15a7be6 Embed
Download Paste or View Raw
  1. Eyeballing the NSA 034
  2.    
  3.    
  4.  “Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  5. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  6. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.”
  7.  
  8.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  9.  
  10.  
  11. ¤ Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  12.  
  13. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  14. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  15. ¤ The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  16. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  17.  
  18.  The contents of the surveillance files — almost half of which
  19. contained information from US citizens or residents — “tell
  20. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  21. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  22. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.”
  23.  
  24. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  25. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  26. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  27.  
  28. ¤ Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  29. Been Spying On ::
  30.  
  31.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  32. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans—including
  33. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  34. academics, and lawyers—under secretive procedures intended
  35. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  36.  
  37.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  38. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  39. own government includes:
  40.  
  41.  • Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  42. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  43. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  44. Security under President George W. Bush;
  45.  
  46.  • Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  47. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  48.  
  49.  • Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  50. international relations at Rutgers University;
  51.  
  52.  • Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  53. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  54. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  55.  
  56.  • Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  57. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  58. rights organization in the country.
  59.  
  60. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  61. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  62. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  63.  
  64. ¤ NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  65.  
  66. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  67.  
  68. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  69.  
  70. ¤ Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  71.  
  72. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  73.  
  74. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  75.  
  76. ▼ NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  77.                               ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  78.  “The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  79. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  80. crime to law enforcement authorities.”
  81.  
  82. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  83.  
  84. ▲ US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  85.  
  86. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  87.  
  88. NOBODY responds
  89.  
  90.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  91. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  92. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  93.  
  94. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  95.  
  96.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  97. back in 2004 up till today.
  98.  
  99. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  100.  
  101.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  102. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  103.  
  104. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  105.  
  106.  Just like those in the “Department of Justice” they
  107. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  108. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  109. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  110. _______________________________________
  111. ¤ Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  112. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  113.  
  114.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  115. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  116. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  117. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  118. “amplify” sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  119. content judged to be “extremist.” The capabilities, detailed
  120. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  121. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  122. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  123. together in a call.
  124.  
  125.  The tools were created by GCHQ’s Joint Threat Research
  126. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  127. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  128. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  129. documents have detailed JTRIG’s use of “fake victim blog
  130. posts,” “false flag operations,” “honey traps” and
  131. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  132. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  133. Facebook users.
  134.  
  135. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  136.  
  137. ¤ GCHQ’s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  138.  
  139. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  140. ---------------------------------------
  141. ¤ More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  142.  
  143. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  144.  
  145.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  146. program run by the US Agency for International
  147. Development to create “a Twitter-like Cuban
  148. communications network” run through “secret shell
  149. companies” in order to create the false appearance
  150. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  151. to the service’s Cuban users was the fact that
  152. “American contractors were gathering their private
  153. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  154. purposes”–specifically, to manipulate those users
  155. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  156. government. According to top-secret documents
  157. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  158. operation is frequently discussed at western
  159. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  160. covertly use social media for “propaganda,” “deception,”
  161. “mass messaging,” and “pushing stories.” ...
  162.  
  163. ¤ GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  164.  
  165. “Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect”
  166.  
  167. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  168.  
  169.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  170. NSA document published today by The Intercept, “enables
  171. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  172. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  173. Intelligence communities.” The 2009 Conference, held at
  174. Fort Meade, included “eighty-six representatives from
  175. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  176. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  177. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  178. Space Intelligence Center.”
  179.  
  180.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  181. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  182. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  183. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  184. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  185. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is “to
  186. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  187. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.”
  188.  
  189.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  190. released GCHQ document is dubbed “Royal Concierge,” under
  191. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  192. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  193. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  194. how to “influence the hotel choice” of travelers and
  195. to determine whether they stay at “SIGINT friendly”
  196. hotels. The document asks: “Can we influence the hotel
  197. choice? Can we cancel their visit?” ...
  198.  
  199. ¤ NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  200.  
  201. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  202. ---------------------------------------
  203. ¤ GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  204.  
  205. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  206.  
  207. ¤ GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  208.  
  209. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  210.  
  211. ¤ GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  212.  
  213.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  214. of the NSA), titled “The Art of Deception: Training
  215. for Online Covert Operations,” were given to the
  216. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  217. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  218. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  219. “the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  220. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  221. attacks they accuse “hacktivists” of using, the
  222. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  223. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.”
  224.  
  225.  The goals of the JTRIG program are “(1) to inject
  226. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  227. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  228. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  229. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  230. generate outcomes it considers desirable.”
  231.  
  232. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  233. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  234. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  235. ---------------------------------------
  236. ¤ GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  237.  
  238. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  239.  
  240. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  241.  
  242. ¤ GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  243.  
  244. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  245.  
  246. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  247.  
  248. ¤ GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  249.  
  250. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  251.  
  252. ¤ GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  253.  
  254. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  255. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  256. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  257.  
  258. ¤ British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  259. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  260.  
  261. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  262. ---------------------------------------
  263. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  264.  
  265. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  266. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  267. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  268. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  269.  
  270. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  271.  
  272. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  273.  
  274. ¤ Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  275.  
  276. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  277.  
  278. ¤ GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  279.  
  280. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  281. ---------------------------------------
  282. ▲ Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  283.  
  284. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  285. _______________________________________
  286. ¤ Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  287.  
  288.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  289. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  290. Binney – that’s a “totalitarian mentality.”
  291.  
  292. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  293. _______________________________________
  294. ¤ NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  295.  
  296. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  297.  
  298.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  299. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  300. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  301. Ausspähprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  302.  
  303.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  304. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  305. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  306. investigate.
  307.  
  308.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  309. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  310. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  311. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  312. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  313. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  314.  
  315. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  316.  
  317. MP4 Video Format » http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  318.  
  319. ¤ XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  320.  
  321. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  322.  
  323. ¤ NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  324.  
  325. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  326. ---------------------------------------
  327. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  328.  
  329. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  330.  
  331. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  332.  
  333.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  334. using Tor.”
  335.  
  336. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  337.  
  338. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  339.  
  340. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  341.  
  342.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t mean that your
  343. browser isn’t storing cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman,
  344. a colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes in browser
  345. vulnerabilities.
  346.  
  347.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  348. aware of Tor’s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  349. wide surveillance.
  350.  
  351.  “The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  352. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  353. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  354. other Web users,” he wrote.
  355.  
  356.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  357. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  358. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,”
  359. he said.
  360.  
  361. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  362.  
  363. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  364. Traffic From Machines ::
  365.  
  366.  “Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  367. out large-scale ‘staining’ as a means to identify individual
  368. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  369.  
  370.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  371. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  372. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  373. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  374. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  375. session.”
  376.  
  377. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  378.  
  379. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  380.  
  381. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  382.  
  383. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  384. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  385. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  386. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  387.  
  388. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  389.  
  390. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  391. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  392. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  393. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  394.  
  395. ¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  396.  
  397.  “We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  398. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  399. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  400. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  401. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  402. which allows the user finer control.” ... ...
  403.  
  404.  “This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  405. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  406. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  407. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  408. server can be used to hide one’s location, but a single-hop
  409. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  410. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  411. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  412. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  413. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  414. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  415. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  416. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  417. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  418. order to trace requests back to the originating client.”
  419.  
  420. ... ...
  421.  
  422.  “In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  423. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  424. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  425. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  426. of Tor.”
  427.  
  428. ... ...
  429.  
  430.  “We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  431. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  432. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  433. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  434. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  435. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  436. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  437. be tried.”
  438.  
  439. ... ...
  440.  
  441.  “It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  442. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  443. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  444. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  445. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  446. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  447. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  448. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  449. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  450. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  451. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  452. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  453. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  454. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  455. who inspecting the directories.”
  456.  
  457. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  458. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  459. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  460.  
  461. ¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  462.  
  463. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  464.  
  465. ¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  466.  
  467. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  468.  
  469. ¤ Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  470.  
  471.  “This document doesn’t give much insight into capabilities
  472. the IC has developed against Tor. It’s apparently quite common
  473. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  474. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  475. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  476. investment. I’d expect there are other programs with more
  477. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.”
  478.  
  479. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  480. _______________________________________
  481. ¤ UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  482.  
  483. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  484.  
  485. ¤ UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  486. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  487.  
  488.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  489. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany’s
  490. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  491. as a double agent for the US.
  492.  
  493.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  494. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  495. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country’s
  496. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  497. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  498.  
  499.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  500. week’s arrest of a 31-year-old BND “double agent” who spent
  501. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  502. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  503. of €10,000 (£7,940) per document. ...
  504.  
  505.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin’s
  506. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  507. in “co-operation”. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  508. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  509. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  510.  
  511.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  512. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin’s Russian
  513. embassy. The Germans had considered it “impossible” that one
  514. of their own intelligence men could be working as a “double agent”
  515. for the Americans.
  516.  
  517. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  518. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  519. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  520. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  521.  
  522. ¤ Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  523.  
  524. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  525.  
  526. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  527.  
  528. ¤ NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  529.  
  530. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  531.  
  532. ¤ Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  533.  
  534. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  535.  
  536. ¤ Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  537.  
  538. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  539.  
  540. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  541.  
  542. ¤ NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  543.  
  544. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  545.  
  546. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  547.  
  548. ¤ Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  549.  
  550. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  551.  
  552. ¤ Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  553.  
  554. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  555.  
  556. ▲ FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  557.  
  558.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  559. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  560. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  561. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  562. where she grew up.
  563.  
  564. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  565. _______________________________________
  566. ¤ NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  567.  
  568. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  569. _______________________________________
  570. ¤ Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  571.  
  572. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  573. _______________________________________
  574. ¤ Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  575.  
  576. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  577. _______________________________________
  578. ¤ NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  579.  
  580. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  581. _______________________________________
  582. ¤ How Secret Partners Expand NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  583.  
  584. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  585. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  586. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  587. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  588.  
  589. ¤ Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  590.  
  591. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  592.  
  593. ¤ Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  594.  
  595. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  596.  
  597. ¤ Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  598.  
  599. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  600.  
  601. ¤ Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  602.  
  603. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  604.  
  605. ¤ Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  606.  
  607. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  608. _______________________________________
  609.  Keith Alexander’s talking points for strategic meeting
  610. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  611. Service (DDIS).
  612.  
  613. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  614. _______________________________________
  615. ¤ FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  616.  
  617. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  618.  
  619. ¤ NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  620.  
  621. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  622. _______________________________________
  623. ¤ Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  624.  
  625. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  626. _______________________________________
  627. ¤ GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  628. of Residents’ Facebook and Google Use ::
  629.  
  630. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  631. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  632. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  633.  
  634.  Britain’s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  635. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  636. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  637. user in the UK.
  638.  
  639. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  640.  
  641. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  642. _______________________________________
  643. ¤ THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  644. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  645.  
  646. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  647. ---------------------------------------
  648. ¤ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  649.  
  650. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  651. _______________________________________
  652. ¤ PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  653.  
  654. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  655. _______________________________________
  656. ¤ DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  657.  
  658. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  659.  
  660. Mirrored » http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  661. _______________________________________
  662. ¤ How Governments Around The World Responded To
  663. Snowden’s Revelations ::
  664.  
  665. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  666. _______________________________________
  667. ¤ GCHQ’s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  668.  
  669. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  670.  
  671. ¤ GCHQ’s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  672.  
  673. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  674. _______________________________________
  675. ¤ UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  676. to Tap Phones ::
  677.  
  678. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  679. _______________________________________
  680. ¤ Some Numbers About NSA’s Data Collection ::
  681.  
  682. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  683. _______________________________________
  684. ¤ NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  685. Documents “Above Top Secret” and Many Are Burned
  686. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  687.  
  688.  “Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  689. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  690. information from 40 years ago – from spying on Frank
  691. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  692. they were spying on – was hidden?
  693.  
  694.  Now do you think they’re going to put that information
  695. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  696. everybody what they’re doing?
  697.  
  698.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  699. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  700. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  701. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  702. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  703. the collection. That’s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  704. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  705. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  706. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  707.  
  708.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they’re taking
  709. the information and they’re putting it in a much higher
  710. security level. It’s called “ECI” – Exceptionally Controlled
  711. Information – and it’s called the black program … which I
  712. was a specialist in, by the way.
  713.  
  714.  I specialized in black world – DOD and IC (Intelligence
  715. Community) – programs, operations and missions … in “VRKs”,
  716. “ECIs”, and “SAPs”, “STOs”. SAP equals Special Access
  717. Program. It’s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  718. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It’s
  719. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  720.  
  721.  Now in that world – the ECI/VRK world – everything in that
  722. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  723. computer systems that house it. It’s totally separate than
  724. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  725. the “JWICS”: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  726. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  727. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  728. for the JWICS.
  729.  
  730.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  731. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as “code word”
  732. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  733. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  734. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  735. that [clearance].
  736.  
  737.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  738. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  739. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  740. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  741.  
  742.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  743. 100 year or until death, ’till the person first being “read in”
  744. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  745. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  746. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that – when Tice
  747. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying – he
  748. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  749. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  750.  
  751.  It’s very compartmentalized and – even with stuff that they had
  752. – you might have something at NSA, that there’s literally 40
  753. people at NSA that know that it’s going on in the entire agency.
  754.  
  755.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  756. spying story, which broke in 2005] – and I was a source of
  757. information for the New York Times – that’s when President Bush
  758. made up that nonsense about the “terrorist surveillance program.”
  759. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  760.  
  761.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up … to try
  762. to placate the American people.
  763.  
  764.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) – who was not cleared for this –
  765. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  766. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  767.  
  768.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  769. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] – just
  770. a few – and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  771. investigation.”
  772.  
  773. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  774. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  775. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  776. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  777. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  778. _______________________________________
  779. ¤ NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  780.  
  781. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  782.  
  783. ¤ NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  784.  
  785. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  786.  
  787. ¤ SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  788.  
  789. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  790.  
  791. ¤ MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  792.  
  793. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  794.  
  795. ¤ Toward the Identity of “Country X” in MYSTIC ::
  796.  
  797. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  798.  
  799. ¤ Wikileaks Releases Identity of “Country X” ::
  800.  
  801. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  802.  
  803. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  804.  
  805. ¤ Google Idea’s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  806. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  807.  
  808. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  809.  
  810. ¤ Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  811. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  812.  
  813. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  814.  
  815. ¤ UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  816. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  817.  
  818. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  819. _______________________________________
  820. ¤ NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  821.  
  822.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  823. agencies are now also using the same facial
  824. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  825. identification systems are being developed as well.
  826. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  827.  
  828. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  829.  
  830. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  831.  
  832. ¤ NSA Identity Spying ::
  833.  
  834. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  835. _______________________________________
  836. ¤ 10 Things (Most People) Didn’t Know Before Snowden ::
  837.  
  838. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  839. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  840. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  841. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  842. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  843. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  844. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  845. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  846. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  847. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  848.  
  849. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  850.  
  851. And a few more to think about,
  852.  
  853. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  854. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  855. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  856. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  857. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  858. _______________________________________
  859. ▼ Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  860.  
  861.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  862. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  863. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  864. activity before he began leaking government documents
  865. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  866. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  867.  
  868.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  869. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  870. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  871. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  872. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  873. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  874. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  875. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  876. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  877. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  878. attention.’”
  879.  
  880.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  881. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  882. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  883. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  884. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  885.  
  886. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  887.  
  888. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  889. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  890.  
  891. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  892. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  893. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  894. ---------------------------------------
  895. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  896.  
  897. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  898.  
  899. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  900. _______________________________________
  901. ¤ What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don’t? ::
  902.  
  903. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  904.  
  905. ¤ A Hint? ; “Flashdrive Cache Paths” (Repost) ::
  906.  
  907. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  908. _______________________________________
  909. ¤ Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  910. Securely and Anonymously ::
  911.  
  912.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  913. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  914. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  915. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  916. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  917. It doesn’t require setting up a server on the
  918. internet somewhere or using a third party
  919. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  920. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  921. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  922. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  923. download the file from you.
  924.  
  925. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  926. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  927.  
  928. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  929.  
  930. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  931.  
  932. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  933.  
  934. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  935. _______________________________________
  936. ¤ Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  937. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  938.  
  939. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  940.  
  941. ¤ The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  942.  
  943. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  944. _______________________________________
  945. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (EPUB) ::
  946.  
  947. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  948.  
  949. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  950.  
  951. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (PDF) ::
  952.  
  953. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  954.  
  955. ▼ NSA Documents From “No Place To Hide” ::
  956.  
  957. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  958.  
  959. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  960.  
  961. ▲ An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  962. Online Next Week ::
  963.  
  964. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  965. ---------------------------------------
  966. ¤ NSA’s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  967.  
  968. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  969.  
  970. ¤ Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  971.  
  972. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  973. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  974.  
  975. ¤ New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  976. Israel’s Security Ahead of America’s ::
  977.  
  978. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  979.  
  980. ¤ New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  981. Infiltration by NSA ::
  982.  
  983. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  984.  
  985. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  986.  
  987. ¤ Leaked Photos of the NSA’s TAO Factory ::
  988.  
  989.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  990. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald’s book
  991. “No Place To Hide” details how the agency’s Tailored
  992. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  993. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  994. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  995. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  996. they’re delivered.
  997.  
  998. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  999.  
  1000. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  1001.  
  1002. ¤ Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  1003.  
  1004. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  1005.  
  1006. ¤ No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  1007.  
  1008. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  1009. ______________________________________
  1010. ¤ House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  1011. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  1012.  
  1013. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  1014. _______________________________________
  1015. ¤ US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  1016. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  1017.  
  1018. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  1019. _______________________________________
  1020. ¤ The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  1021.  
  1022. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  1023. _______________________________________
  1024. ▼ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1025.  
  1026. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1027.  
  1028. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  1029.  
  1030. ▲ Obama’s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden’s
  1031. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  1032.  
  1033.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  1034. national security and other government officials will no
  1035. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  1036. news reporting that is based on “unauthorized leaks.”
  1037.  
  1038. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  1039. _______________________________________
  1040. ¤ Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  1041.  
  1042. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  1043.  
  1044. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  1045. ______________________________________
  1046. ¤ NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  1047.  
  1048. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  1049. ______________________________________
  1050. ¤ United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  1051. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  1052.  
  1053. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  1054. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  1055.  
  1056. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  1057.  
  1058. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  1059. ______________________________________
  1060. ¤ NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  1061.  
  1062. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  1063.  
  1064. ¤ NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  1065.  
  1066. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  1067.  
  1068. ¤ Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  1069.  
  1070.  “Keep in mind that social media survives by
  1071. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  1072. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  1073. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  1074. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  1075. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  1076. industry which generates something in the
  1077. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.”
  1078.  
  1079.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  1080.  
  1081. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  1082. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  1083. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  1084. _______________________________________
  1085. ¤ GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  1086.  
  1087. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  1088. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  1089.  
  1090.  “PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  1091. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  1092. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  1093. ensure each partner is aware of the other’s
  1094. activities and future plans.” … …
  1095.  
  1096.  “Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  1097. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish
  1098. list and is something its leadership still desires.”
  1099.  
  1100. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  1101.  
  1102. ¤ GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  1103.  
  1104. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  1105.  
  1106. ¤ NSA Spied “Suspected Terrorists” At 2012 Olympics ::
  1107.  
  1108. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  1109.  
  1110. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed “Suspected Terrorists” Before,
  1111. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  1112.  
  1113.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  1114. GCHQ’s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  1115. “supportive” of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  1116. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  1117. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  1118. communicated at “leadership” level, according to
  1119. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  1120. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. … …
  1121.  
  1122.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  1123. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. … …
  1124. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  1125. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  1126. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  1127. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  1128. archive, “100s of billions of entries.”
  1129.  
  1130. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  1131. _______________________________________
  1132. ¤ NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  1133.  
  1134. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  1135. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  1136. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  1137.  
  1138.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  1139. system capable of recording “100 percent” of a foreign
  1140. country’s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  1141. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  1142. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  1143. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  1144. Edward Snowden.
  1145.  
  1146.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  1147. machine — one that can replay the voices from any call
  1148. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  1149. for surveillance.
  1150.  
  1151.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  1152. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for “retrospective retrieval,”
  1153. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  1154. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  1155. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  1156.  
  1157.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  1158. “every single” conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  1159. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  1160. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  1161.  
  1162.  The call buffer opens a door “into the past,” the summary
  1163. says, enabling users to “retrieve audio of interest that
  1164. was not tasked at the time of the original call.” Analysts
  1165. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  1166. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  1167. millions of voice clippings, or “cuts,” for processing
  1168. and long-term storage.
  1169.  
  1170. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  1171.  
  1172. ¤ Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  1173.  
  1174.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  1175. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  1176. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  1177. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  1178. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  1179. it’s actually doing this now–the Post knows where,
  1180. but they won’t say.
  1181.  
  1182. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  1183.  
  1184. ¤ NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  1185.  
  1186. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  1187.  
  1188. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  1189. _______________________________________
  1190. ¤ NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  1191.  
  1192.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  1193. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  1194. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  1195. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  1196. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  1197. already been published previously. The second was
  1198. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  1199.  
  1200. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  1201.  
  1202. ¤ NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  1203.  
  1204.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  1205. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  1206. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  1207. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  1208. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  1209. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  1210. The document, marked “top secret” is a summary of
  1211. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  1212. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  1213.  
  1214.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  1215. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  1216.  
  1217.  “NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  1218. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  1219. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  1220. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  1221. benefit” the document says.
  1222.  
  1223.  “Windsor Blue” is the name of a program for
  1224. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  1225. company is working towards creating a so-called
  1226. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  1227. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  1228. per second.
  1229.  
  1230. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  1231. _______________________________________
  1232. ¤ Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  1233.  
  1234. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  1235. _______________________________________
  1236. ¤ NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  1237.  
  1238. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  1239. _______________________________________
  1240. ¤ Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  1241.  
  1242. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  1243. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  1244. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  1245. _______________________________________
  1246. ¤ NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  1247.  
  1248.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  1249. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  1250. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe’s
  1251. top human rights body.
  1252.  
  1253.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  1254. Snowden said the National Security Agency – for
  1255. which he worked as a contractor – had deliberately
  1256. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  1257. Human Rights Watch.
  1258.  
  1259. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  1260.  
  1261. ¤ Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  1262. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  1263.  
  1264. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  1265. _______________________________________
  1266. ¤ EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  1267.  
  1268.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  1269. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  1270. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  1271.  
  1272.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  1273. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  1274. countries to “transpose” it into their own national
  1275. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  1276. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  1277. high as two years. ... ...
  1278.  
  1279.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  1280. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  1281. by domestic courts.
  1282.  
  1283. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  1284. _______________________________________
  1285. ¤ Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  1286.  
  1287. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  1288. _______________________________________
  1289. ¤ US Whines - ‘Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair’ ::
  1290.  
  1291.  “Recent proposals from countries within the
  1292. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  1293. network (dubbed a ‘Schengen cloud’ by advocates) or
  1294. to create national-only electronic networks could
  1295. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  1296. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  1297. offering network services, or dependent on them,”
  1298. the USTR said in its annual report.
  1299.  
  1300. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  1301. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  1302. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  1303. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1304. ¤ ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  1305.  
  1306. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  1307.  
  1308. ¤ ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  1309.  
  1310. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1311. _______________________________________
  1312. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  1313.  
  1314.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  1315. and documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks
  1316. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I’m still collecting
  1317. any information that comes out and will provide an
  1318. updated archive from time to time.
  1319.  
  1320.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  1321. “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and it holds a total of
  1322. 927MB decompressed.
  1323.  
  1324.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  1325. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  1326. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1327.  
  1328. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1329. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  1330.  
  1331. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  1332. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1333. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  1334. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1335. _______________________________________
  1336. ¤ It’s Finally Admitted! ::
  1337.  
  1338. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  1339. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  1340. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  1341. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  1342. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  1343. _______________________________________
  1344. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  1345.  
  1346. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  1347.  
  1348. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  1349.  
  1350. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  1351.  
  1352. ¤ GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  1353.  
  1354. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  1355. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  1356. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  1357. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  1358.  
  1359. ▲ UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  1360. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  1361.  
  1362. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  1363. _______________________________________
  1364. ¤ Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  1365.  
  1366. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  1367.  
  1368. ¤ Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  1369.  
  1370. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  1371.  
  1372. ¤ IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  1373.  
  1374. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  1375.  
  1376. ¤ Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  1377.  
  1378. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  1379. _______________________________________
  1380. ¤ NSA’s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  1381.  
  1382.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  1383. also promises the NSA will “build privacy into
  1384. new technologies” to “protect privacy and civil
  1385. liberties” and “to be as transparent with the
  1386. public as possible” as well helping the public
  1387. “understand how we’re protecting their privacy,
  1388. how we’re protecting national security.”
  1389.  
  1390. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  1391. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1392. ¤ NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  1393.  
  1394. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  1395.  
  1396. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  1397.  
  1398. ¤ Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  1399.  
  1400. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  1401.  
  1402. ¤ Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  1403.  
  1404. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  1405.  
  1406. ¤ NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  1407.  
  1408.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  1409. offensive against China, with targets including the
  1410. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  1411. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  1412. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  1413. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  1414. service’s targets were former Chinese President
  1415. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  1416. well as telecommunications companies.
  1417.  
  1418.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  1419. With 150,000 employees and €28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  1420. in annual revenues, the company is the world’s second
  1421. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  1422. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  1423. to internally as “Shotgiant,” against the company, which
  1424. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  1425. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  1426. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  1427. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA’s
  1428. battle for data supremacy.
  1429.  
  1430.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  1431. in infiltrating Huwaei’s network and copied a list of
  1432. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  1433. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  1434. among other things.
  1435.  
  1436. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  1437. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  1438. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  1439. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  1440.  
  1441. ¤ Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  1442.  
  1443.  “We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  1444. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  1445. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  1446. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  1447. has lodged representations with the American side on
  1448. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  1449. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.”
  1450.  
  1451. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  1452. _______________________________________
  1453. ¤ NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  1454.  
  1455.  The document consists of several posts – one of
  1456. them is titled “I hunt sys admins” – that were
  1457. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  1458. hosted on the agency’s classified servers. They
  1459. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  1460. agency’s effort to break into foreign network
  1461. routers, the devices that connect computer
  1462. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  1463. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  1464. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  1465. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  1466. that flow over their networks.
  1467.  
  1468.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  1469. aspired to create a database that would function
  1470. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  1471. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  1472. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  1473. activity – they are targeted only because they
  1474. control access to networks the agency wants to
  1475. infiltrate. “Who better to target than the person
  1476. that already has the ‘keys to the kingdom’?” one
  1477. of the posts says.
  1478.  
  1479.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  1480. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  1481. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  1482. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  1483. and, the author jokes, “pictures of cats in funny
  1484. poses with amusing captions.”
  1485.  
  1486. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  1487. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  1488. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  1489. _______________________________________
  1490. ¤ NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  1491.  
  1492. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  1493. _______________________________________
  1494. ¤ CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  1495.  
  1496. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  1497.  
  1498. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  1499.  
  1500. ¤ Default Le Monde Report ::
  1501.  
  1502. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  1503.  
  1504. ¤ Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  1505.  
  1506. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  1507. _______________________________________
  1508. ¤ DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  1509.  
  1510. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  1511. _______________________________________
  1512. ¤ TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  1513.  
  1514. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  1515.  
  1516. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  1517. _______________________________________
  1518. ¤ SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  1519.  
  1520. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  1521. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  1522. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  1523. _______________________________________
  1524. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  1525.  
  1526. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1527.  
  1528. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1529. _______________________________________
  1530. ¤ NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  1531.  
  1532. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  1533. _______________________________________
  1534. ¤ Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  1535.  
  1536. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  1537.  
  1538. ¤ Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  1539.  
  1540. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  1541. _______________________________________
  1542. ¤ NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1543.  
  1544.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1545. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1546. “Raw Take” Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1547. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1548. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1549. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1550. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1551.  
  1552. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1553.  
  1554. ▲ FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1555.  
  1556. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1557. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1558. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1559.  
  1560. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1561.  
  1562. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1563.  
  1564. ▲ DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1565.  
  1566.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1567. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1568.  
  1569. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1570.  
  1571. ▲ USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1572.  
  1573. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1574.  
  1575. ▲ FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1576.  
  1577.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1578. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1579. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1580. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1581.  
  1582. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1583.  
  1584. ▲ Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1585.  
  1586. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1587.  
  1588. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1589.  
  1590. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1591.  
  1592. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1593.  
  1594. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1595.  
  1596. NSA’s FOIA Release » http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1597.  
  1598. ▲ NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1599.  
  1600. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1601.  
  1602. ▲ NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1603.  
  1604. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1605. _______________________________________
  1606. ¤ NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  1607.  
  1608. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  1609. _______________________________________
  1610. ¤ NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  1611.  
  1612. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  1613.  
  1614. ▲ FBI’s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  1615.  
  1616. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  1617.  
  1618. ▲ FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  1619.  
  1620. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  1621. _______________________________________
  1622. ¤ STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  1623.  
  1624. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  1625.  
  1626. ▲ NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  1627.  
  1628. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1629. _______________________________________
  1630. ¤ FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  1631.  
  1632. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  1633. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  1634. _______________________________________
  1635. ¤ How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  1636. With Malware ::
  1637.  
  1638.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  1639. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  1640. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  1641. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  1642. level of human oversight in the process.
  1643.  
  1644.  The classified files – provided previously by NSA
  1645. whistleblower Edward Snowden – contain new details
  1646. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  1647. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  1648. of computers worldwide with malware “implants.” The
  1649. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  1650. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  1651. Internet and phone networks.
  1652.  
  1653. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  1654. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  1655. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  1656. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  1657. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  1658. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  1659. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  1660. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  1661. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  1662.  
  1663.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  1664. efforts operates from the agency’s headquarters in
  1665. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  1666. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  1667. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  1668. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  1669.  
  1670.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  1671. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  1672. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  1673. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  1674. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  1675. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  1676. handled by humans. The automated system – codenamed TURBINE
  1677. – is designed to “allow the current implant network to
  1678. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  1679. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  1680. instead of individually.”
  1681.  
  1682. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  1683.  
  1684. ¤ “Thousands of Implants” ::
  1685.  
  1686.  “Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  1687. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  1688. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  1689. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  1690. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  1691. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  1692. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  1693. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  1694. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  1695. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  1696. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  1697. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  1698. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  1699. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  1700. execute endpoint operations.”
  1701.  
  1702. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1703.  
  1704.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  1705. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  1706. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a “back-door
  1707. implant” infects their computers within eight seconds.
  1708.  
  1709.  There’s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  1710. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  1711. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  1712. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  1713. looks suspicious.
  1714.  
  1715.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  1716. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  1717. “man-in-the-middle” and “man-on-the-side” attacks, which
  1718. covertly force a user’s internet browser to route to NSA
  1719. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  1720.  
  1721.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  1722. target’s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  1723. “accesses” to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  1724. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  1725. is able to exploit, the agency’s surveillance sensors alert
  1726. the TURBINE system, which then “shoots” data packets at the
  1727. targeted computer’s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  1728.  
  1729.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  1730. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  1731. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  1732. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target’s
  1733. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  1734. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  1735. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  1736. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  1737. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  1738. in action.
  1739.  
  1740. ¤ How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  1741. Computers for Surveillance ::
  1742.  
  1743. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  1744.  
  1745. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  1746.  
  1747. Mirrored » http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  1748.  
  1749.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  1750. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  1751. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  1752. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  1753. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  1754. of the NSA’s automated TURBINE system.
  1755.  
  1756. ¤ NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  1757.  
  1758. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  1759. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  1760. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  1761. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  1762. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1763. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  1764. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  1765. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  1766. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  1767. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  1768.  
  1769. ¤ Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  1770.  
  1771. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  1772.  
  1773. ¤ NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  1774.  
  1775. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  1776. _______________________________________
  1777. ¤ NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  1778.  
  1779. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  1780. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  1781. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  1782. _______________________________________
  1783. ¤ Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  1784.  
  1785. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  1786. _______________________________________
  1787. ¤ NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  1788.  
  1789.  Alliances between security services are usually
  1790. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  1791. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  1792. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  1793. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  1794. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  1795. internet traffic.
  1796.  
  1797.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  1798. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  1799. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled ‘Netherlands
  1800. – 30 days’, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  1801. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  1802.  
  1803.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  1804. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  1805. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  1806. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  1807. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  1808. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  1809.  
  1810.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  1811. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  1812. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  1813. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  1814. Americans may possibly use the information for
  1815. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  1816. by attacking them with armed drones.
  1817.  
  1818. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  1819.  
  1820. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  1821. _______________________________________
  1822. ¤ NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  1823.  
  1824. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  1825.  
  1826. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  1827. ---------------------------------------
  1828. ¤ Tech Firms Spy ::
  1829.  
  1830. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  1831.  
  1832. ¤ NSA Spies Too ::
  1833.  
  1834. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1835. _______________________________________
  1836. ¤ GCHQ “OPTIC NERVE” Spy Programme ::
  1837.  
  1838. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  1839.  
  1840. ¤ GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  1841.  
  1842.  The documents show that images were collected
  1843. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  1844. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  1845. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  1846. programs.
  1847.  
  1848. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  1849. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  1850. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  1851. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  1852.  
  1853. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  1854.  
  1855. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  1856. _______________________________________
  1857. ¤ NSA Director Alexander’s Phones ::
  1858.  
  1859. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  1860. _______________________________________
  1861. ¤ NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  1862.  
  1863. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  1864.  
  1865. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  1866. _______________________________________
  1867. ¤ NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  1868. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  1869.  
  1870. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  1871.  
  1872. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  1873. _______________________________________
  1874. ¤ NSA Observer ::
  1875.  
  1876. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  1877. _______________________________________
  1878. ¤ Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  1879.  
  1880. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1881.  
  1882. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  1883. _______________________________________
  1884. ¤ NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  1885.  
  1886. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  1887.  
  1888. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  1889. _______________________________________
  1890. ¤ NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  1891.  
  1892. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  1893.  
  1894. 01 “MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010”
  1895.  
  1896. 02 “Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices”
  1897.  
  1898. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  1899. _______________________________________
  1900. ¤ NSA’s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  1901.  
  1902.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  1903. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  1904. Intercept — a new publication helmed by
  1905. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  1906. NSA revelations last year — that the US military
  1907. and CIA use the NSA’s metadata analysis and
  1908. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  1909. targets without confirming their veracity on
  1910. the ground.
  1911.  
  1912. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  1913. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  1914. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  1915. _______________________________________
  1916. ¤ ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  1917.  
  1918.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  1919. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  1920. shows that an American law firm was
  1921. monitored while representing a foreign
  1922. government in trade disputes with the
  1923. United States. The disclosure offers a
  1924. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  1925. which Americans were ensnared by the
  1926. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  1927. interest because lawyers in the United
  1928. States with clients overseas have
  1929. expressed growing concern that their
  1930. confidential communications could be
  1931. compromised by such surveillance.
  1932.  
  1933. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  1934. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  1935. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  1936.  
  1937. NOBODY comments
  1938.  
  1939. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  1940.  
  1941.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  1942. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  1943. be declassified for research in public domain.
  1944. _______________________________________
  1945. ¤ NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  1946.  
  1947. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  1948.  
  1949. ¤ NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  1950.  
  1951. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  1952. _______________________________________
  1953. ¤ Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  1954.  
  1955. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  1956. _______________________________________
  1957. ¤ Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder Allegedly
  1958. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  1959.  
  1960.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  1961. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  1962. that Merkel’s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  1963. was added to the NSA’s National Sigint
  1964. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  1965.  
  1966. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  1967. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  1968. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  1969.  
  1970. ¤ New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  1971. the German Chancellor ::
  1972.  
  1973. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  1974. _______________________________________
  1975. ¤ Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  1976. Phone Call Spying ::
  1977.  
  1978. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  1979.  
  1980. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  1981. _______________________________________
  1982. ¤ First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  1983.  
  1984. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  1985. _______________________________________
  1986. ¤ Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  1987.  
  1988. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  1989. _______________________________________
  1990.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  1991. Guardian’s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  1992. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  1993. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  1994. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  1995. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  1996.  
  1997. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  1998. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1999. ¤ CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2000.  
  2001. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2002.  
  2003. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2004.  
  2005. ¤ CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2006.  
  2007. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2008.  
  2009. ¤ CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2010.  
  2011.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2012. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2013. that Canada’s electronic spy agency used information
  2014. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2015. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2016. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2017. left the terminal.
  2018.  
  2019.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada’s
  2020. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2021. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2022. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2023. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2024.  
  2025.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2026. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2027. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2028. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2029.  
  2030.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2031. “game-changing,” and said they could be used for
  2032. tracking “any target that makes occasional forays
  2033. into other cities/regions.”
  2034.  
  2035. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2036.  
  2037.  CSEC concluded: “Can then take seeds from these
  2038. airports and repeat to cover whole world.”
  2039.  
  2040. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2041.  
  2042. ¤ More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2043.  
  2044. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2045.  
  2046. ¤ How Canada’s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2049. _______________________________________
  2050. ¤ NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2051.  
  2052. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2053.  
  2054. ¤ ... And Now It’s Personal ::
  2055.  
  2056. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2057. _______________________________________
  2058. ¤ GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2059.  
  2060.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2061. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2062. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  2063. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  2064. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  2065. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  2066. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  2067. information, for analysis. At the time the
  2068. documents were printed, they were also able to
  2069. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  2070.  
  2071.  Called “Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV”
  2072. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  2073. a section that spells out “Broad real-time
  2074. monitoring of online activity” of YouTube videos,
  2075. URLs “liked” on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  2076. visits. The monitoring program is called
  2077. “Squeaky Dolphin.”
  2078.  
  2079.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  2080. British had to have been either physically able
  2081. to tap the cables carrying the world’s web
  2082. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  2083. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  2084. and would be able to extract some key data
  2085. about specific users as well.
  2086.  
  2087. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  2088. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  2089. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  2090. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  2091. _______________________________________
  2092. ¤ NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  2093.  
  2094. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  2095. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  2096. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  2097.  
  2098. ¤ GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  2099.  
  2100.  “Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  2101. on the iPhone alone.”
  2102.  
  2103. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  2104.  
  2105. ¤ NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  2106.  
  2107. “Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.”
  2108.  
  2109. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  2110. _______________________________________
  2111. ¤ Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  2112.  
  2113.  The National Security Agency program that
  2114. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  2115. isn’t legal, a privacy review board said
  2116. Thursday in a newly released report.
  2117.  
  2118. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  2119.  
  2120.  “We have not identified a single instance
  2121. involving a threat to the United States in
  2122. which the program made a concrete difference
  2123. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  2124. investigation,” the board wrote in the
  2125. report released Thursday.
  2126.  
  2127.  Despite Obama’s promise to reform the NSA,
  2128. domestic spying will continue.
  2129.  
  2130. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  2131. _______________________________________
  2132. ¤ Snowden Speaks ::
  2133.  
  2134. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  2135. _______________________________________
  2136. ▼ Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story “Absurd” ::
  2137.  
  2138. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  2139.  
  2140. ▲ NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  2141.          ¯¯¯
  2142. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  2143.  
  2144. NOBODY’s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  2145.  
  2146.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  2147. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  2148. will come from peoples’ change of online use ;
  2149. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  2150. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  2151. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  2152. hardcopy backups rather than “the cloud” - and
  2153. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  2154. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  2155. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  2156. of users’ modems when not actually being used. The
  2157. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  2158. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  2159. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  2160. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  2161.  
  2162. Reform?
  2163.  
  2164.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  2165. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  2166. say “fuck the corporate platforms” and change it
  2167. whether legal or not?
  2168.  
  2169. The reform will come from people taking action.
  2170.  
  2171.  Here’s what I’d like to know - will “big government”
  2172. follow up reform with their “internet kill switch?”
  2173. _______________________________________
  2174. ¤ NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  2175.  
  2176. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  2177. _______________________________________
  2178. ¤ NSA’s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  2179.  
  2180.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  2181. three ways NSA is intercepting the world’s
  2182. main internet cables:
  2183.  
  2184.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  2185.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  2186.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  2187.  
  2188. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  2189. ---------------------------------------
  2190. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  2191. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  2192. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  2193. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  2194. _______________________________________
  2195. ¤ 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  2196.  
  2197. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  2198.  
  2199. ¤ FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  2200.  
  2201. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  2202. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  2203. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  2204. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  2205. ---------------------------------------
  2206. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  2207. _______________________________________
  2208. ¤ SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  2209.  
  2210. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  2211.  
  2212. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  2213.  
  2214. ¤ NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  2215.  
  2216.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  2217. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  2218. the metadata of “untargeted and unwarranted”
  2219. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  2220.  
  2221.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  2222. “pretty much everything it can”, according to
  2223. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  2224. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  2225.  
  2226.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  2227. text message database to extract information
  2228. on people’s travel plans, contact books, financial
  2229. transactions and more – including of individuals
  2230. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  2231.  
  2232. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  2233. _______________________________________
  2234. ¤ NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  2235.  
  2236. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  2237.  
  2238. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  2239.  
  2240.  The technology, which the agency has used
  2241. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  2242. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  2243. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  2244. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  2245. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  2246. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  2247. set up miles away from the target.
  2248.  
  2249.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  2250. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  2251. American intelligence agencies for years:
  2252. getting into computers that adversaries,
  2253. and some American partners, have tried to
  2254. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  2255. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  2256. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  2257. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  2258. ---------------------------------------
  2259. Refer to NSA’s Tailored Access Operations
  2260.  
  2261. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  2262. _______________________________________
  2263. ¤ NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  2264.  
  2265. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  2266. ---------------------------------------
  2267. ¤ Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  2268.  
  2269. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  2270. _______________________________________
  2271. ¤ NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  2272.  
  2273. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  2274. _______________________________________
  2275. ¤ NSA’s Organizational Designations ::
  2276.  
  2277. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  2278. _______________________________________
  2279. ¤ Analysis of NSA’s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  2280.  
  2281. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  2282. _______________________________________
  2283. ¤ John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  2284. of Internet Metadata Doesn’t Work ::
  2285.  
  2286. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  2287.  
  2288. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  2289. _______________________________________
  2290. ¤ Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  2291. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  2292.  
  2293. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  2294. _______________________________________
  2295. ¤ NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  2296. All Encryption ::
  2297.  
  2298.  In room-size metal boxes ­secure against
  2299. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  2300. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  2301. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  2302. used to protect banking, medical, business
  2303. and government records around the world.
  2304.  
  2305.  According to documents provided by former
  2306. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  2307. to build “a cryptologically useful quantum
  2308. computer” — a machine exponentially faster
  2309. than classical computers — is part of a
  2310. $79.7 million research program titled
  2311. “Penetrating Hard Targets.” Much of the
  2312. work is hosted under classified contracts
  2313. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  2314.  
  2315. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  2316. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  2317. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  2318. _______________________________________
  2319. ¤ NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  2320.  
  2321. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  2322. _______________________________________
  2323. ¤ Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  2324.  
  2325. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  2326. _______________________________________
  2327. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  2328.  
  2329. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  2330.  
  2331. Mirror » http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  2332.  
  2333. ¤ Jacob’s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  2334.  
  2335. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  2336.  
  2337. ¤ NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  2338.  
  2339. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  2340. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  2341. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  2342.  
  2343. ¤ Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  2344.  
  2345.  The NSA’s TAO hacking unit is considered
  2346. to be the intelligence agency’s top secret
  2347. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  2348. infiltrates computers around the world and
  2349. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  2350. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  2351. it is targeting. ... ...
  2352.  
  2353. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  2354.  
  2355.  The insert method and other variants of
  2356. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  2357. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  2358. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  2359. infrastructure comprised of “covert”
  2360. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  2361. also incorporates routers and servers
  2362. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  2363. network by infecting these networks with
  2364. “implants” that then allow the government
  2365. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  2366.  
  2367.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  2368. to identify and track its targets based on
  2369. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  2370. could include certain email addresses or
  2371. website cookies set on a person’s computer.
  2372. Of course, a cookie doesn’t automatically
  2373. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  2374. additional information like an email address.
  2375. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  2376. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  2377. ---------------------------------------
  2378. ¤ NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  2379.  
  2380. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  2381.  
  2382. ¤ NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  2383.  
  2384.  “YahooBcookie’s are unique to a specific
  2385. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  2386. that are being logged into on that computer
  2387. as long as the user does not clear browser
  2388. cookies.”
  2389.  
  2390. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  2391.  
  2392. ¤ NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  2393.  
  2394. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  2395. ---------------------------------------
  2396. ¤ NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  2397.  
  2398.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  2399. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  2400. could be described as master carpenters for
  2401. the NSA’s department for Tailored Access
  2402. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual
  2403. hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice,
  2404. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  2405. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  2406. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  2407. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  2408. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  2409. considerable role in the intelligence agency’s
  2410. ability to establish a global covert network
  2411. that operates alongside the Internet.
  2412.  
  2413.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  2414. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  2415. allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  2416. on the targeted monitor,” for example, is
  2417. available for just $30. But an “active GSM
  2418. base station” -- a tool that makes it possible
  2419. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  2420. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  2421. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  2422. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  2423. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  2424. over $1 million.
  2425.  
  2426.  The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture
  2427. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  2428. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  2429. clear preference for planting their malicious
  2430. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  2431. computer’s motherboard that is the first thing
  2432. to load when a computer is turned on.
  2433.  
  2434.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  2435. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  2436. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  2437. to virus protection and other security programs.
  2438. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  2439. computer has been completely erased and a new
  2440. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  2441. can continue to function and ensures that new
  2442. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  2443. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  2444. developers call this “Persistence” and believe
  2445. this approach has provided them with the
  2446. possibility of permanent access.
  2447.  
  2448.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  2449. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  2450. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  2451. with the exception of latter, are American
  2452. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  2453. intelligence agency is compromising the
  2454. technology and products of American companies.
  2455.  
  2456. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  2457. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  2458. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  2459. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  2460. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  2461.  
  2462. ¤ NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  2463.  
  2464. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  2465.  
  2466. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  2467.  
  2468. ¤ NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  2469.  
  2470. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  2471.  
  2472. ¤ NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  2473.  
  2474. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  2475.  
  2476. ¤ NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  2477.  
  2478. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  2479.  
  2480. ¤ NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  2481.  
  2482. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  2483.  
  2484. ¤ NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  2485.  
  2486. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  2487.  
  2488. ¤ NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  2489.  
  2490. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  2491.  
  2492. ¤ NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  2493.  
  2494. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  2495.  
  2496. ¤ NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  2497.  
  2498. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  2499.  
  2500. ¤ NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  2501.  
  2502. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  2503.  
  2504. ¤ NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  2505.  
  2506. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  2507.  
  2508. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  2509.  
  2510. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  2511.  
  2512. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  2513. ---------------------------------------
  2514. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  2515.  
  2516. ¤ IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  2517.  
  2518. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  2519.  
  2520. ¤ Foreign Firms Won’t Buy American Tech ::
  2521.  
  2522. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  2523. ---------------------------------------
  2524. ¤ Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  2525.  
  2526. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  2527.  
  2528. ¤ Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  2529.  
  2530.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  2531. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  2532. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  2533.  
  2534. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  2535.  
  2536. ¤ Cyber–Security Experts Ask If Apple “Flaw”
  2537. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  2538.  
  2539.  Following an admission by Apple that a “bug”
  2540. in its operating system had left devices open
  2541. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  2542. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  2543. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  2544. of its mass spying program.
  2545.  
  2546. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  2547. ---------------------------------------
  2548. ¤ Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  2549. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  2550.  
  2551. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  2552.  
  2553. ¤ Dell Inc. Apologizes for the ‘Inconvenience’
  2554. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  2555.  
  2556. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  2557.  
  2558. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  2559.  
  2560. ¤ Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  2561.  
  2562.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  2563. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  2564.  
  2565. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  2566. _______________________________________
  2567. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  2568.  
  2569. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  2570.  
  2571. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  2572.  
  2573. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  2574. _______________________________________
  2575. ¤ Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  2576.  
  2577. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  2578.  
  2579.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  2580. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  2581. in the NSA’s Technology Directorate and
  2582. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  2583. Center’s regional base in Hawaii. For
  2584. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  2585. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  2586. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  2587. color-coded “heat maps” to depict the
  2588. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  2589.  
  2590.  His colleagues were often “astonished to
  2591. learn we are collecting more in the United
  2592. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  2593. in Russia,” he said. Many of them were
  2594. troubled, he said, and several said they
  2595. did not want to know any more.
  2596. ---------------------------------------
  2597. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  2598.  
  2599. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  2600. _______________________________________
  2601. ¤ New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  2602. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  2603.  
  2604. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  2605. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  2606. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  2607. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  2608. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  2609. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  2610. ¤ Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  2611. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  2612.  
  2613. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  2614.  
  2615.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  2616. National Security Agency program which
  2617. collects information on nearly all telephone
  2618. calls made to, from or within the United
  2619. States is likely unconstitutional.
  2620.  
  2621.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  2622. that the program appears to violate the
  2623. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  2624. searches and seizures. He also said the
  2625. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  2626. that collecting the information had helped
  2627. to head off terrorist attacks.
  2628.  
  2629.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  2630. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  2631. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  2632. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  2633. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  2634. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  2635. the order to allow for an appeal.
  2636.  
  2637. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  2638. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  2639.  
  2640.  Leon’s 68-page opinion is the first
  2641. significant legal setback for the NSA’s
  2642. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  2643. in June in news stories based on leaks
  2644. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  2645. For seven years, the metadata program has
  2646. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  2647. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  2648. Court and found constitutional by at least
  2649. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  2650.  
  2651. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  2652.  
  2653. ¤ Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  2654.  
  2655. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  2656.  
  2657. ▼ Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  2658.  
  2659. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  2660.  
  2661. ▲ White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  2662. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  2663.  
  2664. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  2665.  
  2666. ¤ Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  2667.  
  2668. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  2669. ---------------------------------------
  2670. ¤ White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  2671.  
  2672. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  2673.  
  2674. ¤ White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  2675.  
  2676. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  2677. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  2678.  
  2679. ¤ Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  2680. Spying Programs ::
  2681.  
  2682. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  2683. ---------------------------------------
  2684. ▼ FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  2685. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  2686.  
  2687. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  2688.  
  2689. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  2690.  
  2691. ▲ Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  2692. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  2693.  
  2694. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  2695.  
  2696. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  2697. _______________________________________
  2698. ¤ NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  2699.  
  2700.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  2701. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  2702. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  2703.  
  2704. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  2705.  
  2706. “ 1B. Ability to exploit:
  2707.  
  2708.  - Military Information
  2709.  - Economic Information
  2710.  - Information Operations Information
  2711.  - Political Information ”
  2712. _______________________________________
  2713. ¤ Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  2714. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  2715.  
  2716. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  2717. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2718. ¤ NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  2719.  
  2720. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  2721.  
  2722. ¤ RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  2723.  
  2724. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  2725.  
  2726. ¤ NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  2727.  
  2728. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  2729.  
  2730. ¤ List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  2731.  
  2732. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  2733.  
  2734. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  2735.  
  2736. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  2737. _______________________________________
  2738. ¤ Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  2739. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  2740.  
  2741.  In a paper titled ‘The Internet Dark Age’
  2742. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  2743. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  2744. government access in order to make network
  2745. compromise easier. “BT are directly responsible
  2746. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  2747. in millions of homes and businesses within
  2748. the UK,” the paper states.
  2749.  
  2750.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  2751. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  2752. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  2753. assigns all their modems an extra address
  2754. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  2755. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  2756. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  2757. a second IP address for management, except
  2758. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  2759. assigned to the United States Department
  2760. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  2761. of speculation that this is actually a
  2762. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  2763. they can secretly monitor and control
  2764. peoples’ home networks.
  2765.  
  2766.  Maybe, but it’s probably not the case.
  2767. The better explanation is that BT simply
  2768. chose this address space because it’s
  2769. non-routable. While it’s assigned public
  2770. address, it’s only used inside the private
  2771. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  2772. that address space, you’ll see that your
  2773. packets go nowhere.
  2774.  
  2775. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  2776. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  2777. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  2778.  
  2779. ¤ Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  2780.  
  2781.  “Yes, it’s true. And contrary to rumors,
  2782. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  2783. No, BT wasn’t always happy with my writings
  2784. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  2785. independent thinker and didn’t try to
  2786. muzzle me in any way. I’m just ready to
  2787. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  2788. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  2789. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  2790. It’s past time for something new.”
  2791.  
  2792. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  2793. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  2794. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  2795. ---------------------------------------
  2796. ¤ NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  2797.  
  2798.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  2799. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  2800. worldwide with malicious software designed
  2801. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  2802. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  2803. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  2804.  
  2805.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  2806. explains how the NSA collects information
  2807. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  2808. shows that the intelligence service uses
  2809. ‘Computer Network Exploitation’ (CNE) in
  2810. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  2811. secret infiltration of computer systems
  2812. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  2813. software.
  2814.  
  2815.  One example of this type of hacking was
  2816. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  2817. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  2818. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ –
  2819. has been installing this malicious software
  2820. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  2821. their customers’ telephone and data traffic.
  2822. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  2823. through a process of luring employees to a
  2824. false Linkedin page.
  2825.  
  2826. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  2827. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2828. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  2829. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  2830.  
  2831. ¤ NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  2832.  
  2833.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  2834. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  2835. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  2836. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  2837. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  2838. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  2839. and citizens.
  2840.  
  2841.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  2842. will deter this bounty of profits for
  2843. the comsec industry, unless the public
  2844. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  2845. the nettle, and all those making money
  2846. from this deception operation decide to
  2847. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  2848.  
  2849.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  2850. lists, those participating in standards
  2851. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  2852. grants in think tanks and universities,
  2853. those in law firms and public interest
  2854. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  2855. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  2856. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  2857. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  2858. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  2859. diminish Snowden’s revelations with new
  2860. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  2861. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  2862. contracts, list lurking, online and
  2863. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  2864. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  2865. fulfilled.
  2866.  
  2867. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  2868.  
  2869. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2870.  
  2871. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  2872.  
  2873. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2874. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2875. ¤ GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  2876. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  2877.  
  2878. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  2879. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  2880. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  2881. _______________________________________
  2882. ¤ CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  2883.  
  2884. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  2885.  
  2886. ¤ CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  2887.  
  2888. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  2889.  
  2890. ¤ NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  2891.  
  2892. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  2893. _______________________________________
  2894. ¤ Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  2895.  
  2896. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  2897. _______________________________________
  2898. ¤ EU Data Retention Directive “Unlawful”
  2899. and “Incompatible” with Charter of Rights ::
  2900.  
  2901. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  2902.  
  2903. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  2904. _______________________________________
  2905. ¤ GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  2906.  
  2907. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  2908. _______________________________________
  2909. ¤ Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  2910. of Public Concerns ::
  2911.  
  2912. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  2913.  
  2914. ¤ Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  2915.  
  2916. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  2917. _______________________________________
  2918. ¤ GCHQ’s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2919.  
  2920.  “FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  2921. analysts to query GCHQ’s vast repository
  2922. of metadata about the world’s secure
  2923. communications over TLS/SSL. It’s
  2924. certainly not a program through which
  2925. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  2926. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  2927. services like Google, as reported by others,
  2928. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  2929. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  2930. Google are based on a small piece of a
  2931. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  2932. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  2933. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  2934. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  2935. That’s not to say the GCHQ doesn’t perform
  2936. MITM attacks, but there’s no evidence to
  2937. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  2938. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  2939. by providing information about a target.”
  2940.  
  2941. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  2942.  
  2943. ¤ NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2944.  
  2945. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  2946. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  2947. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  2948. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2949. ¤ John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  2950.  
  2951. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  2952.  
  2953. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  2954. _______________________________________
  2955. ¤ FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  2956.  
  2957. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  2958. ---------------------------------------
  2959. ¤ hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  2960.  
  2961. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  2962.  
  2963.  HDFS stands for “Hadoop Distributed File
  2964. System” which was inspired by Google Inc,
  2965. and later managed by big data corporations
  2966. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  2967.  
  2968.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  2969. large files across machines in a large
  2970. cluster.
  2971.  
  2972. ¤ Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  2973.  
  2974.  “Hadoop is a data processing system that
  2975. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  2976. data analysis.” ... “Largest install is at
  2977. Yahoo, a major contributor.”
  2978.  
  2979.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  2980. major components, a central metadata server
  2981. and file servers from data.
  2982.  
  2983. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  2984.  
  2985. ¤ Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  2986.  
  2987.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  2988. posted on public domain.
  2989.  
  2990. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  2991.  
  2992. ¤ Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  2993. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  2994.  
  2995. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2996. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2997. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  2998.  
  2999. ¤ hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3000.  
  3001. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3002. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3003. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3004. ---------------------------------------
  3005. ¤ CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3006. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3007.  
  3008. “Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.”
  3009.  
  3010. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3011.  
  3012. ¤ CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3013.  
  3014. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3015.  
  3016. ¤ NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3017.  
  3018. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3019.  
  3020. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  3021.  
  3022. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3023.  
  3024. ¤ NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3025.  
  3026.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3027. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3028. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3029. content of all our communications have
  3030. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3031. program since the 1990s.
  3032.  
  3033.  The new details concern how, “The National
  3034. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3035. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3036. of cellphones around the world.”
  3037.  
  3038.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3039. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3040. peddling when it claims that, “The NSA
  3041. does not target Americans’ location data
  3042. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3043. substantial amount of information on
  3044. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3045. “incidentally.”
  3046.  
  3047.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3048. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3049. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3050. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3051. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3052. damage control by the establishment.
  3053.  
  3054. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3055. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3056. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3057. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3058. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3059. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3060. ---------------------------------------
  3061. ¤ NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3062. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  3063.  
  3064.  The National Security Agency is ‘secretly’
  3065. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  3066. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  3067. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  3068. targets for government hacking and to
  3069. bolster surveillance.
  3070.  
  3071. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  3072. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  3073. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  3074. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  3075. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  3076. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  3077. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  3078. ---------------------------------------
  3079. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google’s Cookie ::
  3080.  
  3081. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  3082. ---------------------------------------
  3083. ¤ How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  3084. In a World Without Cookies ::
  3085.  
  3086. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  3087. _______________________________________
  3088. ¤ How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  3089.  
  3090. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  3091. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  3092. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  3093.  
  3094. ¤ SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  3095.  
  3096. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  3097. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  3098. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  3099. _______________________________________
  3100. ¤ Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  3101. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  3102.  
  3103. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  3104. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  3105. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  3106. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  3107. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  3108. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  3109.  
  3110. ¤ NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  3111.  
  3112. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  3113.  
  3114. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship Was “Top Secret” ::
  3115.  
  3116. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  3117.  
  3118. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  3119.  
  3120. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship “Actively Engaged” ::
  3121.  
  3122. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  3123.  
  3124. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  3125.  
  3126. ¤ NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  3127.  
  3128. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  3129.  
  3130. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  3131.  
  3132. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  3133. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  3134. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  3135.  
  3136. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  3137.  
  3138. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  3139. ---------------------------------------
  3140. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  3141.  
  3142. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  3143. ---------------------------------------
  3144. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  3145.  
  3146. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  3147.  
  3148. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  3149.  
  3150. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  3151.  
  3152. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  3153.  
  3154. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  3155.  
  3156. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  3157.  
  3158. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  3159. _______________________________________
  3160.  “Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  3161. worldwide was published by the German
  3162. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  3163. map was put online by accident, but before
  3164. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  3165. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  3166. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  3167. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  3168. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  3169. the names of all other cities were blurred
  3170. by Der Spiegel.”
  3171.  
  3172.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  3173.  
  3174. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  3175.  
  3176. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  3177.  
  3178. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  3179.  
  3180. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  3181.  
  3182. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  3183.  
  3184. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  3185. ---------------------------------------
  3186. ¤ Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  3187.  
  3188. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  3189.  
  3190. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  3191. _______________________________________
  3192. ¤ Five Eyes ::
  3193.  
  3194. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  3195. _______________________________________
  3196. ¤ A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  3197.  
  3198. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  3199. _______________________________________
  3200. ¤ PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  3201. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  3202.  
  3203. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  3204.  
  3205. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  3206. _______________________________________
  3207. ¤ NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  3208.  
  3209. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  3210.  
  3211. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  3212. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  3213. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  3214. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  3215. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  3216. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  3217. _______________________________________
  3218. ¤ Rollingstone Describes NSA’s Influx of Money ::
  3219.  
  3220.  September 11th, which also happened to
  3221. be Drake’s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  3222. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  3223. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  3224. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  3225. “unchained itself from the Constitution,”
  3226. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  3227. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  3228. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  3229. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  3230. itself.
  3231.  
  3232.  “Massive amounts of money were pumped
  3233. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  3234. saying, ‘How big do you want the check?’”
  3235. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  3236. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  3237. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  3238. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  3239. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  3240. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  3241. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  3242. where the NSA’s sprawling 5,000-acre
  3243. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  3244. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  3245. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  3246. its workforce by one-third, to about
  3247. 33,000. The number of private companies
  3248. it depended upon more than tripled during
  3249. that time.
  3250.  
  3251.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  3252. and the increasing reliance on the private
  3253. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  3254. the very heart of America’s intelligence
  3255. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  3256. contractors. “Essentially, 9/11 was a
  3257. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  3258. you needed for the party was your clearance,”
  3259. says Drake. “And tons of people were
  3260. getting those clearances. So you had
  3261. this huge apparatus being built, and
  3262. the government was just managing it.
  3263. And in some cases, they weren’t even
  3264. doing that.” ... ...
  3265.  
  3266.  By the time Snowden joined the agency’s
  3267. workforce, the surveillance he would
  3268. later expose was becoming not just
  3269. institutionalized but very big business.
  3270. “It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  3271. the full flower of that massive, massive
  3272. bubble of money,” says Drake. “And people
  3273. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  3274. could go.” ... ...
  3275.  
  3276.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  3277. leaking government secrets when he was
  3278. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  3279. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  3280. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  3281. system. His optimism didn’t last long.
  3282. “I watched as Obama advanced the very
  3283. policies that I thought would be reined
  3284. in,” he later said. As a result, he added,
  3285. “I got hardened.” The more Snowden saw of
  3286. the NSA’s actual business – and, particularly,
  3287. the more he read “true information,”
  3288. including a 2009 Inspector General’s report
  3289. detailing the Bush era’s warrantless-
  3290. surveillance program – the more he realized
  3291. that there were actually two governments:
  3292. the one that was elected, and the other,
  3293. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  3294. “If the highest officials in government
  3295. can break the law without fearing punishment
  3296. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  3297. powers become tremendously dangerous.”
  3298.  
  3299. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  3300. _______________________________________
  3301. ¤ Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  3302.  
  3303. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  3304. _______________________________________
  3305. ¤ Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  3306.  
  3307. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  3308. _______________________________________
  3309. ¤ Snowden Leaks “Greatest Intelligence
  3310. Failure Since World War 2” Exaggerated ::
  3311.  
  3312.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  3313. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  3314. press claim he stole “up to 20,000.” British
  3315. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  3316. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  3317. is the “greatest intelligence failure since
  3318. World War 2.” High officials and ex-spies
  3319. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  3320. in terrorism.
  3321.  
  3322.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  3323. to exaggerate Snowden’s damage, of betrayal
  3324. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  3325. threatening national security. It is
  3326. successfully restricting release of the
  3327. Snowden material and will likely become
  3328. more forceful as releases continue to the
  3329. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  3330. to criminalize release as a national
  3331. security threat.
  3332.  
  3333. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  3334. _______________________________________
  3335. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  3336.  
  3337.  Includes most reports, slides and
  3338. documents all related to the recent
  3339. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  3340. 4th of 2013. I’m still collecting
  3341. any information that comes out and
  3342. will provide updated archives from
  3343. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  3344.  
  3345.  After decompression - the folder is
  3346. titled “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and
  3347. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  3348.  
  3349. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3350. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  3351.  
  3352. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  3353. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  3354. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  3355. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3356. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3357. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  3358. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  3359. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3360. _______________________________________
  3361. ¤ indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  3362.  
  3363. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3364. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3365. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3366.  
  3367. ¤ Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  3368. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  3369.  
  3370.  Australia’s intelligence apparatus mines
  3371. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  3372. Australians, and hands over the material
  3373. to the US and its closest allies, according
  3374. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  3375. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  3376. Australia web site.
  3377.  
  3378.  The document obtained by the former US
  3379. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  3380. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  3381. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  3382. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  3383. as well as the people and governments of
  3384. many Asian countries.
  3385.  
  3386.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  3387. restricting the ASD’s internal spying,
  3388. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  3389. global partners so-called metadata of
  3390. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  3391. address books and social media posts of
  3392. millions of people.
  3393.  
  3394.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  3395. the recent revelations, also from documents
  3396. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  3397. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  3398. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  3399. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  3400. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  3401. operate as electronic listening posts
  3402. for the US-led spying network.
  3403.  
  3404. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  3405. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  3406. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  3407. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  3408. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  3409. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  3410.  
  3411. ¤ Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  3412. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  3413.  
  3414.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s
  3415. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  3416. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  3417. political figures has been furiously
  3418. denounced by other media outlets for
  3419. breaching “national security” and the
  3420. “national interest.” The reaction
  3421. underscores the extent to which the
  3422. media establishment has been integrated
  3423. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  3424.  
  3425.  On November 18, after being approached
  3426. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  3427. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  3428. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  3429. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  3430. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  3431. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  3432. senior political figures. The report
  3433. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  3434. crisis for the Australian government, with
  3435. the Indonesian president suspending military
  3436. and intelligence cooperation.
  3437.  
  3438. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  3439. _______________________________________
  3440. ¤ NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  3441.  
  3442.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  3443. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  3444. Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s dictatorship
  3445. allowed the largest American spy agency
  3446. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  3447. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  3448.  
  3449.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  3450. by CBC News.
  3451.  
  3452.  The briefing notes, stamped “Top Secret,”
  3453. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  3454. a security command post during a six-day
  3455. spying operation by the National Security
  3456. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  3457. other foreign heads of government were on
  3458. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  3459.  
  3460.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  3461. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  3462.  
  3463.  The world was still struggling to climb
  3464. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  3465. were debating a wide array of possible
  3466. measures including a global tax on banks,
  3467. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  3468. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  3469. eventually scotched.
  3470.  
  3471. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  3472. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  3473. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  3474. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  3475. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  3476.  
  3477. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  3478. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  3479.  
  3480. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  3481.  
  3482.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  3483. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  3484.  
  3485. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  3486.  
  3487. ¤ Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  3488.  
  3489. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  3490.  
  3491. ¤ Ministério de Minas e Energia está na
  3492. mira de espiões americanos e canadenses ::
  3493.  
  3494. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  3495.  
  3496. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  3497.  
  3498. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  3499.  
  3500. ¤ American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  3501. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  3502.  
  3503. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  3504.  
  3505. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  3506.  
  3507.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  3508. believe that they have only “moved on” from discussing
  3509. CSEC’s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  3510. to worry about.
  3511.  
  3512.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  3513. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  3514. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  3515. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC’s
  3516. staff—it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  3517. military personnel assist its work—give an inkling of the
  3518. scale of its activities.
  3519.  
  3520.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  3521. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  3522. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  3523. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  3524. Of especial importance is the CSEC’s partnership with the NSA.
  3525. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  3526. the two organizations “have integrated personnel” i.e. swap
  3527. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  3528. Internet surveillance programs.
  3529.  
  3530.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  3531. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  3532. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  3533. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  3534. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  3535. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates’
  3536. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  3537.  
  3538. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  3539.  
  3540. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  3541.  
  3542. ¤ NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  3543.  
  3544. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  3545. _______________________________________
  3546. ¤ EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  3547.  
  3548. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  3549.  
  3550. ¤ EU Hearings On NSA ::
  3551.  
  3552. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  3553. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  3554. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  3555.  
  3556. ¤ EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  3557.  
  3558. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  3559.  
  3560. ¤ EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  3561.  
  3562. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  3563. _______________________________________
  3564.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  3565. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would –
  3566. in theory – forbid local governments from
  3567. providing services to federal agencies
  3568. that collect electronic data from Americans
  3569. without a personalized warrant.
  3570.  
  3571.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  3572. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  3573. but at least one legislator has committed
  3574. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  3575. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  3576. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  3577. is introduced.
  3578.  
  3579.  “We are still very early in the campaign,
  3580. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  3581. long-term strategy,” says Maharrey, whose
  3582. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  3583. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  3584. and a handful of other groups.
  3585.  
  3586.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  3587. Maharrey adds.
  3588.  
  3589. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  3590. _______________________________________
  3591. ¤ Guardian’s Reporters Face Threats and
  3592. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  3593.  
  3594.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  3595. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  3596. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  3597. US and British intelligence — particularly
  3598. their cooperation in data collection and
  3599. snooping programs involving British citizens
  3600. and close allies on the European continent.
  3601.  
  3602.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  3603. to account by British authorities for
  3604. jeopardizing national security. The
  3605. Guardian’s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  3606. is being forced to appear before a
  3607. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  3608. the news outlet’s actions.
  3609.  
  3610. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3611. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  3612. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  3613.  
  3614. ¤ Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  3615.  
  3616. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3617.  
  3618. ¤ US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  3619. as the British Dictatorship ::
  3620.  
  3621.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  3622. published Edward Snowden’s leaks, was
  3623. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  3624. shining light on the NSA’s abuse of power.
  3625. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  3626. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  3627. seems the United States is reaching the event
  3628. horizon to a police state.
  3629.  
  3630. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  3631.  
  3632. Cryptome noted
  3633.  
  3634.  “There have been no reports of leakage
  3635. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  3636. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  3637. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  3638. UKG), although there could be some which have
  3639. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  3640. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  3641.  
  3642.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  3643. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  3644. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  3645. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  3646. deception, co-optation.
  3647.  
  3648.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  3649. had access, or suspected of access, are
  3650. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  3651. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  3652. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  3653. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  3654. standard coercive means of authorities.
  3655.  
  3656.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  3657. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  3658. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  3659. advised successive cooperators, usually
  3660. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  3661. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  3662. participation.
  3663.  
  3664.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  3665. disputes and disagreements among competing
  3666. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  3667. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  3668. along with threats against families, friends
  3669. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  3670. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  3671. with authorities, including use of rewards
  3672. -- monetary and career -- for informants.”
  3673.  
  3674. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  3675. _______________________________________
  3676. ¤ NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  3677.  
  3678. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  3679. _______________________________________
  3680. ¤ Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  3681. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  3682. Governments ::
  3683.  
  3684. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  3685. _______________________________________
  3686. ¤ NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  3687. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  3688.  
  3689. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  3690. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  3691. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  3692. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  3693. _______________________________________
  3694. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  3695.  
  3696. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  3697.  
  3698. ¤ What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  3699.  
  3700. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  3701.  
  3702. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  3703.  
  3704. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  3705.  
  3706. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  3707.  
  3708. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  3709.  
  3710. ¤ NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  3711.  
  3712. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  3713.  
  3714. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  3715.  
  3716. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  3717.  
  3718. ¤ NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  3719.  
  3720. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  3721.  
  3722. ¤ NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  3723.  
  3724. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  3725.  
  3726. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  3727. Steal Email Metadata ::
  3728.  
  3729.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  3730. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  3731. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  3732. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  3733.  
  3734.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  3735. servers around the world, reducing the
  3736. chance of losing your information should
  3737. one fail. When you log in to an account
  3738. with these firms, the data sent between
  3739. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  3740. it difficult to snoop – but the internal
  3741. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  3742. And because many of the transfers take place
  3743. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  3744. isn’t required to tap the information.
  3745.  
  3746.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  3747. broken into the main communications links
  3748. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  3749. around the world, according to documents
  3750. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  3751. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  3752. officials.
  3753.  
  3754.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  3755. positioned itself to collect at will from
  3756. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  3757. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  3758. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  3759. but it keeps a lot.
  3760.  
  3761.  The NSA’s principal tool to exploit the
  3762. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  3763. operated jointly with the agency’s British
  3764. counterpart, the Government Communications
  3765. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  3766. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  3767. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  3768. that carry information among the data
  3769. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  3770.  
  3771. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  3772. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  3773. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  3774. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  3775. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  3776.  
  3777. ¤ NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  3778.  
  3779.  In June, President Obama said the NSA’s
  3780. email collecting program “does not apply
  3781. to US citizens.”
  3782.  
  3783.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  3784. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  3785. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  3786. accounts around the world, many of them
  3787. belonging to Americans, according to
  3788. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  3789. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  3790. Edward Snowden.
  3791.  
  3792.  The collection program, which has not
  3793. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  3794. address books and “buddy lists” from
  3795. instant messaging services as they move
  3796. across global data links. Online services
  3797. often transmit those contacts when a user
  3798. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  3799. a computer or mobile device with information
  3800. stored on remote servers.
  3801.  
  3802. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  3803. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  3804. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  3805.  
  3806. ¤ Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  3807.  
  3808. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  3809.  
  3810. ¤ NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  3811.  
  3812. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  3813. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  3814. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  3815. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  3816. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  3817. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3818. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant ::
  3819.  
  3820. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  3821.  
  3822. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Collected
  3823. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  3824.  
  3825. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  3826.  
  3827. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  3828.  
  3829. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  3830.  
  3831. ¤ Guardian’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3832.  
  3833. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  3834.  
  3835. ¤ Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3836.  
  3837. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  3838.  
  3839. ¤ Three Boundless Informant “Heatmaps” ::
  3840.  
  3841. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  3842.  
  3843. ¤ NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  3844.  
  3845. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  3846.  
  3847. ¤ US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  3848.  
  3849. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  3850. ---------------------------------------
  3851. NOBODY comments ▼
  3852.  
  3853.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant document
  3854. differs from the Guardians.
  3855.  
  3856. Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3857.  
  3858. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  3859.  
  3860. Guardians’ Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3861.  
  3862. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  3863.  
  3864.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  3865. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  3866. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  3867.  
  3868.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant graph
  3869. shows the “aggregate” estimate, both
  3870. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  3871. interception ; while the Guardian’s graph
  3872. only shows the digital “DNI” estimate.
  3873. ---------------------------------------
  3874. ¤ DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  3875.  
  3876. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  3877.  
  3878. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3879.  
  3880.  This was written from a person who purports
  3881. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  3882.  
  3883. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  3884.  
  3885. ¤ RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3886.  
  3887. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  3888.  
  3889. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  3890. Misleading ::
  3891.  
  3892. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  3893.  
  3894. ¤ DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  3895. on NSA Spying ::
  3896.  
  3897. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  3898.  
  3899.  “Recent articles published in the
  3900. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  3901. inaccurate and misleading information
  3902. regarding US foreign intelligence
  3903. activities. The allegation that the
  3904. National Security Agency collected more
  3905. than 70 million “recordings of French
  3906. citizens’ telephone data” is false.
  3907.  
  3908.  While we are not going to discuss the
  3909. details of our activities, we have
  3910. repeatedly made it clear that the
  3911. United States gathers intelligence of
  3912. the type gathered by all nations. The
  3913. US collects intelligence to protect the
  3914. nation, its interests, and its allies
  3915. from, among other things, threats such
  3916. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  3917. weapons of mass destruction.
  3918.  
  3919.  The United States values our longstanding
  3920. friendship and alliance with France and
  3921. we will continue to cooperate on security
  3922. and intelligence matters going forward.”
  3923.  
  3924. James R. Clapper
  3925. Director of National Intelligence
  3926. ---------------------------------------
  3927. ¤ Snowden Responds to Feinstein’s Stupidity ::
  3928.  
  3929. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  3930.  
  3931.  “Today, no telephone in America makes
  3932. a call without leaving a record with the
  3933. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  3934. or leaves America without passing through
  3935. the NSA’s hands,” Snowden said in a
  3936. statement Thursday.
  3937.  
  3938.  “Our representatives in Congress tell us
  3939. this is not surveillance. They’re wrong.”
  3940. _______________________________________
  3941. ¤ US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  3942. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  3943.  
  3944.  US and British intelligence officials
  3945. say they are concerned about a “doomsday”
  3946. collection of highly classified, heavily
  3947. encrypted materials they believe former
  3948. National Security Agency contractor
  3949. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  3950.  
  3951.  One source saw the cache of documents
  3952. as an “insurance policy” for Snowden
  3953. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  3954. other harm. ... ...
  3955.  
  3956.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  3957. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  3958. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  3959. that “if anything happens at all to
  3960. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  3961. to get access to the full archives.”
  3962.  
  3963. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  3964. _______________________________________
  3965. ¤ (Go Figure) Obama’s “Overhaul” of Spy
  3966. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  3967.  
  3968.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  3969. government surveillance policies. But he
  3970. is not disclosing those changes to the
  3971. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  3972. world leaders? He won’t say. Has he stopped
  3973. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  3974. World Bank and the International Monetary
  3975. Fund? He won’t say.
  3976.  
  3977.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  3978. to review and recommend changes to his
  3979. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  3980.  
  3981. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  3982. _______________________________________
  3983. ¤ NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  3984.  
  3985.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  3986. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  3987. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  3988. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  3989. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  3990.  
  3991.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  3992. broad goals, the five-page document said
  3993. that existing American laws were not adequate
  3994. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  3995. surveillance in what it cited as “the golden
  3996. age of Sigint,” or signals intelligence.
  3997. “The interpretation and guidelines for
  3998. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  3999. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4000. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4001. and target environments, or the operational
  4002. expectations levied on NSA’s mission,” the
  4003. document concluded.
  4004.  
  4005. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4006. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4007. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4008. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4009. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4010.  
  4011. ¤ NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4012.  
  4013.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4014. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4015. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4016. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4017. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4018. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4019.  
  4020. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4021. _______________________________________
  4022. ¤ Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4023.  
  4024. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4025. _______________________________________
  4026. ¤ GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4027.  
  4028. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4029.  
  4030. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4031.  
  4032. ¤ GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4033.  
  4034.  Britain’s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4035. diplomats’ travels using a sophisticated
  4036. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4037. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4038. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4039.  
  4040. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4041. _______________________________________
  4042. ¤ Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4043.  
  4044.  “We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4045. collection of solely domestic communications
  4046. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4047. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4048. request each week until we receive your
  4049. response,” EPIC said.
  4050.  
  4051.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4052. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4053. EPIC’s plea. A document began circulating
  4054. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4055. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4056. as denied.
  4057.  
  4058. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4059.  
  4060. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4061. _______________________________________
  4062. ¤ NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  4063.  
  4064. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  4065.  
  4066. ¤ Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  4067. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  4068.  
  4069. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  4070.  
  4071. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  4072.  
  4073. ¤ Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  4074. No Privacy ::
  4075.  
  4076. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  4077.  
  4078. ¤ Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  4079. Spying Programs ::
  4080.  
  4081. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  4082.  
  4083. ¤ John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  4084.  
  4085. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  4086.  
  4087. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  4088. _______________________________________
  4089. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Brief ::
  4090.  
  4091. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4092.  
  4093. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  4094.  
  4095. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Guide ::
  4096.  
  4097. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4098.  
  4099. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  4100.  
  4101. ¤ NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  4102.  
  4103. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  4104.  
  4105.  “(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  4106. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  4107. or indigenous cryptographic information
  4108. security devices or systems in order to
  4109. make them exploitable.”
  4110.  
  4111. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  4112.  
  4113.  “(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  4114. successfully exploits cryptographic
  4115. components of commercial information
  4116. security devices or systems when the
  4117. device or system specified.”
  4118.  
  4119. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4120.  
  4121. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  4122.  
  4123. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  4124.  
  4125. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4126. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4127. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  4128.  
  4129. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  4130.  
  4131.  US and British intelligence agencies
  4132. have successfully cracked much of the
  4133. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  4134. of millions of people to protect the
  4135. privacy of their personal data, online
  4136. transactions and emails, according to
  4137. top-secret documents revealed by former
  4138. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  4139.  
  4140.  Those methods include covert measures
  4141. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  4142. international encryption standards, the
  4143. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  4144. with “brute force”, and – the most closely
  4145. guarded secret of all – collaboration with
  4146. technology companies and internet service
  4147. providers themselves.
  4148.  
  4149.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  4150. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  4151. – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into
  4152. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  4153.  
  4154.  Independent security experts have long
  4155. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  4156. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  4157. confirmed for the first time by another
  4158. secret document. It shows the agency
  4159. worked covertly to get its own version
  4160. of a draft security standard issued by
  4161. the US National Institute of Standards
  4162. and Technology approved for worldwide
  4163. use in 2006.
  4164.  
  4165. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  4166.  
  4167. ¤ Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  4168.  
  4169. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4170.  
  4171. ¤ Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  4172.  
  4173. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  4174.  
  4175. ¤ Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  4176.  
  4177. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4178.  
  4179. ¤ Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4180.  
  4181. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  4182. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  4183. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  4184.  
  4185. ¤ Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4186.  
  4187. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  4188. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  4189.  
  4190. ¤ DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4191.  
  4192. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  4193.  
  4194. ¤ Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  4195.  
  4196. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  4197.  
  4198. ¤ Documents Confirm “Back Doors” Inserted
  4199. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  4200.  
  4201. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  4202.  
  4203. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  4204.  
  4205.  A range of US hardware and software
  4206. companies are in danger of being dragged
  4207. into the widening scandal over internet
  4208. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  4209. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  4210. Security Agency contractor.
  4211.  
  4212.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  4213. that it has collaborated with technology
  4214. companies to plant “back doors” into
  4215. their systems – or ways for the agency
  4216. secretly to penetrate systems without
  4217. the users’ knowledge.
  4218.  
  4219. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  4220.  
  4221. ¤ You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  4222.  
  4223. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  4224. _______________________________________
  4225. ¤ SSL Inspector ::
  4226.  
  4227. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  4228.  
  4229. ¤ Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  4230.  
  4231. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  4232. _______________________________________
  4233. ¤ Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  4234. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  4235.  
  4236. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  4237.  
  4238. ¤ Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  4239.  
  4240. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  4241.  
  4242. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  4243.  
  4244. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  4245.  
  4246. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  4247.  
  4248. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  4249.  
  4250. ¤ A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  4251.  
  4252. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  4253. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4254. ¤ Greenwald’s Partner, David Miranda
  4255. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  4256.  
  4257. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  4258. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4259. ¤ Meet the Spies Doing the NSA’s Dirty Work ::
  4260.  
  4261.  The heart of the FBI’s signals intelligence
  4262. activities is an obscure organization called
  4263. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  4264. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  4265. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  4266. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  4267. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  4268. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  4269. presentation given to journalists by former
  4270. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU’s
  4271. pivotal role in the NSA’s Prism system --
  4272. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  4273. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  4274. be collected, which is then gathered and
  4275. delivered by the DITU.
  4276.  
  4277.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  4278. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  4279. home of the FBI’s training academy and the
  4280. bureau’s Operational Technology Division,
  4281. which runs all the FBI’s technical intelligence
  4282. collection, processing, and reporting.
  4283.  
  4284. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  4285.  
  4286. ¤ More PRISM Slides Published ::
  4287.  
  4288. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  4289. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  4290. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4291.  
  4292.  
  4293. ¤ PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  4294.  
  4295. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4296. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4297. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4298.  
  4299. ¤ Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  4300.  
  4301. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  4302.  
  4303. ¤ NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  4304.  
  4305. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  4306.  
  4307. ¤ Le Monde’s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  4308.  
  4309. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  4310.  
  4311.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  4312. by the NSA.
  4313.  
  4314.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  4315. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  4316. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  4317. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  4318. also now has access to some of these documents.
  4319.  
  4320.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  4321. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  4322. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  4323. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  4324. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  4325. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  4326.  
  4327.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  4328. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  4329. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  4330. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  4331. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  4332. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  4333. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  4334. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  4335. Facebook and Microsoft.
  4336.  
  4337. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  4338.  
  4339.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  4340. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  4341. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  4342. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  4343. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  4344. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  4345. and unilateral access to their servers.
  4346.  
  4347.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  4348. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  4349. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  4350. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  4351. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  4352. diving.
  4353.  
  4354.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  4355. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  4356.  
  4357.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  4358. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  4359. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  4360. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  4361. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  4362. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  4363. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  4364. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  4365. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  4366. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  4367. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  4368. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  4369. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  4370. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  4371. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  4372. major US carriers.
  4373.  
  4374. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  4375.  
  4376.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  4377. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  4378. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  4379. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  4380. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  4381. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  4382. engines.
  4383.  
  4384.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  4385. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  4386. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  4387. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  4388. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  4389.  
  4390.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  4391. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  4392. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  4393. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  4394. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  4395. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  4396. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  4397. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  4398. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  4399. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  4400. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  4401. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  4402. companies have been targeted.
  4403.  
  4404.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  4405. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  4406. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  4407. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  4408. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  4409. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  4410. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  4411. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  4412. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  4413. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  4414. _______________________________________
  4415. ¤ UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  4416.  
  4417. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  4418.  
  4419. ¤ 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  4420.  
  4421. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  4422.  
  4423. ¤ Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  4424. ‘World Leaders’, But Not You ::
  4425.  
  4426. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  4427.  
  4428. NOBODY comments
  4429.  
  4430.  100% expected. They will continue to
  4431. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  4432. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  4433. We must adjust to it by learning how
  4434. to counter their surveillance.
  4435.  
  4436. ¤ UPDATE ; Inside America’s Plan to Kill
  4437. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  4438.  
  4439.  The United States and its key intelligence
  4440. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  4441. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  4442. Nations to promote a universal human right
  4443. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  4444. sources and an internal American government
  4445. document obtained by The Cable.
  4446.  
  4447.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  4448. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  4449. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  4450. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  4451. internet surveillance by the National
  4452. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  4453. services. American representatives have made
  4454. it clear that they won’t tolerate such
  4455. checks on their global surveillance network.
  4456. The stakes are high, particularly in
  4457. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  4458. an international backlash against NSA
  4459. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  4460. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  4461. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  4462.  
  4463. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  4464.  
  4465. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  4466. _______________________________________
  4467. ¤ Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  4468. Public News Coverage ::
  4469.  
  4470. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  4471. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  4472. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  4473. _______________________________________
  4474. ¤ Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  4475. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  4476.  
  4477. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  4478. _______________________________________
  4479. ¤ US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  4480.  
  4481.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  4482. a division for particularly difficult
  4483. missions. Called “Tailored Access Operations”
  4484. (TAO), this department devises special
  4485. methods for special targets.
  4486.  
  4487.  That category includes surveillance of
  4488. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  4489. the division reported its mission
  4490. accomplished. A report classified as
  4491. “top secret” said: “TAO successfully
  4492. exploited a key mail server in the
  4493. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  4494. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  4495. first-ever access to President Felipe
  4496. Calderon’s public email account.”
  4497.  
  4498. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  4499.  
  4500. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  4501.  
  4502. Cryptome comments ▼
  4503.  
  4504.  This spying was apparently done from
  4505. the NSA’s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  4506. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  4507. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  4508. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  4509.  
  4510. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  4511.  
  4512. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  4513. _______________________________________
  4514. ¤ More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  4515.  
  4516. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  4517.  
  4518. ¤ NSA Spies on French Government ::
  4519.  
  4520. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4521.  
  4522. ¤ NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  4523.  
  4524. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4525.  
  4526. ¤ NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  4527.  
  4528. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  4529.  
  4530. ¤ EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  4531.  
  4532. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  4533.  
  4534. ¤ Other Governments “Envious” of NSA ::
  4535.  
  4536. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  4537.  
  4538.  David Addington, Cheney’s chief of staff,
  4539. thought that the NSA should use its
  4540. technology to intercept emails and
  4541. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  4542. terminal to another, and was upset to
  4543. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  4544. That was a line he would only cross,
  4545. deliberately, with court and congressional
  4546. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  4547. but as we now know, the agency added
  4548. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  4549. suspicious communications that transited
  4550. the border of the United States, and
  4551. later began to collect reams of metadata
  4552. in order to analyze it.
  4553.  
  4554.  Hayden wasn’t being cautious just for
  4555. the record: NSA’s job was to collect
  4556. foreign intelligence — to steal stuff,
  4557. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  4558. in order to provide policymakers with a
  4559. decision advantage. The advantage the
  4560. NSA provided was accurate information
  4561. about what people who interacted with
  4562. the United States said in private about
  4563. their intentions; that gap between saying
  4564. and doing, and the ability to predict
  4565. action from it, allows the president of
  4566. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  4567.  
  4568.  It’s one thing to say that the United
  4569. States’ actions don’t always match up
  4570. with the values we espouse, and that’s
  4571. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  4572. our moral authority wanes and our
  4573. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  4574.  
  4575.  It’s quite another to assume that other
  4576. countries are any purer. They never have
  4577. been and probably won’t be. Many are much
  4578. purer than others, so the amount of
  4579. resources the intelligence community
  4580. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  4581. to correspond with how honest our allies
  4582. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  4583. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  4584. can we figure out which allies are more
  4585. reliable if we don’t figure out the
  4586. correspondence between public and private
  4587. words and actions.
  4588.  
  4589.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  4590. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  4591. want their leaders to gain a decision
  4592. advantage in the give and take between
  4593. countries. They want to know what US
  4594. policymakers will do before the Americans
  4595. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  4596. France, they aggressively spy on the
  4597. United States, on US citizens and
  4598. politicians, in order to collect that
  4599. information. The difference lies in the
  4600. scale of intelligence collection: The
  4601. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  4602. most sophisticated intelligence community
  4603. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  4604. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  4605. envious.
  4606. _______________________________________
  4607. ¤ NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  4608.  
  4609. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  4610. _______________________________________
  4611. ¤ 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  4612.  
  4613. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  4614. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4615. ¤ Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA’s PRISM
  4616. with ‘Secure Email’ Plan ::
  4617.  
  4618. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  4619. _______________________________________
  4620. ¤ Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  4621. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  4622.  
  4623. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  4624. _______________________________________
  4625.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  4626. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  4627. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  4628. from the award ceremony are the first of
  4629. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  4630. Russia.
  4631.  
  4632. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  4633. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4634. ▼ GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  4635.  
  4636.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  4637. of the Security Service, said the
  4638. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  4639. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  4640. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  4641. agencies.
  4642.  
  4643. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  4644.  
  4645. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  4646.  
  4647.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  4648. they are not using Tor.”
  4649.  
  4650. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  4651.  
  4652. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  4653. ---------------------------------------
  4654.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  4655. old bleach log.
  4656.  
  4657. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  4658. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  4659. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  4660. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  4661.  
  4662. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  4663.  
  4664.  “SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  4665. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  4666. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  4667. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  4668. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  4669. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  4670. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  4671. function.
  4672.  
  4673.  There are also various third party
  4674. programs that can produce files in
  4675. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  4676. Captivate and SWiSH Max.”
  4677.  
  4678.  “.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  4679. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  4680. data stored on the system running the
  4681. Flash player.”
  4682. ---------------------------------------
  4683. ▲ NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  4684.  
  4685.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  4686. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  4687. It can be found within Windows systems
  4688. and can be wiped out here ;
  4689.  
  4690. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4691. Application Data\Macromedia\
  4692.  
  4693. and may also be cloned here ;
  4694.  
  4695. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  4696.  
  4697.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  4698. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  4699.  
  4700. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  4701.  
  4702. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4703. Local Settings\Temp\
  4704. ---------------------------------------
  4705. • Adobe Flash Player Registry »
  4706.  
  4707. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  4708.  
  4709. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  4710.  
  4711. • swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump »
  4712.  
  4713. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  4714.  
  4715. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  4716.  
  4717. • Evercookie Cache Format Registry »
  4718.  
  4719. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  4720.  
  4721. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  4722.  
  4723. • Adobe “Asset Cache” Format Registry »
  4724.  
  4725. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  4726.  
  4727. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  4728.  
  4729. • Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher »
  4730.  
  4731. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  4732.  
  4733. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  4734. ---------------------------------------
  4735. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  4736.  
  4737.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  4738. application created by Samy Kamkar
  4739. which produces zombie cookies in a
  4740. web browser that are intentionally
  4741. difficult to delete. ... ...
  4742.  
  4743.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  4744. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  4745. by copying itself in different forms on
  4746. the user’s machine and resurrecting
  4747. itself if it notices that some of the
  4748. copies are missing or expired.
  4749.  
  4750.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  4751. Evercookie uses the following storage
  4752. mechanisms when available:
  4753.  
  4754. • Standard HTTP cookies
  4755. • Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  4756. • Silverlight Isolated Storage
  4757. • Storing cookies in RGB values of
  4758. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  4759. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  4760. (cookies) back out
  4761. • Storing cookies in Web history
  4762. • Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  4763. • Storing cookies in Web cache
  4764. • window.name caching
  4765. • Internet Explorer userData storage
  4766. • HTML5 Session Storage
  4767. • HTML5 Local Storage
  4768. • HTML5 Global Storage
  4769. • HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  4770. ---------------------------------------
  4771. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  4772.  
  4773.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t
  4774. mean that your browser isn't storing
  4775. cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  4776. colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes
  4777. in browser vulnerabilities.
  4778.  
  4779.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  4780. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor’s entry
  4781. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  4782. wide surveillance.
  4783.  
  4784.  “The very feature that makes Tor a
  4785. powerful anonymity service, and the
  4786. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  4787. the Internet, makes it easy to
  4788. differentiate Tor users from other
  4789. Web users,” he wrote.
  4790.  
  4791.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  4792. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  4793. identifies you. Even though your IP
  4794. address changed [because of Tor], the
  4795. cookies gave you away,” he said.
  4796.  
  4797. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  4798. ---------------------------------------
  4799. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  4800. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  4801.  
  4802.  “Working together, CT and CNE have
  4803. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  4804. ‘staining’ as a means to identify
  4805. individual machines linked to that
  4806. IP address. ... ...
  4807.  
  4808.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  4809. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  4810. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  4811. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  4812. and is stamped into every packet, which
  4813. enables all the events from that stained
  4814. machine to be brought back together to
  4815. recreate a browsing session.”
  4816.  
  4817. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  4818.  
  4819. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  4820.  
  4821. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  4822.  
  4823. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  4824. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  4825. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  4826. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  4827.  
  4828. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  4829.  
  4830. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  4831. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  4832. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  4833. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption