EYEBALLING THE NSA 032

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  1. EYEBALLING THE NSA 032
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  7.    
  8.  “Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  9. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  10. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.”
  11.  
  12.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  13.  
  14.  
  15. ¤ FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  16.  
  17. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  18. _______________________________________
  19. ¤ GCHQ’s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  20.  
  21. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  22.  
  23. ¤ GCHQ’s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  24.  
  25. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  26. _______________________________________
  27. ¤ UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  28. to Tap Phones ::
  29.  
  30. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  31. _______________________________________
  32. ¤ Some Numbers About NSA’s Data Collection ::
  33.  
  34. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  35. _______________________________________
  36. ¤ NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  37. Documents “Above Top Secret” and Many Are Burned
  38. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  39.  
  40.  “Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  41. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  42. information from 40 years ago – from spying on Frank
  43. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  44. they were spying on – was hidden?
  45.  
  46.  Now do you think they’re going to put that information
  47. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  48. everybody what they’re doing?
  49.  
  50.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  51. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  52. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  53. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  54. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  55. the collection. That’s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  56. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  57. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  58. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  59.  
  60.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they’re taking
  61. the information and they’re putting it in a much higher
  62. security level. It’s called “ECI” – Exceptionally Controlled
  63. Information – and it’s called the black program … which I
  64. was a specialist in, by the way.
  65.  
  66.  I specialized in black world – DOD and IC (Intelligence
  67. Community) – programs, operations and missions … in “VRKs”,
  68. “ECIs”, and “SAPs”, “STOs”. SAP equals Special Access
  69. Program. It’s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  70. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It’s
  71. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  72.  
  73.  Now in that world – the ECI/VRK world – everything in that
  74. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  75. computer systems that house it. It’s totally separate than
  76. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  77. the “JWICS”: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  78. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  79. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  80. for the JWICS.
  81.  
  82.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  83. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as “code word”
  84. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  85. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  86. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  87. that [clearance].
  88.  
  89.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  90. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  91. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  92. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  93.  
  94.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  95. 100 year or until death, ’till the person first being “read in”
  96. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  97. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  98. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that – when Tice
  99. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying – he
  100. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  101. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  102.  
  103.  It’s very compartmentalized and – even with stuff that they had
  104. – you might have something at NSA, that there’s literally 40
  105. people at NSA that know that it’s going on in the entire agency.
  106.  
  107.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  108. spying story, which broke in 2005] – and I was a source of
  109. information for the New York Times – that’s when President Bush
  110. made up that nonsense about the “terrorist surveillance program.”
  111. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  112.  
  113.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up … to try
  114. to placate the American people.
  115.  
  116.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) – who was not cleared for this –
  117. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  118. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  119.  
  120.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  121. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] – just
  122. a few – and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  123. investigation.”
  124.  
  125. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  126. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  127. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  128. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  129. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  130. _______________________________________
  131. ¤ NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  132.  
  133. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  134.  
  135. ¤ NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  136.  
  137. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  138.  
  139. ¤ SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  140.  
  141. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  142.  
  143. ¤ MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  144.  
  145. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  146.  
  147. ¤ Toward the Identity of “Country X” in MYSTIC ::
  148.  
  149. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  150.  
  151. ¤ Wikileaks Releases Identity of “Country X” ::
  152.  
  153. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  154.  
  155. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  156.  
  157. ¤ Google Idea’s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  158. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  159.  
  160. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  161.  
  162. ¤ Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  163. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  164.  
  165. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  166. _______________________________________
  167. ¤ NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  168.  
  169.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  170. agencies are now also using the same facial
  171. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  172. identification systems are being developed as well.
  173. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  174.  
  175. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  176.  
  177. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  178.  
  179. ¤ NSA Identity Spying ::
  180.  
  181. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  182. _______________________________________
  183. ¤ 10 Things (Most People) Didn’t Know Before Snowden ::
  184.  
  185. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  186. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  187. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  188. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  189. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  190. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  191. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  192. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  193. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  194. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  195.  
  196. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  197.  
  198. And a few more to think about,
  199.  
  200. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  201. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  202. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  203. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  204. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  205. _______________________________________
  206. ▼ Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  207.  
  208.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  209. NSA’s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  210. to raise concerns about the agency’s surveillance
  211. activity before he began leaking government documents
  212. to reporters, calling the response a “clearly tailored
  213. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.”
  214.  
  215.  “The NSA’s new discovery of written contact between
  216. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  217. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,”
  218. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. “It
  219. reveals as false the NSA’s claim to Barton Gellman
  220. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  221. ‘after extensive investigation, including interviews
  222. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  223. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden’s
  224. contention that he brought these matters to anyone’s
  225. attention.’”
  226.  
  227.  Snowden’s email followed Thursday’s release by the US
  228. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  229. exchange between Snowden and the NSA’s Office of the
  230. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  231. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  232.  
  233. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  234.  
  235. ▲ NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  236. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  237.  
  238. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  239. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  240. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  241. ---------------------------------------
  242. ¤ NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  243.  
  244. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  245.  
  246. Mirror here » http://upstore.net/62ocku
  247. _______________________________________
  248. ¤ What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don’t? ::
  249.  
  250. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  251.  
  252. ¤ A Hint? ; “Flashdrive Cache Paths” (Repost) ::
  253.  
  254. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  255. _______________________________________
  256. ¤ Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  257. Securely and Anonymously ::
  258.  
  259.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  260. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  261. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  262. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  263. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  264. It doesn’t require setting up a server on the
  265. internet somewhere or using a third party
  266. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  267. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  268. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  269. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  270. download the file from you.
  271.  
  272. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  273. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  274.  
  275. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  276.  
  277. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  278.  
  279. ¤ Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  280.  
  281. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  282. _______________________________________
  283. ¤ Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  284. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  285.  
  286. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  287.  
  288. ¤ The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  289.  
  290. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  291. _______________________________________
  292. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (EPUB) ::
  293.  
  294. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  295.  
  296. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  297.  
  298. ¤ Glenn Greenwald - “No Place To Hide” (PDF) ::
  299.  
  300. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  301.  
  302. ▼ NSA Documents From “No Place To Hide” ::
  303.  
  304. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  305.  
  306. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  307.  
  308. ▲ An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  309. Online Next Week ::
  310.  
  311. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  312. ---------------------------------------
  313. ¤ NSA’s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  314.  
  315. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  316.  
  317. ¤ Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  318.  
  319. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  320. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  321.  
  322. ¤ New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  323. Israel’s Security Ahead of America’s ::
  324.  
  325. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  326.  
  327. ¤ New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  328. Infiltration by NSA ::
  329.  
  330. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  331.  
  332. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  333.  
  334. ¤ Leaked Photos of the NSA’s TAO Factory ::
  335.  
  336.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  337. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald’s book
  338. “No Place To Hide” details how the agency’s Tailored
  339. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  340. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  341. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  342. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  343. they’re delivered.
  344.  
  345. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  346.  
  347. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  348.  
  349. ¤ Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  350.  
  351. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  352.  
  353. ¤ No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  354.  
  355. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  356. ______________________________________
  357. ¤ House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  358. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  359.  
  360. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  361. _______________________________________
  362. ¤ US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  363. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  364.  
  365. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  366. _______________________________________
  367. ¤ The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  368.  
  369. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  370. _______________________________________
  371. ▼ Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  372.  
  373. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  374.  
  375. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  376.  
  377. ▲ Obama’s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden’s
  378. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  379.  
  380.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  381. national security and other government officials will no
  382. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  383. news reporting that is based on “unauthorized leaks.”
  384.  
  385. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  386. _______________________________________
  387. ¤ Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  388.  
  389. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  390.  
  391. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  392. ______________________________________
  393. ¤ NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  394.  
  395. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  396. ______________________________________
  397. ¤ United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  398. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  399.  
  400. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  401. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  402.  
  403. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  404.  
  405. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  406. ______________________________________
  407. ¤ NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  408.  
  409. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  410.  
  411. ¤ NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  412.  
  413. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  414.  
  415. ¤ Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  416.  
  417.  “Keep in mind that social media survives by
  418. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  419. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  420. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  421. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  422. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  423. industry which generates something in the
  424. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.”
  425.  
  426.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  427.  
  428. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  429. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  430. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  431. _______________________________________
  432. ¤ GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  433.  
  434. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  435. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  436.  
  437.  “PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  438. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  439. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  440. ensure each partner is aware of the other’s
  441. activities and future plans.” … …
  442.  
  443.  “Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  444. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ’s wish
  445. list and is something its leadership still desires.”
  446.  
  447. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  448.  
  449. ¤ GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  450.  
  451. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  452.  
  453. ¤ NSA Spied “Suspected Terrorists” At 2012 Olympics ::
  454.  
  455. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  456.  
  457. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed “Suspected Terrorists” Before,
  458. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  459.  
  460.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  461. GCHQ’s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  462. “supportive” of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  463. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  464. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  465. communicated at “leadership” level, according to
  466. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  467. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. … …
  468.  
  469.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  470. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. … …
  471. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  472. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  473. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  474. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  475. archive, “100s of billions of entries.”
  476.  
  477. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  478. _______________________________________
  479. ¤ NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  480.  
  481. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  482. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  483. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  484.  
  485.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  486. system capable of recording “100 percent” of a foreign
  487. country’s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  488. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  489. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  490. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  491. Edward Snowden.
  492.  
  493.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  494. machine — one that can replay the voices from any call
  495. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  496. for surveillance.
  497.  
  498.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  499. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for “retrospective retrieval,”
  500. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  501. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  502. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  503.  
  504.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  505. “every single” conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  506. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  507. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  508.  
  509.  The call buffer opens a door “into the past,” the summary
  510. says, enabling users to “retrieve audio of interest that
  511. was not tasked at the time of the original call.” Analysts
  512. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  513. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  514. millions of voice clippings, or “cuts,” for processing
  515. and long-term storage.
  516.  
  517. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  518.  
  519. ¤ Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  520.  
  521.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  522. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  523. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  524. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  525. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  526. it’s actually doing this now–the Post knows where,
  527. but they won’t say.
  528.  
  529. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  530.  
  531. ¤ NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  532.  
  533. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  534.  
  535. Mirror here » http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  536. _______________________________________
  537. ¤ NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  538.  
  539.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  540. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  541. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  542. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  543. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  544. already been published previously. The second was
  545. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  546.  
  547. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  548.  
  549. ¤ NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  550.  
  551.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  552. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  553. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  554. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  555. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  556. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  557. The document, marked “top secret” is a summary of
  558. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  559. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  560.  
  561.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  562. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  563.  
  564.  “NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  565. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  566. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  567. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  568. benefit” the document says.
  569.  
  570.  “Windsor Blue” is the name of a program for
  571. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  572. company is working towards creating a so-called
  573. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  574. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  575. per second.
  576.  
  577. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  578. _______________________________________
  579. ¤ Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  580.  
  581. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  582. _______________________________________
  583. ¤ NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  584.  
  585. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  586. _______________________________________
  587. ¤ Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  588.  
  589. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  590. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  591. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  592. _______________________________________
  593. ¤ NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  594.  
  595.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  596. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  597. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe’s
  598. top human rights body.
  599.  
  600.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  601. Snowden said the National Security Agency – for
  602. which he worked as a contractor – had deliberately
  603. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  604. Human Rights Watch.
  605.  
  606. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  607.  
  608. ¤ Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  609. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  610.  
  611. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  612. _______________________________________
  613. ¤ EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  614.  
  615.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  616. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  617. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  618.  
  619.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  620. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  621. countries to “transpose” it into their own national
  622. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  623. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  624. high as two years. ... ...
  625.  
  626.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  627. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  628. by domestic courts.
  629.  
  630. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  631. _______________________________________
  632. ¤ Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  633.  
  634. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  635. _______________________________________
  636. ¤ US Whines - ‘Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair’ ::
  637.  
  638.  “Recent proposals from countries within the
  639. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  640. network (dubbed a ‘Schengen cloud’ by advocates) or
  641. to create national-only electronic networks could
  642. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  643. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  644. offering network services, or dependent on them,”
  645. the USTR said in its annual report.
  646.  
  647. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  648. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  649. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  650. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  651. ¤ More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  652.  
  653. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  654.  
  655.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  656. program run by the US Agency for International
  657. Development to create “a Twitter-like Cuban
  658. communications network” run through “secret shell
  659. companies” in order to create the false appearance
  660. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  661. to the service’s Cuban users was the fact that
  662. “American contractors were gathering their private
  663. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  664. purposes”–specifically, to manipulate those users
  665. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  666. government. According to top-secret documents
  667. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  668. operation is frequently discussed at western
  669. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  670. covertly use social media for “propaganda,” “deception,”
  671. “mass messaging,” and “pushing stories.” ...
  672.  
  673. ¤ GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  674.  
  675. “Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect”
  676.  
  677. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  678.  
  679.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  680. NSA document published today by The Intercept, “enables
  681. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  682. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  683. Intelligence communities.” The 2009 Conference, held at
  684. Fort Meade, included “eighty-six representatives from
  685. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  686. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  687. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  688. Space Intelligence Center.”
  689.  
  690.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  691. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  692. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  693. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  694. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  695. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is “to
  696. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  697. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.”
  698.  
  699.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  700. released GCHQ document is dubbed “Royal Concierge,” under
  701. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  702. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  703. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  704. how to “influence the hotel choice” of travelers and
  705. to determine whether they stay at “SIGINT friendly”
  706. hotels. The document asks: “Can we influence the hotel
  707. choice? Can we cancel their visit?” ...
  708.  
  709. ¤ NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  710.  
  711. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  712. ---------------------------------------
  713. ¤ GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  714.  
  715. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  716.  
  717. ¤ GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  718.  
  719. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  720.  
  721. ¤ GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  722.  
  723.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  724. of the NSA), titled “The Art of Deception: Training
  725. for Online Covert Operations,” were given to the
  726. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  727. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  728. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  729. “the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  730. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  731. attacks they accuse “hacktivists” of using, the
  732. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  733. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.”
  734.  
  735.  The goals of the JTRIG program are “(1) to inject
  736. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  737. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  738. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  739. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  740. generate outcomes it considers desirable.”
  741.  
  742. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  743. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  744. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  745. ---------------------------------------
  746. ¤ GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  747.  
  748. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  749.  
  750. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  751.  
  752. ¤ GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  753.  
  754. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  755.  
  756. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  757.  
  758. ¤ GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  759.  
  760. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  761.  
  762. ¤ GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  763.  
  764. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  765. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  766. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  767.  
  768. ¤ British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  769. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  770.  
  771. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  772. ---------------------------------------
  773. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  774.  
  775. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  776. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  777. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  778. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  779.  
  780. ¤ NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  781.  
  782. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  783.  
  784. ¤ Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  785.  
  786. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  787.  
  788. ¤ GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  789.  
  790. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  791. ---------------------------------------
  792. ▲ Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  793.  
  794. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  795. _______________________________________
  796. ¤ ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  797.  
  798. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  799.  
  800. ¤ ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  801.  
  802. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  803. _______________________________________
  804. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  805.  
  806.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  807. and documents from and related to Snowden’s leaks
  808. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I’m still collecting
  809. any information that comes out and will provide an
  810. updated archive from time to time.
  811.  
  812.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  813. “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and it holds a total of
  814. 927MB decompressed.
  815.  
  816.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  817. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  818. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  819.  
  820. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  821. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  822.  
  823. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  824. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  825. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  826. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  827. _______________________________________
  828. ¤ It’s Finally Admitted! ::
  829.  
  830. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  831. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  832. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  833. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  834. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  835. _______________________________________
  836. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  837.  
  838. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  839.  
  840. ¤ NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  841.  
  842. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  843.  
  844. ¤ GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  845.  
  846. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  847. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  848. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  849. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  850.  
  851. ▲ UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  852. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  853.  
  854. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  855. _______________________________________
  856. ¤ Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  857.  
  858. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  859.  
  860. ¤ Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  861.  
  862. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  863.  
  864. ¤ IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  865.  
  866. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  867.  
  868. ¤ Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  869.  
  870. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  871. _______________________________________
  872. ¤ NSA’s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  873.  
  874.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  875. also promises the NSA will “build privacy into
  876. new technologies” to “protect privacy and civil
  877. liberties” and “to be as transparent with the
  878. public as possible” as well helping the public
  879. “understand how we’re protecting their privacy,
  880. how we’re protecting national security.”
  881.  
  882. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  883. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  884. ¤ NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  885.  
  886. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  887.  
  888. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  889.  
  890. ¤ Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  891.  
  892. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  893.  
  894. ¤ Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  895.  
  896. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  897.  
  898. ¤ NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  899.  
  900.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  901. offensive against China, with targets including the
  902. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  903. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  904. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  905. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  906. service’s targets were former Chinese President
  907. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  908. well as telecommunications companies.
  909.  
  910.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  911. With 150,000 employees and €28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  912. in annual revenues, the company is the world’s second
  913. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  914. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  915. to internally as “Shotgiant,” against the company, which
  916. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  917. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  918. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  919. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA’s
  920. battle for data supremacy.
  921.  
  922.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  923. in infiltrating Huwaei’s network and copied a list of
  924. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  925. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  926. among other things.
  927.  
  928. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  929. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  930. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  931. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  932.  
  933. ¤ Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  934.  
  935.  “We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  936. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  937. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  938. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  939. has lodged representations with the American side on
  940. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  941. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.”
  942.  
  943. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  944. _______________________________________
  945. ¤ NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  946.  
  947.  The document consists of several posts – one of
  948. them is titled “I hunt sys admins” – that were
  949. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  950. hosted on the agency’s classified servers. They
  951. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  952. agency’s effort to break into foreign network
  953. routers, the devices that connect computer
  954. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  955. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  956. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  957. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  958. that flow over their networks.
  959.  
  960.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  961. aspired to create a database that would function
  962. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  963. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  964. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  965. activity – they are targeted only because they
  966. control access to networks the agency wants to
  967. infiltrate. “Who better to target than the person
  968. that already has the ‘keys to the kingdom’?” one
  969. of the posts says.
  970.  
  971.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  972. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  973. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  974. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  975. and, the author jokes, “pictures of cats in funny
  976. poses with amusing captions.”
  977.  
  978. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  979. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  980. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  981. _______________________________________
  982. ¤ NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  983.  
  984. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  985. _______________________________________
  986. ¤ CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  987.  
  988. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  989.  
  990. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  991.  
  992. ¤ Default Le Monde Report ::
  993.  
  994. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  995.  
  996. ¤ Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  997.  
  998. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  999. _______________________________________
  1000. ¤ DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  1001.  
  1002. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  1003. _______________________________________
  1004. ¤ TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  1005.  
  1006. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  1007.  
  1008. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  1009. _______________________________________
  1010. ¤ SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  1011.  
  1012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  1013. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  1014. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  1015. _______________________________________
  1016. ¤ NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  1017.  
  1018. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1019.  
  1020. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1021. _______________________________________
  1022. ¤ NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  1023.  
  1024. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  1025. _______________________________________
  1026. ¤ Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  1027.  
  1028. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  1029.  
  1030. ¤ Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  1031.  
  1032. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  1033. _______________________________________
  1034. ¤ NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1035.  
  1036.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1037. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1038. “Raw Take” Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1039. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1040. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1041. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1042. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1043.  
  1044. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1045.  
  1046. ▲ FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1047.  
  1048. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1049. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1050. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1051.  
  1052. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1053.  
  1054. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1055.  
  1056. ▲ DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1057.  
  1058.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1059. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1060.  
  1061. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1062.  
  1063. ▲ USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1064.  
  1065. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1066.  
  1067. ▲ FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1068.  
  1069.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1070. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1071. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1072. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1073.  
  1074. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1075.  
  1076. ▲ Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1077.  
  1078. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1079.  
  1080. ▲ NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1081.  
  1082. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1083.  
  1084. ▲ Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1085.  
  1086. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1087.  
  1088. NSA’s FOIA Release » http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1089.  
  1090. ▲ NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1091.  
  1092. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1093.  
  1094. ▲ NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1095.  
  1096. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1097. _______________________________________
  1098. ¤ NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  1099.  
  1100. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  1101. _______________________________________
  1102. ¤ NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  1103.  
  1104. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  1105.  
  1106. ▲ FBI’s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  1107.  
  1108. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  1109.  
  1110. ▲ FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  1111.  
  1112. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  1113. _______________________________________
  1114. ¤ STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  1115.  
  1116. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  1117.  
  1118. ▲ NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  1119.  
  1120. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1121. _______________________________________
  1122. ¤ FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  1123.  
  1124. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  1125. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  1126. _______________________________________
  1127. ¤ How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  1128. With Malware ::
  1129.  
  1130.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  1131. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  1132. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  1133. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  1134. level of human oversight in the process.
  1135.  
  1136.  The classified files – provided previously by NSA
  1137. whistleblower Edward Snowden – contain new details
  1138. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  1139. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  1140. of computers worldwide with malware “implants.” The
  1141. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  1142. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  1143. Internet and phone networks.
  1144.  
  1145. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  1146. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  1147. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  1148. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  1149. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  1150. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  1151. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  1152. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  1153. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  1154.  
  1155.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  1156. efforts operates from the agency’s headquarters in
  1157. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  1158. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  1159. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  1160. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  1161.  
  1162.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  1163. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  1164. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  1165. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  1166. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  1167. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  1168. handled by humans. The automated system – codenamed TURBINE
  1169. – is designed to “allow the current implant network to
  1170. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  1171. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  1172. instead of individually.”
  1173.  
  1174. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  1175.  
  1176. ¤ “Thousands of Implants” ::
  1177.  
  1178.  “Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  1179. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  1180. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  1181. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  1182. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  1183. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  1184. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  1185. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  1186. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  1187. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  1188. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  1189. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  1190. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  1191. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  1192. execute endpoint operations.”
  1193.  
  1194. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1195.  
  1196.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  1197. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  1198. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a “back-door
  1199. implant” infects their computers within eight seconds.
  1200.  
  1201.  There’s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  1202. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  1203. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  1204. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  1205. looks suspicious.
  1206.  
  1207.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  1208. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  1209. “man-in-the-middle” and “man-on-the-side” attacks, which
  1210. covertly force a user’s internet browser to route to NSA
  1211. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  1212.  
  1213.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  1214. target’s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  1215. “accesses” to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  1216. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  1217. is able to exploit, the agency’s surveillance sensors alert
  1218. the TURBINE system, which then “shoots” data packets at the
  1219. targeted computer’s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  1220.  
  1221.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  1222. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  1223. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  1224. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target’s
  1225. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  1226. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  1227. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  1228. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  1229. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  1230. in action.
  1231.  
  1232. ¤ How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  1233. Computers for Surveillance ::
  1234.  
  1235. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  1236.  
  1237. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  1238.  
  1239. Mirrored » http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  1240.  
  1241.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  1242. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  1243. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  1244. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  1245. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  1246. of the NSA’s automated TURBINE system.
  1247.  
  1248. ¤ NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  1249.  
  1250. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  1251. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  1252. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  1253. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  1254. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1255. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  1256. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  1257. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  1258. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  1259. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  1260.  
  1261. ¤ Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  1262.  
  1263. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  1264.  
  1265. ¤ NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  1266.  
  1267. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  1268. _______________________________________
  1269. ¤ NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  1270.  
  1271. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  1272. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  1273. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  1274. _______________________________________
  1275. ¤ Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  1276.  
  1277. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  1278. _______________________________________
  1279. ¤ NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  1280.  
  1281.  Alliances between security services are usually
  1282. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  1283. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  1284. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  1285. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  1286. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  1287. internet traffic.
  1288.  
  1289.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  1290. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  1291. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled ‘Netherlands
  1292. – 30 days’, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  1293. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  1294.  
  1295.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  1296. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  1297. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  1298. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  1299. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  1300. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  1301.  
  1302.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  1303. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  1304. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  1305. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  1306. Americans may possibly use the information for
  1307. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  1308. by attacking them with armed drones.
  1309.  
  1310. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  1311.  
  1312. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  1313. _______________________________________
  1314. ¤ NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  1315.  
  1316. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  1317.  
  1318. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  1319. ---------------------------------------
  1320. ¤ Tech Firms Spy ::
  1321.  
  1322. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  1323.  
  1324. ¤ NSA Spies Too ::
  1325.  
  1326. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1327. _______________________________________
  1328. ¤ GCHQ “OPTIC NERVE” Spy Programme ::
  1329.  
  1330. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  1331.  
  1332. ¤ GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  1333.  
  1334.  The documents show that images were collected
  1335. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  1336. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  1337. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  1338. programs.
  1339.  
  1340. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  1341. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  1342. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  1343. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  1344.  
  1345. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  1346.  
  1347. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  1348. _______________________________________
  1349. ¤ NSA Director Alexander’s Phones ::
  1350.  
  1351. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  1352. _______________________________________
  1353. ¤ NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  1354.  
  1355. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  1356.  
  1357. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  1358. _______________________________________
  1359. ¤ NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  1360. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  1361.  
  1362. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  1363.  
  1364. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  1365. _______________________________________
  1366. ¤ NSA Observer ::
  1367.  
  1368. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  1369. _______________________________________
  1370. ¤ Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  1371.  
  1372. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1373.  
  1374. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  1375. _______________________________________
  1376. ¤ NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  1377.  
  1378. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  1379.  
  1380. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  1381. _______________________________________
  1382. ¤ NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  1383.  
  1384. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  1385.  
  1386. 01 “MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010”
  1387.  
  1388. 02 “Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices”
  1389.  
  1390. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  1391. _______________________________________
  1392. ¤ NSA’s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  1393.  
  1394.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  1395. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  1396. Intercept — a new publication helmed by
  1397. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  1398. NSA revelations last year — that the US military
  1399. and CIA use the NSA’s metadata analysis and
  1400. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  1401. targets without confirming their veracity on
  1402. the ground.
  1403.  
  1404. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  1405. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  1406. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  1407. _______________________________________
  1408. ¤ ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  1409.  
  1410.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  1411. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  1412. shows that an American law firm was
  1413. monitored while representing a foreign
  1414. government in trade disputes with the
  1415. United States. The disclosure offers a
  1416. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  1417. which Americans were ensnared by the
  1418. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  1419. interest because lawyers in the United
  1420. States with clients overseas have
  1421. expressed growing concern that their
  1422. confidential communications could be
  1423. compromised by such surveillance.
  1424.  
  1425. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  1426. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  1427. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  1428.  
  1429. NOBODY comments
  1430.  
  1431. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  1432.  
  1433.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  1434. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  1435. be declassified for research in public domain.
  1436. _______________________________________
  1437. ¤ NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  1438.  
  1439. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  1440.  
  1441. ¤ NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  1442.  
  1443. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  1444. _______________________________________
  1445. ¤ Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  1446.  
  1447. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  1448. _______________________________________
  1449. ¤ Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder Allegedly
  1450. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  1451.  
  1452.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  1453. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  1454. that Merkel’s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  1455. was added to the NSA’s National Sigint
  1456. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  1457.  
  1458. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  1459. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  1460. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  1461.  
  1462. ¤ New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  1463. the German Chancellor ::
  1464.  
  1465. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  1466. _______________________________________
  1467. ¤ Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  1468. Phone Call Spying ::
  1469.  
  1470. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  1471.  
  1472. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  1473. _______________________________________
  1474. ¤ First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  1475.  
  1476. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  1477. _______________________________________
  1478. ¤ Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  1479.  
  1480. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  1481. _______________________________________
  1482.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  1483. Guardian’s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  1484. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  1485. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  1486. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  1487. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  1488.  
  1489. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  1490. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  1491. ¤ CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  1492.  
  1493. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  1494.  
  1495. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  1496.  
  1497. ¤ CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  1498.  
  1499. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  1500.  
  1501. ¤ CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  1502.  
  1503.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  1504. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  1505. that Canada’s electronic spy agency used information
  1506. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  1507. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  1508. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  1509. left the terminal.
  1510.  
  1511.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada’s
  1512. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  1513. clandestine operation by the Communications
  1514. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  1515. certainly illegal. ... ...
  1516.  
  1517.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  1518. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  1519. software program CSEC was developing with help
  1520. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  1521.  
  1522.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  1523. “game-changing,” and said they could be used for
  1524. tracking “any target that makes occasional forays
  1525. into other cities/regions.”
  1526.  
  1527. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  1528.  
  1529.  CSEC concluded: “Can then take seeds from these
  1530. airports and repeat to cover whole world.”
  1531.  
  1532. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  1533.  
  1534. ¤ More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  1535.  
  1536. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  1537.  
  1538. ¤ How Canada’s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  1539.  
  1540. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  1541. _______________________________________
  1542. ¤ NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  1543.  
  1544. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  1545.  
  1546. ¤ ... And Now It’s Personal ::
  1547.  
  1548. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  1549. _______________________________________
  1550. ¤ GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  1551.  
  1552.  Documents taken from the National Security
  1553. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  1554. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  1555. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  1556. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  1557. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  1558. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  1559. information, for analysis. At the time the
  1560. documents were printed, they were also able to
  1561. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  1562.  
  1563.  Called “Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV”
  1564. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  1565. a section that spells out “Broad real-time
  1566. monitoring of online activity” of YouTube videos,
  1567. URLs “liked” on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  1568. visits. The monitoring program is called
  1569. “Squeaky Dolphin.”
  1570.  
  1571.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  1572. British had to have been either physically able
  1573. to tap the cables carrying the world’s web
  1574. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  1575. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  1576. and would be able to extract some key data
  1577. about specific users as well.
  1578.  
  1579. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  1580. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  1581. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  1582. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  1583. _______________________________________
  1584. ¤ NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  1585.  
  1586. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  1587. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  1588. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  1589.  
  1590. ¤ GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  1591.  
  1592.  “Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  1593. on the iPhone alone.”
  1594.  
  1595. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  1596.  
  1597. ¤ NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  1598.  
  1599. “Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.”
  1600.  
  1601. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  1602. _______________________________________
  1603. ¤ Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  1604.  
  1605.  The National Security Agency program that
  1606. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  1607. isn’t legal, a privacy review board said
  1608. Thursday in a newly released report.
  1609.  
  1610. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  1611.  
  1612.  “We have not identified a single instance
  1613. involving a threat to the United States in
  1614. which the program made a concrete difference
  1615. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  1616. investigation,” the board wrote in the
  1617. report released Thursday.
  1618.  
  1619.  Despite Obama’s promise to reform the NSA,
  1620. domestic spying will continue.
  1621.  
  1622. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  1623. _______________________________________
  1624. ¤ Snowden Speaks ::
  1625.  
  1626. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  1627. _______________________________________
  1628. ▼ Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story “Absurd” ::
  1629.  
  1630. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  1631.  
  1632. ▲ NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  1633.          ¯¯¯
  1634. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  1635.  
  1636. NOBODY’s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  1637.  
  1638.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  1639. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  1640. will come from peoples’ change of online use ;
  1641. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  1642. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  1643. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  1644. hardcopy backups rather than “the cloud” - and
  1645. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  1646. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  1647. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  1648. of users’ modems when not actually being used. The
  1649. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  1650. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  1651. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  1652. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  1653.  
  1654. Reform?
  1655.  
  1656.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  1657. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  1658. say “fuck the corporate platforms” and change it
  1659. whether legal or not?
  1660.  
  1661. The reform will come from people taking action.
  1662.  
  1663.  Here’s what I’d like to know - will “big government”
  1664. follow up reform with their “internet kill switch?”
  1665. _______________________________________
  1666. ¤ NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  1667.  
  1668. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  1669. _______________________________________
  1670. ¤ NSA’s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  1671.  
  1672.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  1673. three ways NSA is intercepting the world’s
  1674. main internet cables:
  1675.  
  1676.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  1677.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  1678.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  1679.  
  1680. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  1681. ---------------------------------------
  1682. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  1683. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  1684. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  1685. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  1686. _______________________________________
  1687. ¤ 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  1688.  
  1689. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  1690.  
  1691. ¤ FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  1692.  
  1693. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  1694. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  1695. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  1696. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  1697. ---------------------------------------
  1698. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1699. _______________________________________
  1700. ¤ SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  1701.  
  1702. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  1703.  
  1704. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  1705.  
  1706. ¤ NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  1707.  
  1708.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  1709. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  1710. the metadata of “untargeted and unwarranted”
  1711. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  1712.  
  1713.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  1714. “pretty much everything it can”, according to
  1715. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  1716. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  1717.  
  1718.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  1719. text message database to extract information
  1720. on people’s travel plans, contact books, financial
  1721. transactions and more – including of individuals
  1722. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  1723.  
  1724. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  1725. _______________________________________
  1726. ¤ NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  1727.  
  1728. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  1729.  
  1730. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  1731.  
  1732.  The technology, which the agency has used
  1733. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  1734. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  1735. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  1736. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  1737. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  1738. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  1739. set up miles away from the target.
  1740.  
  1741.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  1742. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  1743. American intelligence agencies for years:
  1744. getting into computers that adversaries,
  1745. and some American partners, have tried to
  1746. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  1747. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  1748. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  1749. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  1750. ---------------------------------------
  1751. Refer to NSA’s Tailored Access Operations
  1752.  
  1753. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  1754. _______________________________________
  1755. ¤ NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  1756.  
  1757. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  1758. ---------------------------------------
  1759. ¤ Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  1760.  
  1761. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  1762. _______________________________________
  1763. ¤ NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  1764.  
  1765. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  1766. _______________________________________
  1767. ¤ NSA’s Organizational Designations ::
  1768.  
  1769. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  1770. _______________________________________
  1771. ¤ Analysis of NSA’s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  1772.  
  1773. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  1774. _______________________________________
  1775. ¤ John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  1776. of Internet Metadata Doesn’t Work ::
  1777.  
  1778. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  1779.  
  1780. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  1781. _______________________________________
  1782. ¤ Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  1783. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  1784.  
  1785. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  1786. _______________________________________
  1787. ¤ NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  1788. All Encryption ::
  1789.  
  1790.  In room-size metal boxes ­secure against
  1791. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  1792. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  1793. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  1794. used to protect banking, medical, business
  1795. and government records around the world.
  1796.  
  1797.  According to documents provided by former
  1798. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  1799. to build “a cryptologically useful quantum
  1800. computer” — a machine exponentially faster
  1801. than classical computers — is part of a
  1802. $79.7 million research program titled
  1803. “Penetrating Hard Targets.” Much of the
  1804. work is hosted under classified contracts
  1805. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  1806.  
  1807. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  1808. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  1809. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  1810. _______________________________________
  1811. ¤ NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  1812.  
  1813. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  1814. _______________________________________
  1815. ¤ Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  1816.  
  1817. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  1818. _______________________________________
  1819. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  1820.  
  1821. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  1822.  
  1823. Mirror » http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  1824.  
  1825. ¤ Jacob’s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  1826.  
  1827. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  1828.  
  1829. ¤ NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  1830.  
  1831. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  1832. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  1833. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  1834.  
  1835. ¤ Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  1836.  
  1837.  The NSA’s TAO hacking unit is considered
  1838. to be the intelligence agency’s top secret
  1839. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  1840. infiltrates computers around the world and
  1841. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  1842. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  1843. it is targeting. ... ...
  1844.  
  1845. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  1846.  
  1847.  The insert method and other variants of
  1848. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  1849. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  1850. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  1851. infrastructure comprised of “covert”
  1852. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  1853. also incorporates routers and servers
  1854. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  1855. network by infecting these networks with
  1856. “implants” that then allow the government
  1857. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  1858.  
  1859.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  1860. to identify and track its targets based on
  1861. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  1862. could include certain email addresses or
  1863. website cookies set on a person’s computer.
  1864. Of course, a cookie doesn’t automatically
  1865. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  1866. additional information like an email address.
  1867. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  1868. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  1869. ---------------------------------------
  1870. ¤ NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  1871.  
  1872. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  1873.  
  1874. ¤ NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  1875.  
  1876.  “YahooBcookie’s are unique to a specific
  1877. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  1878. that are being logged into on that computer
  1879. as long as the user does not clear browser
  1880. cookies.”
  1881.  
  1882. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  1883.  
  1884. ¤ NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  1885.  
  1886. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  1887. ---------------------------------------
  1888. ¤ NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  1889.  
  1890.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  1891. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  1892. could be described as master carpenters for
  1893. the NSA’s department for Tailored Access
  1894. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual
  1895. hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice,
  1896. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  1897. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  1898. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  1899. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  1900. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  1901. considerable role in the intelligence agency’s
  1902. ability to establish a global covert network
  1903. that operates alongside the Internet.
  1904.  
  1905.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  1906. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  1907. allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  1908. on the targeted monitor,” for example, is
  1909. available for just $30. But an “active GSM
  1910. base station” -- a tool that makes it possible
  1911. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  1912. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  1913. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  1914. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  1915. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  1916. over $1 million.
  1917.  
  1918.  The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture
  1919. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  1920. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  1921. clear preference for planting their malicious
  1922. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  1923. computer’s motherboard that is the first thing
  1924. to load when a computer is turned on.
  1925.  
  1926.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  1927. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  1928. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  1929. to virus protection and other security programs.
  1930. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  1931. computer has been completely erased and a new
  1932. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  1933. can continue to function and ensures that new
  1934. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  1935. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  1936. developers call this “Persistence” and believe
  1937. this approach has provided them with the
  1938. possibility of permanent access.
  1939.  
  1940.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  1941. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  1942. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  1943. with the exception of latter, are American
  1944. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  1945. intelligence agency is compromising the
  1946. technology and products of American companies.
  1947.  
  1948. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  1949. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  1950. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  1951. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  1952. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  1953.  
  1954. ¤ NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  1955.  
  1956. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  1957.  
  1958. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  1959.  
  1960. ¤ NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  1961.  
  1962. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  1963.  
  1964. ¤ NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  1965.  
  1966. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  1967.  
  1968. ¤ NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  1969.  
  1970. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  1971.  
  1972. ¤ NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  1973.  
  1974. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  1975.  
  1976. ¤ NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  1977.  
  1978. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  1979.  
  1980. ¤ NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  1981.  
  1982. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  1983.  
  1984. ¤ NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  1985.  
  1986. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  1987.  
  1988. ¤ NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  1989.  
  1990. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  1991.  
  1992. ¤ NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  1993.  
  1994. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  1995.  
  1996. ¤ NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  1997.  
  1998. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  1999.  
  2000. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  2001.  
  2002. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  2003.  
  2004. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  2005. ---------------------------------------
  2006. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  2007.  
  2008. ¤ IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  2009.  
  2010. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  2011.  
  2012. ¤ Foreign Firms Won’t Buy American Tech ::
  2013.  
  2014. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  2015. ---------------------------------------
  2016. ¤ Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  2017.  
  2018. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  2019.  
  2020. ¤ Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  2021.  
  2022.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  2023. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  2024. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  2025.  
  2026. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  2027.  
  2028. ¤ Cyber–Security Experts Ask If Apple “Flaw”
  2029. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  2030.  
  2031.  Following an admission by Apple that a “bug”
  2032. in its operating system had left devices open
  2033. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  2034. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  2035. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  2036. of its mass spying program.
  2037.  
  2038. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  2039. ---------------------------------------
  2040. ¤ Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  2041. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  2042.  
  2043. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  2044.  
  2045. ¤ Dell Inc. Apologizes for the ‘Inconvenience’
  2046. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  2049.  
  2050. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  2051.  
  2052. ¤ Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  2053.  
  2054.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  2055. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  2056.  
  2057. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  2058. _______________________________________
  2059. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  2060.  
  2061. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  2062.  
  2063. ¤ NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  2064.  
  2065. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  2066. _______________________________________
  2067. ¤ Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  2068.  
  2069. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  2070.  
  2071.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  2072. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  2073. in the NSA’s Technology Directorate and
  2074. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  2075. Center’s regional base in Hawaii. For
  2076. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  2077. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  2078. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  2079. color-coded “heat maps” to depict the
  2080. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  2081.  
  2082.  His colleagues were often “astonished to
  2083. learn we are collecting more in the United
  2084. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  2085. in Russia,” he said. Many of them were
  2086. troubled, he said, and several said they
  2087. did not want to know any more.
  2088. ---------------------------------------
  2089. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  2090.  
  2091. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  2092. _______________________________________
  2093. ¤ New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  2094. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  2095.  
  2096. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  2097. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  2098. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  2099. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  2100. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  2101. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  2102. ¤ Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  2103. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  2104.  
  2105. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  2106.  
  2107.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  2108. National Security Agency program which
  2109. collects information on nearly all telephone
  2110. calls made to, from or within the United
  2111. States is likely unconstitutional.
  2112.  
  2113.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  2114. that the program appears to violate the
  2115. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  2116. searches and seizures. He also said the
  2117. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  2118. that collecting the information had helped
  2119. to head off terrorist attacks.
  2120.  
  2121.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  2122. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  2123. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  2124. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  2125. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  2126. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  2127. the order to allow for an appeal.
  2128.  
  2129. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  2130. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  2131.  
  2132.  Leon’s 68-page opinion is the first
  2133. significant legal setback for the NSA’s
  2134. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  2135. in June in news stories based on leaks
  2136. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  2137. For seven years, the metadata program has
  2138. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  2139. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  2140. Court and found constitutional by at least
  2141. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  2142.  
  2143. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  2144.  
  2145. ¤ Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  2146.  
  2147. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  2148.  
  2149. ▼ Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  2150.  
  2151. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  2152.  
  2153. ▲ White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  2154. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  2155.  
  2156. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  2157.  
  2158. ¤ Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  2159.  
  2160. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  2161. ---------------------------------------
  2162. ¤ White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  2163.  
  2164. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  2165.  
  2166. ¤ White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  2167.  
  2168. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  2169. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  2170.  
  2171. ¤ Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  2172. Spying Programs ::
  2173.  
  2174. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  2175. ---------------------------------------
  2176. ▼ FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  2177. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  2178.  
  2179. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  2180.  
  2181. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  2182.  
  2183. ▲ Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  2184. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  2185.  
  2186. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  2187.  
  2188. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  2189. _______________________________________
  2190. ¤ NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  2191.  
  2192.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  2193. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  2194. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  2195.  
  2196. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  2197.  
  2198. “ 1B. Ability to exploit:
  2199.  
  2200.  - Military Information
  2201.  - Economic Information
  2202.  - Information Operations Information
  2203.  - Political Information ”
  2204. _______________________________________
  2205. ¤ Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  2206. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  2207.  
  2208. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  2209. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2210. ¤ NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  2211.  
  2212. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  2213.  
  2214. ¤ RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  2215.  
  2216. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  2217.  
  2218. ¤ NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  2219.  
  2220. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  2221.  
  2222. ¤ List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  2223.  
  2224. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  2225.  
  2226. ¤ FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  2227.  
  2228. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  2229. _______________________________________
  2230. ¤ Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  2231. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  2232.  
  2233.  In a paper titled ‘The Internet Dark Age’
  2234. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  2235. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  2236. government access in order to make network
  2237. compromise easier. “BT are directly responsible
  2238. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  2239. in millions of homes and businesses within
  2240. the UK,” the paper states.
  2241.  
  2242.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  2243. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  2244. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  2245. assigns all their modems an extra address
  2246. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  2247. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  2248. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  2249. a second IP address for management, except
  2250. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  2251. assigned to the United States Department
  2252. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  2253. of speculation that this is actually a
  2254. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  2255. they can secretly monitor and control
  2256. peoples’ home networks.
  2257.  
  2258.  Maybe, but it’s probably not the case.
  2259. The better explanation is that BT simply
  2260. chose this address space because it’s
  2261. non-routable. While it’s assigned public
  2262. address, it’s only used inside the private
  2263. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  2264. that address space, you’ll see that your
  2265. packets go nowhere.
  2266.  
  2267. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  2268. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  2269. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  2270.  
  2271. ¤ Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  2272.  
  2273.  “Yes, it’s true. And contrary to rumors,
  2274. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  2275. No, BT wasn’t always happy with my writings
  2276. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  2277. independent thinker and didn’t try to
  2278. muzzle me in any way. I’m just ready to
  2279. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  2280. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  2281. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  2282. It’s past time for something new.”
  2283.  
  2284. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  2285. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  2286. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  2287. ---------------------------------------
  2288. ¤ NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  2289.  
  2290.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  2291. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  2292. worldwide with malicious software designed
  2293. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  2294. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  2295. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  2296.  
  2297.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  2298. explains how the NSA collects information
  2299. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  2300. shows that the intelligence service uses
  2301. ‘Computer Network Exploitation’ (CNE) in
  2302. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  2303. secret infiltration of computer systems
  2304. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  2305. software.
  2306.  
  2307.  One example of this type of hacking was
  2308. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  2309. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  2310. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ –
  2311. has been installing this malicious software
  2312. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  2313. their customers’ telephone and data traffic.
  2314. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  2315. through a process of luring employees to a
  2316. false Linkedin page.
  2317.  
  2318. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  2319. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2320. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  2321. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  2322.  
  2323. ¤ NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  2324.  
  2325.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  2326. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  2327. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  2328. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  2329. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  2330. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  2331. and citizens.
  2332.  
  2333.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  2334. will deter this bounty of profits for
  2335. the comsec industry, unless the public
  2336. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  2337. the nettle, and all those making money
  2338. from this deception operation decide to
  2339. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  2340.  
  2341.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  2342. lists, those participating in standards
  2343. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  2344. grants in think tanks and universities,
  2345. those in law firms and public interest
  2346. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  2347. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  2348. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  2349. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  2350. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  2351. diminish Snowden’s revelations with new
  2352. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  2353. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  2354. contracts, list lurking, online and
  2355. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  2356. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  2357. fulfilled.
  2358.  
  2359. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  2360.  
  2361. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2362.  
  2363. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  2364.  
  2365. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2366. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2367. ¤ GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  2368. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  2369.  
  2370. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  2371. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  2372. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  2373. _______________________________________
  2374. ¤ CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  2375.  
  2376. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  2377.  
  2378. ¤ CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  2379.  
  2380. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  2381.  
  2382. ¤ NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  2383.  
  2384. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  2385. _______________________________________
  2386. ¤ Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  2387.  
  2388. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  2389. _______________________________________
  2390. ¤ EU Data Retention Directive “Unlawful”
  2391. and “Incompatible” with Charter of Rights ::
  2392.  
  2393. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  2394.  
  2395. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  2396. _______________________________________
  2397. ¤ GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  2398.  
  2399. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  2400. _______________________________________
  2401. ¤ Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  2402. of Public Concerns ::
  2403.  
  2404. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  2405.  
  2406. ¤ Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  2407.  
  2408. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  2409. _______________________________________
  2410. ¤ GCHQ’s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2411.  
  2412.  “FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  2413. analysts to query GCHQ’s vast repository
  2414. of metadata about the world’s secure
  2415. communications over TLS/SSL. It’s
  2416. certainly not a program through which
  2417. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  2418. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  2419. services like Google, as reported by others,
  2420. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  2421. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  2422. Google are based on a small piece of a
  2423. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  2424. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  2425. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  2426. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  2427. That’s not to say the GCHQ doesn’t perform
  2428. MITM attacks, but there’s no evidence to
  2429. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  2430. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  2431. by providing information about a target.”
  2432.  
  2433. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  2434.  
  2435. ¤ NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2436.  
  2437. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  2438. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  2439. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  2440. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  2441. ¤ John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  2442.  
  2443. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  2444.  
  2445. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  2446. _______________________________________
  2447. ¤ FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  2448.  
  2449. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  2450. ---------------------------------------
  2451. ¤ hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  2452.  
  2453. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  2454.  
  2455.  HDFS stands for “Hadoop Distributed File
  2456. System” which was inspired by Google Inc,
  2457. and later managed by big data corporations
  2458. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  2459.  
  2460.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  2461. large files across machines in a large
  2462. cluster.
  2463.  
  2464. ¤ Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  2465.  
  2466.  “Hadoop is a data processing system that
  2467. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  2468. data analysis.” ... “Largest install is at
  2469. Yahoo, a major contributor.”
  2470.  
  2471.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  2472. major components, a central metadata server
  2473. and file servers from data.
  2474.  
  2475. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  2476.  
  2477. ¤ Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  2478.  
  2479.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  2480. posted on public domain.
  2481.  
  2482. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  2483.  
  2484. ¤ Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  2485. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  2486.  
  2487. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2488. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2489. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  2490.  
  2491. ¤ hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  2492.  
  2493. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  2494. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  2495. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  2496. ---------------------------------------
  2497. ¤ CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  2498. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  2499.  
  2500. “Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.”
  2501.  
  2502. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  2503.  
  2504. ¤ CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  2505.  
  2506. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  2507.  
  2508. ¤ NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  2509.  
  2510. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  2511.  
  2512. ¤ NSA’s Global Interception Network ::
  2513.  
  2514. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2515.  
  2516. ¤ NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  2517.  
  2518.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  2519. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  2520. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  2521. content of all our communications have
  2522. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  2523. program since the 1990s.
  2524.  
  2525.  The new details concern how, “The National
  2526. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  2527. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  2528. of cellphones around the world.”
  2529.  
  2530.  However, the report reveals itself to
  2531. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  2532. peddling when it claims that, “The NSA
  2533. does not target Americans’ location data
  2534. by design, but the agency acquires a
  2535. substantial amount of information on
  2536. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  2537. “incidentally.”
  2538.  
  2539.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  2540. happens to record the locations of Americans
  2541. using data from their cellphones, and is
  2542. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  2543. surveillance, is yet another example of
  2544. damage control by the establishment.
  2545.  
  2546. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  2547. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  2548. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  2549. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  2550. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  2551. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  2552. ---------------------------------------
  2553. ¤ NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  2554. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  2555.  
  2556.  The National Security Agency is ‘secretly’
  2557. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  2558. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  2559. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  2560. targets for government hacking and to
  2561. bolster surveillance.
  2562.  
  2563. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  2564. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  2565. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  2566. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  2567. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  2568. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  2569. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  2570. ---------------------------------------
  2571. ¤ FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google’s Cookie ::
  2572.  
  2573. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  2574. ---------------------------------------
  2575. ¤ How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  2576. In a World Without Cookies ::
  2577.  
  2578. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  2579. _______________________________________
  2580. ¤ How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  2581.  
  2582. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  2583. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  2584. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  2585.  
  2586. ¤ SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  2587.  
  2588. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  2589. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  2590. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  2591. _______________________________________
  2592. ¤ Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  2593. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  2594.  
  2595. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  2596. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  2597. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  2598. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  2599. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  2600. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  2601.  
  2602. ¤ NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  2603.  
  2604. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  2605.  
  2606. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship Was “Top Secret” ::
  2607.  
  2608. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  2609.  
  2610. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  2611.  
  2612. ¤ NSA & FRA Relationship “Actively Engaged” ::
  2613.  
  2614. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  2615.  
  2616. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  2617.  
  2618. ¤ NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  2619.  
  2620. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  2621.  
  2622. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  2623.  
  2624. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  2625. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  2626. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  2627.  
  2628. ¤ NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  2629.  
  2630. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  2631. ---------------------------------------
  2632. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  2633.  
  2634. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  2635. ---------------------------------------
  2636. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  2637.  
  2638. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  2639.  
  2640. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  2641.  
  2642. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  2643.  
  2644. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  2645.  
  2646. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  2647.  
  2648. ¤ NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  2649.  
  2650. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  2651. _______________________________________
  2652.  “Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  2653. worldwide was published by the German
  2654. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  2655. map was put online by accident, but before
  2656. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  2657. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  2658. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  2659. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  2660. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  2661. the names of all other cities were blurred
  2662. by Der Spiegel.”
  2663.  
  2664.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  2665.  
  2666. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  2667.  
  2668. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  2669.  
  2670. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  2671.  
  2672. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  2673.  
  2674. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  2675.  
  2676. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  2677. ---------------------------------------
  2678. ¤ Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  2679.  
  2680. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  2681.  
  2682. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  2683. _______________________________________
  2684. ¤ Five Eyes ::
  2685.  
  2686. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  2687. _______________________________________
  2688. ¤ A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  2689.  
  2690. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  2691. _______________________________________
  2692. ¤ PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  2693. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  2694.  
  2695. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  2696.  
  2697. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  2698. _______________________________________
  2699. ¤ NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  2700.  
  2701. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  2702.  
  2703. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  2704. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  2705. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  2706. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  2707. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  2708. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  2709. _______________________________________
  2710. ¤ Rollingstone Describes NSA’s Influx of Money ::
  2711.  
  2712.  September 11th, which also happened to
  2713. be Drake’s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  2714. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  2715. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  2716. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  2717. “unchained itself from the Constitution,”
  2718. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  2719. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  2720. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  2721. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  2722. itself.
  2723.  
  2724.  “Massive amounts of money were pumped
  2725. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  2726. saying, ‘How big do you want the check?’”
  2727. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  2728. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  2729. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  2730. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  2731. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  2732. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  2733. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  2734. where the NSA’s sprawling 5,000-acre
  2735. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  2736. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  2737. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  2738. its workforce by one-third, to about
  2739. 33,000. The number of private companies
  2740. it depended upon more than tripled during
  2741. that time.
  2742.  
  2743.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  2744. and the increasing reliance on the private
  2745. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  2746. the very heart of America’s intelligence
  2747. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  2748. contractors. “Essentially, 9/11 was a
  2749. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  2750. you needed for the party was your clearance,”
  2751. says Drake. “And tons of people were
  2752. getting those clearances. So you had
  2753. this huge apparatus being built, and
  2754. the government was just managing it.
  2755. And in some cases, they weren’t even
  2756. doing that.” ... ...
  2757.  
  2758.  By the time Snowden joined the agency’s
  2759. workforce, the surveillance he would
  2760. later expose was becoming not just
  2761. institutionalized but very big business.
  2762. “It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  2763. the full flower of that massive, massive
  2764. bubble of money,” says Drake. “And people
  2765. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  2766. could go.” ... ...
  2767.  
  2768.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  2769. leaking government secrets when he was
  2770. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  2771. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  2772. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  2773. system. His optimism didn’t last long.
  2774. “I watched as Obama advanced the very
  2775. policies that I thought would be reined
  2776. in,” he later said. As a result, he added,
  2777. “I got hardened.” The more Snowden saw of
  2778. the NSA’s actual business – and, particularly,
  2779. the more he read “true information,”
  2780. including a 2009 Inspector General’s report
  2781. detailing the Bush era’s warrantless-
  2782. surveillance program – the more he realized
  2783. that there were actually two governments:
  2784. the one that was elected, and the other,
  2785. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  2786. “If the highest officials in government
  2787. can break the law without fearing punishment
  2788. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  2789. powers become tremendously dangerous.”
  2790.  
  2791. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  2792. _______________________________________
  2793. ¤ Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  2794.  
  2795. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  2796. _______________________________________
  2797. ¤ Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  2798.  
  2799. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  2800. _______________________________________
  2801. ¤ Snowden Leaks “Greatest Intelligence
  2802. Failure Since World War 2” Exaggerated ::
  2803.  
  2804.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  2805. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  2806. press claim he stole “up to 20,000.” British
  2807. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  2808. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  2809. is the “greatest intelligence failure since
  2810. World War 2.” High officials and ex-spies
  2811. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  2812. in terrorism.
  2813.  
  2814.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  2815. to exaggerate Snowden’s damage, of betrayal
  2816. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  2817. threatening national security. It is
  2818. successfully restricting release of the
  2819. Snowden material and will likely become
  2820. more forceful as releases continue to the
  2821. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  2822. to criminalize release as a national
  2823. security threat.
  2824.  
  2825. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  2826. _______________________________________
  2827. ¤ KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  2828.  
  2829.  Includes most reports, slides and
  2830. documents all related to the recent
  2831. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  2832. 4th of 2013. I’m still collecting
  2833. any information that comes out and
  2834. will provide updated archives from
  2835. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  2836.  
  2837.  After decompression - the folder is
  2838. titled “Eyeballing_Snowden_Info” and
  2839. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  2840.  
  2841. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2842. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  2843.  
  2844. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  2845. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  2846. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  2847. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2848. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2849. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  2850. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  2851. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2852. _______________________________________
  2853. ¤ indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  2854.  
  2855. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2856. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2857. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2858.  
  2859. ¤ Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  2860. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  2861.  
  2862.  Australia’s intelligence apparatus mines
  2863. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  2864. Australians, and hands over the material
  2865. to the US and its closest allies, according
  2866. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  2867. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  2868. Australia web site.
  2869.  
  2870.  The document obtained by the former US
  2871. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  2872. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  2873. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  2874. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  2875. as well as the people and governments of
  2876. many Asian countries.
  2877.  
  2878.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  2879. restricting the ASD’s internal spying,
  2880. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  2881. global partners so-called metadata of
  2882. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  2883. address books and social media posts of
  2884. millions of people.
  2885.  
  2886.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  2887. the recent revelations, also from documents
  2888. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  2889. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  2890. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  2891. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  2892. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  2893. operate as electronic listening posts
  2894. for the US-led spying network.
  2895.  
  2896. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  2897. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  2898. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  2899. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  2900. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  2901. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  2902.  
  2903. ¤ Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  2904. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  2905.  
  2906.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s
  2907. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  2908. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  2909. political figures has been furiously
  2910. denounced by other media outlets for
  2911. breaching “national security” and the
  2912. “national interest.” The reaction
  2913. underscores the extent to which the
  2914. media establishment has been integrated
  2915. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  2916.  
  2917.  On November 18, after being approached
  2918. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  2919. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  2920. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  2921. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  2922. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  2923. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  2924. senior political figures. The report
  2925. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  2926. crisis for the Australian government, with
  2927. the Indonesian president suspending military
  2928. and intelligence cooperation.
  2929.  
  2930. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  2931. _______________________________________
  2932. ¤ NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  2933.  
  2934.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  2935. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  2936. Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s dictatorship
  2937. allowed the largest American spy agency
  2938. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  2939. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  2940.  
  2941.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  2942. by CBC News.
  2943.  
  2944.  The briefing notes, stamped “Top Secret,”
  2945. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  2946. a security command post during a six-day
  2947. spying operation by the National Security
  2948. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  2949. other foreign heads of government were on
  2950. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  2951.  
  2952.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  2953. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  2954.  
  2955.  The world was still struggling to climb
  2956. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  2957. were debating a wide array of possible
  2958. measures including a global tax on banks,
  2959. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  2960. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  2961. eventually scotched.
  2962.  
  2963. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  2964. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  2965. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  2966. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  2967. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  2968.  
  2969. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  2970. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  2971.  
  2972. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  2973.  
  2974.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  2975. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  2976.  
  2977. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  2978.  
  2979. ¤ Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  2980.  
  2981. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  2982.  
  2983. ¤ Ministério de Minas e Energia está na
  2984. mira de espiões americanos e canadenses ::
  2985.  
  2986. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  2987.  
  2988. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  2989.  
  2990. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  2991.  
  2992. ¤ American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  2993. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  2994.  
  2995. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  2996.  
  2997. ¤ Canada’s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  2998.  
  2999.  The politicians and corporate media
  3000. would have Canadians believe that they
  3001. have only “moved on” from discussing
  3002. CSEC’s activities because there is
  3003. nothing for Canadians to worry about.
  3004.  
  3005.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool
  3006. of the Canadian ruling class that plays
  3007. an important role in the pursuit of its
  3008. imperialist foreign policy and in the
  3009. surveillance and suppression of opposition
  3010. at home. The size of CSEC’s staff—it
  3011. employs almost 2,000 people and a further
  3012. thousand military personnel assist its
  3013. work—give an inkling of the scale of
  3014. its activities.
  3015.  
  3016.  These include everything from supporting
  3017. the overseas operations of the Canadian
  3018. military, to spying on governments that
  3019. are reputed allies of Canada and assisting
  3020. CSIS and the RCMP in conducting a vast
  3021. program of domestic surveillance. Of
  3022. especial importance is the CSEC’s
  3023. partnership with the NSA. According to
  3024. former NSA technical director William
  3025. Binney, the two organizations “have
  3026. integrated personnel” i.e. swap personnel
  3027. to improve seamless collaboration. They
  3028. also share Internet surveillance programs.
  3029.  
  3030.  As a further element of its collaboration
  3031. with the Five Eyes alliance, CSEC was
  3032. relied on in the project of spying on
  3033. diplomats and officials during the 2009
  3034. London G20 meeting according to a report
  3035. in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  3036. which was based on documents supplied
  3037. by Snowden. The highly sensitive operation
  3038. involved the penetration of delegates’
  3039. smartphones to monitor their email
  3040. messages and calls.
  3041.  
  3042. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  3043.  
  3044. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  3045.  
  3046. ¤ NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  3047.  
  3048. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  3049. _______________________________________
  3050. ¤ EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  3051.  
  3052. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  3053.  
  3054. ¤ EU Hearings On NSA ::
  3055.  
  3056. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  3057. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  3058. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  3059.  
  3060. ¤ EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  3061.  
  3062. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  3063.  
  3064. ¤ EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  3065.  
  3066. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  3067. _______________________________________
  3068.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  3069. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would –
  3070. in theory – forbid local governments from
  3071. providing services to federal agencies
  3072. that collect electronic data from Americans
  3073. without a personalized warrant.
  3074.  
  3075.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  3076. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  3077. but at least one legislator has committed
  3078. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  3079. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  3080. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  3081. is introduced.
  3082.  
  3083.  “We are still very early in the campaign,
  3084. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  3085. long-term strategy,” says Maharrey, whose
  3086. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  3087. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  3088. and a handful of other groups.
  3089.  
  3090.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  3091. Maharrey adds.
  3092.  
  3093. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  3094. _______________________________________
  3095. ¤ Guardian’s Reporters Face Threats and
  3096. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  3097.  
  3098.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  3099. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  3100. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  3101. US and British intelligence — particularly
  3102. their cooperation in data collection and
  3103. snooping programs involving British citizens
  3104. and close allies on the European continent.
  3105.  
  3106.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  3107. to account by British authorities for
  3108. jeopardizing national security. The
  3109. Guardian’s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  3110. is being forced to appear before a
  3111. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  3112. the news outlet’s actions.
  3113.  
  3114. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3115. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  3116. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  3117.  
  3118. ¤ Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  3119.  
  3120. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3121.  
  3122. ¤ US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  3123. as the British Dictatorship ::
  3124.  
  3125.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  3126. published Edward Snowden’s leaks, was
  3127. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  3128. shining light on the NSA’s abuse of power.
  3129. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  3130. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  3131. seems the United States is reaching the event
  3132. horizon to a police state.
  3133.  
  3134. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  3135.  
  3136. Cryptome noted
  3137.  
  3138.  “There have been no reports of leakage
  3139. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  3140. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  3141. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  3142. UKG), although there could be some which have
  3143. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  3144. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  3145.  
  3146.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  3147. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  3148. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  3149. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  3150. deception, co-optation.
  3151.  
  3152.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  3153. had access, or suspected of access, are
  3154. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  3155. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  3156. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  3157. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  3158. standard coercive means of authorities.
  3159.  
  3160.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  3161. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  3162. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  3163. advised successive cooperators, usually
  3164. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  3165. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  3166. participation.
  3167.  
  3168.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  3169. disputes and disagreements among competing
  3170. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  3171. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  3172. along with threats against families, friends
  3173. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  3174. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  3175. with authorities, including use of rewards
  3176. -- monetary and career -- for informants.”
  3177.  
  3178. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  3179. _______________________________________
  3180. ¤ NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  3181.  
  3182. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  3183. _______________________________________
  3184. ¤ Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  3185. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  3186. Governments ::
  3187.  
  3188. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  3189. _______________________________________
  3190. ¤ NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  3191. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  3192.  
  3193. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  3194. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  3195. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  3196. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  3197. _______________________________________
  3198. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  3199.  
  3200. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  3201.  
  3202. ¤ What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  3203.  
  3204. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  3205.  
  3206. ¤ NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  3207.  
  3208. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  3209.  
  3210. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  3211.  
  3212. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  3213.  
  3214. ¤ NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  3215.  
  3216. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  3217.  
  3218. ¤ NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  3219.  
  3220. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  3221.  
  3222. ¤ NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  3223.  
  3224. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  3225.  
  3226. ¤ NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  3227.  
  3228. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  3229.  
  3230. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  3231. Steal Email Metadata ::
  3232.  
  3233.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  3234. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  3235. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  3236. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  3237.  
  3238.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  3239. servers around the world, reducing the
  3240. chance of losing your information should
  3241. one fail. When you log in to an account
  3242. with these firms, the data sent between
  3243. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  3244. it difficult to snoop – but the internal
  3245. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  3246. And because many of the transfers take place
  3247. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  3248. isn’t required to tap the information.
  3249.  
  3250.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  3251. broken into the main communications links
  3252. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  3253. around the world, according to documents
  3254. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  3255. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  3256. officials.
  3257.  
  3258.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  3259. positioned itself to collect at will from
  3260. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  3261. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  3262. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  3263. but it keeps a lot.
  3264.  
  3265.  The NSA’s principal tool to exploit the
  3266. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  3267. operated jointly with the agency’s British
  3268. counterpart, the Government Communications
  3269. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  3270. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  3271. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  3272. that carry information among the data
  3273. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  3274.  
  3275. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  3276. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  3277. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  3278. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  3279. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  3280.  
  3281. ¤ NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  3282.  
  3283.  In June, President Obama said the NSA’s
  3284. email collecting program “does not apply
  3285. to US citizens.”
  3286.  
  3287.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  3288. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  3289. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  3290. accounts around the world, many of them
  3291. belonging to Americans, according to
  3292. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  3293. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  3294. Edward Snowden.
  3295.  
  3296.  The collection program, which has not
  3297. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  3298. address books and “buddy lists” from
  3299. instant messaging services as they move
  3300. across global data links. Online services
  3301. often transmit those contacts when a user
  3302. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  3303. a computer or mobile device with information
  3304. stored on remote servers.
  3305.  
  3306. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  3307. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  3308. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  3309.  
  3310. ¤ Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  3311.  
  3312. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  3313.  
  3314. ¤ NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  3315.  
  3316. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  3317. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  3318. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  3319. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  3320. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  3321. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3322. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant ::
  3323.  
  3324. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  3325.  
  3326. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Collected
  3327. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  3328.  
  3329. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  3330.  
  3331. ¤ NSA’s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  3332.  
  3333. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  3334.  
  3335. ¤ Guardian’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3336.  
  3337. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  3338.  
  3339. ¤ Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3340.  
  3341. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  3342.  
  3343. ¤ Three Boundless Informant “Heatmaps” ::
  3344.  
  3345. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  3346.  
  3347. ¤ NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  3348.  
  3349. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  3350.  
  3351. ¤ US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  3352.  
  3353. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  3354. ---------------------------------------
  3355. NOBODY comments ▼
  3356.  
  3357.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant document
  3358. differs from the Guardians.
  3359.  
  3360. Le Monde’s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3361.  
  3362. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  3363.  
  3364. Guardians’ Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3365.  
  3366. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  3367.  
  3368.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  3369. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  3370. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  3371.  
  3372.  Le Monde’s Boundless Informant graph
  3373. shows the “aggregate” estimate, both
  3374. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  3375. interception ; while the Guardian’s graph
  3376. only shows the digital “DNI” estimate.
  3377. ---------------------------------------
  3378. ¤ DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  3379.  
  3380. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  3381.  
  3382. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3383.  
  3384.  This was written from a person who purports
  3385. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  3386.  
  3387. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  3388.  
  3389. ¤ RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3390.  
  3391. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  3392.  
  3393. ¤ BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  3394. Misleading ::
  3395.  
  3396. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  3397.  
  3398. ¤ DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  3399. on NSA Spying ::
  3400.  
  3401. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  3402.  
  3403.  “Recent articles published in the
  3404. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  3405. inaccurate and misleading information
  3406. regarding US foreign intelligence
  3407. activities. The allegation that the
  3408. National Security Agency collected more
  3409. than 70 million “recordings of French
  3410. citizens’ telephone data” is false.
  3411.  
  3412.  While we are not going to discuss the
  3413. details of our activities, we have
  3414. repeatedly made it clear that the
  3415. United States gathers intelligence of
  3416. the type gathered by all nations. The
  3417. US collects intelligence to protect the
  3418. nation, its interests, and its allies
  3419. from, among other things, threats such
  3420. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  3421. weapons of mass destruction.
  3422.  
  3423.  The United States values our longstanding
  3424. friendship and alliance with France and
  3425. we will continue to cooperate on security
  3426. and intelligence matters going forward.”
  3427.  
  3428. James R. Clapper
  3429. Director of National Intelligence
  3430. ---------------------------------------
  3431. ¤ Snowden Responds to Feinstein’s Stupidity ::
  3432.  
  3433. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  3434.  
  3435.  “Today, no telephone in America makes
  3436. a call without leaving a record with the
  3437. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  3438. or leaves America without passing through
  3439. the NSA’s hands,” Snowden said in a
  3440. statement Thursday.
  3441.  
  3442.  “Our representatives in Congress tell us
  3443. this is not surveillance. They’re wrong.”
  3444. _______________________________________
  3445. ¤ US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  3446. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  3447.  
  3448.  US and British intelligence officials
  3449. say they are concerned about a “doomsday”
  3450. collection of highly classified, heavily
  3451. encrypted materials they believe former
  3452. National Security Agency contractor
  3453. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  3454.  
  3455.  One source saw the cache of documents
  3456. as an “insurance policy” for Snowden
  3457. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  3458. other harm. ... ...
  3459.  
  3460.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  3461. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  3462. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  3463. that “if anything happens at all to
  3464. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  3465. to get access to the full archives.”
  3466.  
  3467. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  3468. _______________________________________
  3469. ¤ (Go Figure) Obama’s “Overhaul” of Spy
  3470. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  3471.  
  3472.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  3473. government surveillance policies. But he
  3474. is not disclosing those changes to the
  3475. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  3476. world leaders? He won’t say. Has he stopped
  3477. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  3478. World Bank and the International Monetary
  3479. Fund? He won’t say.
  3480.  
  3481.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  3482. to review and recommend changes to his
  3483. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  3484.  
  3485. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  3486. _______________________________________
  3487. ¤ NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  3488.  
  3489.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  3490. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  3491. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  3492. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  3493. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  3494.  
  3495.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  3496. broad goals, the five-page document said
  3497. that existing American laws were not adequate
  3498. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  3499. surveillance in what it cited as “the golden
  3500. age of Sigint,” or signals intelligence.
  3501. “The interpretation and guidelines for
  3502. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  3503. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  3504. pace with the complexity of the technology
  3505. and target environments, or the operational
  3506. expectations levied on NSA’s mission,” the
  3507. document concluded.
  3508.  
  3509. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  3510. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  3511. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  3512. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  3513. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  3514.  
  3515. ¤ NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  3516.  
  3517.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  3518. called Treasure Map and describes its
  3519. capabilities but does not publish visual
  3520. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  3521. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  3522. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  3523.  
  3524. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  3525. _______________________________________
  3526. ¤ Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  3527.  
  3528. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  3529. _______________________________________
  3530. ¤ GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  3531.  
  3532. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  3533.  
  3534. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  3535.  
  3536. ¤ GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  3537.  
  3538.  Britain’s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  3539. diplomats’ travels using a sophisticated
  3540. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  3541. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  3542. the door to a variety of spying options.
  3543.  
  3544. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  3545. _______________________________________
  3546. ¤ Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  3547.  
  3548.  “We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  3549. collection of solely domestic communications
  3550. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  3551. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  3552. request each week until we receive your
  3553. response,” EPIC said.
  3554.  
  3555.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  3556. said this week that it would not be hearing
  3557. EPIC’s plea. A document began circulating
  3558. early Monday in which the high court listed
  3559. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  3560. as denied.
  3561.  
  3562. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  3563.  
  3564. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  3565. _______________________________________
  3566. ¤ NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  3567.  
  3568. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  3569.  
  3570. ¤ Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  3571. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  3572.  
  3573. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  3574.  
  3575. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  3576.  
  3577. ¤ Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  3578. No Privacy ::
  3579.  
  3580. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  3581.  
  3582. ¤ Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  3583. Spying Programs ::
  3584.  
  3585. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  3586.  
  3587. ¤ John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  3588.  
  3589. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  3590.  
  3591. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  3592. _______________________________________
  3593. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Brief ::
  3594.  
  3595. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3596.  
  3597. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  3598.  
  3599. ¤ NSA & GCHQ “Bullrun” Decryption Guide ::
  3600.  
  3601. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3602.  
  3603. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  3604.  
  3605. ¤ NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  3606.  
  3607. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  3608.  
  3609.  “(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  3610. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  3611. or indigenous cryptographic information
  3612. security devices or systems in order to
  3613. make them exploitable.”
  3614.  
  3615. “TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum”
  3616.  
  3617.  “(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  3618. successfully exploits cryptographic
  3619. components of commercial information
  3620. security devices or systems when the
  3621. device or system specified.”
  3622.  
  3623. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3624.  
  3625. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  3626.  
  3627. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  3628.  
  3629. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3630. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3631. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  3632.  
  3633. ¤ NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  3634.  
  3635.  US and British intelligence agencies
  3636. have successfully cracked much of the
  3637. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  3638. of millions of people to protect the
  3639. privacy of their personal data, online
  3640. transactions and emails, according to
  3641. top-secret documents revealed by former
  3642. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  3643.  
  3644.  Those methods include covert measures
  3645. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  3646. international encryption standards, the
  3647. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  3648. with “brute force”, and – the most closely
  3649. guarded secret of all – collaboration with
  3650. technology companies and internet service
  3651. providers themselves.
  3652.  
  3653.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  3654. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  3655. – known as backdoors or trapdoors – into
  3656. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  3657.  
  3658.  Independent security experts have long
  3659. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  3660. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  3661. confirmed for the first time by another
  3662. secret document. It shows the agency
  3663. worked covertly to get its own version
  3664. of a draft security standard issued by
  3665. the US National Institute of Standards
  3666. and Technology approved for worldwide
  3667. use in 2006.
  3668.  
  3669. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  3670.  
  3671. ¤ Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  3672.  
  3673. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3674.  
  3675. ¤ Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  3676.  
  3677. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  3678.  
  3679. ¤ Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  3680.  
  3681. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3682.  
  3683. ¤ Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3684.  
  3685. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  3686. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  3687. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  3688.  
  3689. ¤ Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3690.  
  3691. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  3692. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  3693.  
  3694. ¤ DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3695.  
  3696. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  3697.  
  3698. ¤ Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  3699.  
  3700. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  3701.  
  3702. ¤ Documents Confirm “Back Doors” Inserted
  3703. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  3704.  
  3705. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  3706.  
  3707. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  3708.  
  3709.  A range of US hardware and software
  3710. companies are in danger of being dragged
  3711. into the widening scandal over internet
  3712. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  3713. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  3714. Security Agency contractor.
  3715.  
  3716.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  3717. that it has collaborated with technology
  3718. companies to plant “back doors” into
  3719. their systems – or ways for the agency
  3720. secretly to penetrate systems without
  3721. the users’ knowledge.
  3722.  
  3723. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  3724.  
  3725. ¤ You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  3726.  
  3727. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  3728. _______________________________________
  3729. ¤ SSL Inspector ::
  3730.  
  3731. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  3732.  
  3733. ¤ Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  3734.  
  3735. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  3736. _______________________________________
  3737. ¤ Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  3738. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  3739.  
  3740. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  3741.  
  3742. ¤ Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  3743.  
  3744. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  3745.  
  3746. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  3747.  
  3748. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  3749.  
  3750. ¤ US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  3751.  
  3752. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  3753.  
  3754. ¤ A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  3755.  
  3756. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  3757. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3758. ¤ Greenwald’s Partner, David Miranda
  3759. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  3760.  
  3761. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  3762. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  3763. ¤ Meet the Spies Doing the NSA’s Dirty Work ::
  3764.  
  3765.  The heart of the FBI’s signals intelligence
  3766. activities is an obscure organization called
  3767. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  3768. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  3769. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  3770. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  3771. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  3772. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  3773. presentation given to journalists by former
  3774. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU’s
  3775. pivotal role in the NSA’s Prism system --
  3776. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  3777. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  3778. be collected, which is then gathered and
  3779. delivered by the DITU.
  3780.  
  3781.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  3782. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  3783. home of the FBI’s training academy and the
  3784. bureau’s Operational Technology Division,
  3785. which runs all the FBI’s technical intelligence
  3786. collection, processing, and reporting.
  3787.  
  3788. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  3789.  
  3790. ¤ More PRISM Slides Published ::
  3791.  
  3792. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  3793. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  3794. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3795.  
  3796.  
  3797. ¤ PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  3798.  
  3799. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3800. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3801. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3802.  
  3803. ¤ Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  3804.  
  3805. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  3806.  
  3807. ¤ NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  3808.  
  3809. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  3810.  
  3811. ¤ Le Monde’s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  3812.  
  3813. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  3814.  
  3815.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  3816. by the NSA.
  3817.  
  3818.  During the summer, the documents provided
  3819. to the Guardian and the Washington Post by
  3820. former NSA employee Edward Snowden helped
  3821. unveil the extent of surveillance and
  3822. espionage carried out by the NSA and its
  3823. allies. Le Monde also now has access to
  3824. some of these documents.
  3825.  
  3826.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most
  3827. secretive intelligence agencies of the
  3828. United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  3829. who was granted an asylum for a year in
  3830. Russia. Wanting to denounce "the largest
  3831. program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  3832. history," the American working for a
  3833. subcontractor of the NSA has obtained
  3834. several thousands of highly confidential
  3835. documents.
  3836.  
  3837.  In early June, the first secrets of the
  3838. National Security Agency in these parts
  3839. start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  3840. that the telephone operator Verizon
  3841. provides NSA phone data of several
  3842. million Americans, according to a court
  3843. order secret. Then it was the turn of
  3844. the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  3845. allows the US Secret Service, and first
  3846. and foremost to the NSA, to access a
  3847. privileged manner, since December 2007,
  3848. data from nine major Internet companies,
  3849. including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
  3850.  
  3851. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  3852.  
  3853.  A document providing internal training
  3854. on Prism, which Le Monde has also had
  3855. access, how the NSA analysts can query
  3856. the databases of Web giants, research
  3857. documents, emails or instant discussions.
  3858. All within a legal framework that
  3859. overcomes the request of an individual
  3860. mandate. The companies named in the
  3861. documents have denied that the NSA
  3862. had a direct and unilateral access to
  3863. their servers.
  3864.  
  3865.  In addition to this targeted surveillance,
  3866. Snowden records reveal another method of
  3867. massive collection of the NSA called
  3868. Upstream. This system can collect data
  3869. from the submarine cable and Internet
  3870. infrastructures. A logical strategy,
  3871. when we know that 99% of global
  3872. communications now pass through diving.
  3873.  
  3874.  To learn more about the context of the
  3875. revelations of the World, the editorial
  3876. read : "Fight Big Brother"
  3877.  
  3878.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the
  3879. Government Communications Headquarters
  3880. (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system,
  3881. because of the historical proximity of
  3882. Great Britain and the United States,
  3883. confidentiality agreements and a financial
  3884. dependence of those services from London
  3885. to Washington. There are also technical
  3886. reasons : a significant portion of
  3887. submarine cables linking Europe to
  3888. America through Britain. With Edward
  3889. Snowden, the Tempora program , which
  3890. aims to "control the Internet" by
  3891. monitoring these cables, has been
  3892. revealed. "You're in an enviable
  3893. position, says a document presenting
  3894. Tempora, presented by the Guardian,
  3895. have fun and pull in the best." Turning
  3896. a page of the document presenting the
  3897. Prism program, we discover Upstream
  3898. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview,
  3899. and oakstar Stormbrew ) which we know to
  3900. date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  3901. would largely on intercepted telephone
  3902. conversations via the major US carriers.
  3903.  
  3904. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  3905.  
  3906.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass
  3907. of intercepted data. One of them is called
  3908. XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  3909. detailed in the columns of the Guardian.
  3910. The extreme precision of the data are
  3911. clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  3912. the content of e-mails to a list of
  3913. websites visited by their target or the
  3914. keywords entered by the latter in the
  3915. search engines.
  3916.  
  3917.  The framework for this research is not
  3918. binding, as the Guardian explained, and
  3919. many Americans are data made available to
  3920. agents. According to the presentation
  3921. materials, to promote the capabilities
  3922. of the tool, three hundred terrorists
  3923. have been arrested since 2008 thanks to
  3924. XKeyscore.
  3925.  
  3926.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their
  3927. considerable resources monitoring the
  3928. fight against terrorism, but also to
  3929. spy allies. At the G20 summit in London
  3930. in 2009, computers of diplomats and heads
  3931. of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well
  3932. as some of their phone calls. NSA, she
  3933. focused on the European Union (EU), as
  3934. revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the
  3935. basis of documents Snowden. NSA has
  3936. installed cookies on the premises of
  3937. the EU representation in Washington.
  3938. The EU delegation to the UN in New York,
  3939. and the building of the Council of the
  3940. European Union in Brussels were also
  3941. scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil
  3942. is also one of the countries affected
  3943. by this intelligence. According to
  3944. Brazilian media group O Globo, its
  3945. political leaders as some companies
  3946. have been targeted.
  3947.  
  3948.  The Snowden documents have informed
  3949. the considerable efforts made by the
  3950. United States to start listening to
  3951. Internet, in a sometimes unclear legal
  3952. framework and often away from real
  3953. democratic debate. Interviewed by
  3954. Le Monde, the US authorities have
  3955. assured that the Prism program was
  3956. the subject of a parliamentary debate
  3957. in the United States and was working
  3958. in a strictly regulated legal framework.
  3959. Asked on September 12 revelations
  3960. Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director
  3961. of National Intelligence, said: "What
  3962. happened - and that is harmful -
  3963. sparked conversation and debate that
  3964. it probably was necessary."
  3965. _______________________________________
  3966. ¤ UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  3967.  
  3968. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  3969.  
  3970. ¤ 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  3971.  
  3972. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  3973.  
  3974. ¤ Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  3975. ‘World Leaders’, But Not You ::
  3976.  
  3977. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  3978.  
  3979. NOBODY comments
  3980.  
  3981.  100% expected. They will continue to
  3982. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  3983. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  3984. We must adjust to it by learning how
  3985. to counter their surveillance.
  3986.  
  3987. ¤ UPDATE ; Inside America’s Plan to Kill
  3988. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  3989.  
  3990.  The United States and its key intelligence
  3991. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  3992. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  3993. Nations to promote a universal human right
  3994. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  3995. sources and an internal American government
  3996. document obtained by The Cable.
  3997.  
  3998.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  3999. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  4000. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  4001. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  4002. internet surveillance by the National
  4003. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  4004. services. American representatives have made
  4005. it clear that they won’t tolerate such
  4006. checks on their global surveillance network.
  4007. The stakes are high, particularly in
  4008. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  4009. an international backlash against NSA
  4010. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  4011. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  4012. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  4013.  
  4014. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  4015.  
  4016. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  4017. _______________________________________
  4018. ¤ Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  4019. Public News Coverage ::
  4020.  
  4021. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  4022. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  4023. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  4024. _______________________________________
  4025. ¤ Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  4026. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  4027.  
  4028. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  4029. _______________________________________
  4030. ¤ US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  4031.  
  4032.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  4033. a division for particularly difficult
  4034. missions. Called “Tailored Access Operations”
  4035. (TAO), this department devises special
  4036. methods for special targets.
  4037.  
  4038.  That category includes surveillance of
  4039. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  4040. the division reported its mission
  4041. accomplished. A report classified as
  4042. “top secret” said: “TAO successfully
  4043. exploited a key mail server in the
  4044. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  4045. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  4046. first-ever access to President Felipe
  4047. Calderon’s public email account.”
  4048.  
  4049. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  4050.  
  4051. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  4052.  
  4053. Cryptome comments ▼
  4054.  
  4055.  This spying was apparently done from
  4056. the NSA’s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  4057. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  4058. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  4059. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  4060.  
  4061. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  4062.  
  4063. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  4064. _______________________________________
  4065. ¤ More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  4066.  
  4067. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  4068.  
  4069. ¤ NSA Spies on French Government ::
  4070.  
  4071. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4072.  
  4073. ¤ NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  4074.  
  4075. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4076.  
  4077. ¤ NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  4078.  
  4079. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  4080.  
  4081. ¤ EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  4082.  
  4083. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  4084.  
  4085. ¤ Other Governments “Envious” of NSA ::
  4086.  
  4087. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  4088.  
  4089.  David Addington, Cheney’s chief of staff,
  4090. thought that the NSA should use its
  4091. technology to intercept emails and
  4092. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  4093. terminal to another, and was upset to
  4094. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  4095. That was a line he would only cross,
  4096. deliberately, with court and congressional
  4097. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  4098. but as we now know, the agency added
  4099. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  4100. suspicious communications that transited
  4101. the border of the United States, and
  4102. later began to collect reams of metadata
  4103. in order to analyze it.
  4104.  
  4105.  Hayden wasn’t being cautious just for
  4106. the record: NSA’s job was to collect
  4107. foreign intelligence — to steal stuff,
  4108. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  4109. in order to provide policymakers with a
  4110. decision advantage. The advantage the
  4111. NSA provided was accurate information
  4112. about what people who interacted with
  4113. the United States said in private about
  4114. their intentions; that gap between saying
  4115. and doing, and the ability to predict
  4116. action from it, allows the president of
  4117. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  4118.  
  4119.  It’s one thing to say that the United
  4120. States’ actions don’t always match up
  4121. with the values we espouse, and that’s
  4122. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  4123. our moral authority wanes and our
  4124. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  4125.  
  4126.  It’s quite another to assume that other
  4127. countries are any purer. They never have
  4128. been and probably won’t be. Many are much
  4129. purer than others, so the amount of
  4130. resources the intelligence community
  4131. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  4132. to correspond with how honest our allies
  4133. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  4134. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  4135. can we figure out which allies are more
  4136. reliable if we don’t figure out the
  4137. correspondence between public and private
  4138. words and actions.
  4139.  
  4140.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  4141. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  4142. want their leaders to gain a decision
  4143. advantage in the give and take between
  4144. countries. They want to know what US
  4145. policymakers will do before the Americans
  4146. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  4147. France, they aggressively spy on the
  4148. United States, on US citizens and
  4149. politicians, in order to collect that
  4150. information. The difference lies in the
  4151. scale of intelligence collection: The
  4152. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  4153. most sophisticated intelligence community
  4154. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  4155. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  4156. envious.
  4157. _______________________________________
  4158. ¤ NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  4159.  
  4160. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  4161. _______________________________________
  4162. ¤ 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  4163.  
  4164. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  4165. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4166. ¤ Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA’s PRISM
  4167. with ‘Secure Email’ Plan ::
  4168.  
  4169. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  4170. _______________________________________
  4171. ¤ Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  4172. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  4173.  
  4174. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  4175. _______________________________________
  4176.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  4177. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  4178. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  4179. from the award ceremony are the first of
  4180. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  4181. Russia.
  4182.  
  4183. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  4184. ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
  4185. ▼ GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  4186.  
  4187.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  4188. of the Security Service, said the
  4189. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  4190. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  4191. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  4192. agencies.
  4193.  
  4194. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  4195.  
  4196. ¤ NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  4197.  
  4198.  “Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  4199. they are not using Tor.”
  4200.  
  4201. “Investigate Evercookie persistence.”
  4202.  
  4203. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  4204. ---------------------------------------
  4205.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  4206. old bleach log.
  4207.  
  4208. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  4209. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  4210. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  4211. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  4212.  
  4213. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  4214.  
  4215.  “SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  4216. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  4217. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  4218. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  4219. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  4220. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  4221. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  4222. function.
  4223.  
  4224.  There are also various third party
  4225. programs that can produce files in
  4226. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  4227. Captivate and SWiSH Max.”
  4228.  
  4229.  “.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  4230. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  4231. data stored on the system running the
  4232. Flash player.”
  4233. ---------------------------------------
  4234. ▲ NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  4235.  
  4236.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  4237. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  4238. It can be found within Windows systems
  4239. and can be wiped out here ;
  4240.  
  4241. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4242. Application Data\Macromedia\
  4243.  
  4244. and may also be cloned here ;
  4245.  
  4246. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  4247.  
  4248.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  4249. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  4250.  
  4251. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  4252.  
  4253. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4254. Local Settings\Temp\
  4255. ---------------------------------------
  4256. • Adobe Flash Player Registry »
  4257.  
  4258. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  4259.  
  4260. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  4261.  
  4262. • swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump »
  4263.  
  4264. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  4265.  
  4266. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  4267.  
  4268. • Evercookie Cache Format Registry »
  4269.  
  4270. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  4271.  
  4272. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  4273.  
  4274. • Adobe “Asset Cache” Format Registry »
  4275.  
  4276. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  4277.  
  4278. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  4279.  
  4280. • Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher »
  4281.  
  4282. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  4283.  
  4284. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  4285. ---------------------------------------
  4286. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  4287.  
  4288.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  4289. application created by Samy Kamkar
  4290. which produces zombie cookies in a
  4291. web browser that are intentionally
  4292. difficult to delete. ... ...
  4293.  
  4294.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  4295. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  4296. by copying itself in different forms on
  4297. the user’s machine and resurrecting
  4298. itself if it notices that some of the
  4299. copies are missing or expired.
  4300.  
  4301.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  4302. Evercookie uses the following storage
  4303. mechanisms when available:
  4304.  
  4305. • Standard HTTP cookies
  4306. • Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  4307. • Silverlight Isolated Storage
  4308. • Storing cookies in RGB values of
  4309. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  4310. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  4311. (cookies) back out
  4312. • Storing cookies in Web history
  4313. • Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  4314. • Storing cookies in Web cache
  4315. • window.name caching
  4316. • Internet Explorer userData storage
  4317. • HTML5 Session Storage
  4318. • HTML5 Local Storage
  4319. • HTML5 Global Storage
  4320. • HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  4321. ---------------------------------------
  4322. ¤ Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  4323.  
  4324.  “Just because you’re using Tor doesn’t
  4325. mean that your browser isn't storing
  4326. cookies,” said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  4327. colleague of Hansen’s who also specializes
  4328. in browser vulnerabilities.
  4329.  
  4330.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  4331. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor’s entry
  4332. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  4333. wide surveillance.
  4334.  
  4335.  “The very feature that makes Tor a
  4336. powerful anonymity service, and the
  4337. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  4338. the Internet, makes it easy to
  4339. differentiate Tor users from other
  4340. Web users,” he wrote.
  4341.  
  4342.  “The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  4343. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  4344. identifies you. Even though your IP
  4345. address changed [because of Tor], the
  4346. cookies gave you away,” he said.
  4347.  
  4348. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  4349. ---------------------------------------
  4350. ¤ GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  4351. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  4352.  
  4353.  “Working together, CT and CNE have
  4354. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  4355. ‘staining’ as a means to identify
  4356. individual machines linked to that
  4357. IP address. ... ...
  4358.  
  4359.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  4360. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  4361. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  4362. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  4363. and is stamped into every packet, which
  4364. enables all the events from that stained
  4365. machine to be brought back together to
  4366. recreate a browsing session.”
  4367.  
  4368. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  4369.  
  4370. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  4371.  
  4372. ¤ Packet Staining ::
  4373.  
  4374. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  4375. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  4376. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  4377. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  4378.  
  4379. ¤ NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  4380.  
  4381. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  4382. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  4383. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  4384. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  4385.  
  4386. ¤ NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  4387.  
  4388.  “We have seen several targets using Tor.
  4389. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  4390. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  4391. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  4392. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  4393. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  4394. identify it. We also worked to create
  4395. a custom Tor client which allows the
  4396. user finer control.” ... ...
  4397.  
  4398.  “This accomplishes several things.
  4399. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  4400. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  4401. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  4402. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  4403. be excessively complex, as a single
  4404. proxy server can be used to hide one’s
  4405. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  4406. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  4407. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  4408. going to and from the proxy server,
  4409. it is possible to deduce which clients
  4410. are making which requests. Second, if
  4411. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  4412. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  4413. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  4414. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  4415. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  4416. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  4417. must be coordinated across several machines,
  4418. and an attacker must own all the hops
  4419. along the circuit in order to trace
  4420. requests back to the originating client.”
  4421.  
  4422. ... ...
  4423.  
  4424.  “In our time in the lab, we found that
  4425. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  4426. a hidden service will turn up the port
  4427. that the hidden service is using to deal
  4428. with incoming connections. It can then be
  4429. directly connected to, outside of Tor.”
  4430.  
  4431. ... ...
  4432.  
  4433.  “We would have to try to connect to
  4434. each of the ports we see open on a
  4435. machine to determine if there is a
  4436. hidden service being run. We would not
  4437. even know which protocol the hidden
  4438. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  4439. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  4440. etc. The only thing we know is that
  4441. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  4442. not enough to attempt to connect once
  4443. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  4444. Several protocols must be tried.”
  4445.  
  4446. ... ...
  4447.  
  4448.  “It may also be useful to study Tor
  4449. directory servers in more detail. Our
  4450. work focused solely on the client, but
  4451. many attacks would be much easier with
  4452. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  4453. servers ultimately control which Tor
  4454. servers are used by clients. We have found
  4455. that a server can put itself on a directory
  4456. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  4457. server running several Tor processes, each
  4458. having a different nickname, open port,
  4459. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  4460. requires different configuration files
  4461. for the different processes, which are
  4462. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  4463. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  4464. since it is listed several times. This
  4465. increases the density of friendly servers
  4466. in the cloud without increasing the number
  4467. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  4468. each listing has the same IP address,
  4469. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  4470. who inspecting the directories.”
  4471.  
  4472. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  4473. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  4474. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  4475.  
  4476. ¤ NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  4477.  
  4478. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  4479.  
  4480. ¤ NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  4481.  
  4482. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  4483.  
  4484. ¤ Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  4485.  
  4486.  “This document doesn’t give much insight
  4487. into capabilities the IC has developed
  4488. against Tor. It’s apparently quite common
  4489. to run multiple research teams (either
  4490. known or unknown to each other) against
  4491. a single target, and a few summer students
  4492. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  4493. small investment. I’d expect there are
  4494. other programs with more sophisticated
  4495. attacks, especially now 7 years later.”
  4496.  
  4497. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  4498. _______________________________________
  4499. ¤ Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  4500.  
  4501. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  4502. _______________________________________
  4503. ¤ Mike Rogers Says He’d Like To See
  4504. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  4505.  
  4506. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  4507.  
  4508.  “I must admit, in my darker moment over
  4509. the past several months, I’d also thought
  4510. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  4511. for a different list,” Hayden said during
  4512. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  4513. Sasso of The Hill.
  4514.  
  4515.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  4516. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  4517. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  4518. was also on the panel, responded, “I can
  4519. help you with that.”
  4520.  
  4521. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  4522.  
  4523.  The conversation then turned specifically
  4524. to the government’s use of targeted
  4525. killings, with Hayden noting “Yes, we
  4526. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  4527. hope they make full use of the capacities
  4528. of the National Security Agency when we
  4529. do that.”
  4530.  
  4531.  Hayden was responding to a question
  4532. about a new project announced by journalists
  4533. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  4534. delving into the NSA’s alleged role in
  4535. assassinations.
  4536.  
  4537. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  4538. _______________________________________
  4539. ¤ NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  4540.  
  4541. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  4542.  
  4543. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  4544.  
  4545. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  4546. _______________________________________
  4547. ¤ Cost and Responsibility for Snowden’s
  4548. Breaches ::
  4549.  
  4550. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  4551.  
  4552. ¤ Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  4553.  
  4554. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  4555. _______________________________________
  4556. ¤ NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  4557. of US Citizens ::
  4558.  
  4559.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  4560. body of knowledge in recent months about
  4561. the NSA’s access to and use of private
  4562. information concerning Americans, prompting
  4563. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  4564. in the agency and President Obama to order
  4565. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  4566. Almost everything about the agency’s
  4567. operations is hidden, and the decision
  4568. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  4569. was made in secret, without review by the
  4570. nation’s intelligence court or any public
  4571. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  4572. Department memo warned of the potential
  4573. for the “misuse” of such information
  4574. without adequate safeguards.
  4575.  
  4576. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  4577. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  4578. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  4579.  
  4580. ¤ NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  4581. From American Social Networks ::
  4582.  
  4583. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  4584. _______________________________________
  4585. ¤ GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  4586. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  4587.  
  4588. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  4589. _______________________________________
  4590. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE “NO”
  4591. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  4592.  
  4593.  Led by the German government, a loose
  4594. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  4595. across the world is pushing to update an
  4596. influential international human rights
  4597. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  4598.  
  4599. ... ...
  4600.  
  4601.  The annual conference was attended by a
  4602. diverse selection of privacy and data
  4603. protection officials from across the
  4604. world, with representatives attending
  4605. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  4606. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  4607. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  4608. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  4609. United Kingdom.
  4610.  
  4611.  During a closed session at the conference
  4612. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  4613. resolution was put forward for a vote
  4614. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  4615. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  4616. the idea, recognizing a need to “create
  4617. globally applicable standards for data
  4618. protection and the protection of privacy
  4619. in accordance with the rule of law.”
  4620.  
  4621.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  4622. of the resolution ... the United States.
  4623.  
  4624.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  4625. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  4626. eventually need to be put forward at the
  4627. United Nations and voted on by member
  4628. states, and that could take time. But
  4629. the growing appetite to amend the
  4630. international treaty in light of the
  4631. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  4632. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  4633. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  4634. technology in the digital age to trample
  4635. over basic universal privacy rights.
  4636.  
  4637. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  4638.  
  4639. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  4640.  
  4641. NOBODY comments
  4642.  
  4643.  “The problem is not just the NSA, but
  4644. all secret agencies around the world,
  4645. in general. All secret agencies and
  4646. their third-party vendors or allies
  4647. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  4648. backdoors in electronic communication
  4649. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  4650. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  4651. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  4652. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  4653. you must kill any trust in security.
  4654.  
  4655.  Security does not exist on the web.
  4656. Digital privacy is a hoax. It’s null.
  4657. It’s a wet dream. It’s justice FUBAR.”
  4658. _______________________________________
  4659. ¤ Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  4660.  
  4661. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  4662.  
  4663. ¤ Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  4664.  
  4665. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  4666. _______________________________________
  4667. ¤ Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  4668.  
  4669. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  4670. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  4671. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  4672. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  4673. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  4674.  
  4675. ¤ Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  4676. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  4677.  
  4678. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  4679. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  4680. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  4681.  
  4682.  In short, “upstream” capabilities are
  4683. tapping the backbone itself, via the
  4684. willing assistance of the telcos (who
  4685. still have remained mostly silent on
  4686. all of this) as opposed to “downstream”
  4687. collection, which requires going to the
  4688. internet companies directly.
  4689.  
  4690. ¤ Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  4691.  
  4692. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  4693.  
  4694. ▼ Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  4695.  
  4696. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  4697. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  4698. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  4699. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  4700. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  4701. _______________________________________
  4702. ¤ Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  4703. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  4704. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  4705.  
  4706. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  4707. _______________________________________
  4708. ¤ NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  4709.  
  4710.  According to a top secret document
  4711. disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward
  4712. Snowden and obtained by The Hindu, the
  4713. PRISM programme was deployed by the
  4714. American agency to gather key information
  4715. from India by tapping directly into the
  4716. servers of tech giants which provide
  4717. services such as email, video sharing,
  4718. voice-over-IPs, online chats, file
  4719. transfer and social networking services.
  4720.  
  4721.  And, according to the PRISM document
  4722. seen by The Hindu, much of the communication
  4723. targeted by the NSA is unrelated to terrorism,
  4724. contrary to claims of Indian and American
  4725. officials.
  4726.  
  4727.  Instead, much of the surveillance was
  4728. focused on India’s domestic politics and
  4729. the country’s strategic and commercial
  4730. interests.
  4731.  
  4732. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  4733.  
  4734.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication
  4735. intelligence) document about “Close Access
  4736. SIGADs”, the offices of Indian diplomats
  4737. and high-ranking military officials stationed
  4738. at these important posts were targets of
  4739. four different kinds of electronic snooping
  4740. devices:
  4741.  
  4742.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of
  4743. the hard drive of computers.
  4744.  
  4745.  Highlands, which makes digital collection
  4746. from implants.
  4747.  
  4748.  Vagrant, which collects data of open
  4749. computer screens.
  4750.  
  4751.  Magnetic, which is a collection of
  4752. digital signals.
  4753.  
  4754. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  4755. _______________________________________
  4756. ¤ Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US
  4757. Intelligence ::
  4758.  
  4759.  Accessing archived government documents,
  4760. the National Security Archive, an
  4761. anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  4762. decades-long effort by the US to detect,
  4763. monitor, and in some cases plan the
  4764. destruction of, “more than 10,000 such
  4765. facilities worldwide, many of them in
  4766. hostile territory, and many presumably
  4767. intended to hide or protect lethal military
  4768. equipment and activities, including
  4769. weapons of mass destruction, that could
  4770. threaten US or allied interests.”
  4771.  
  4772. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  4773. _______________________________________
  4774. ¤ More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  4775.  
  4776. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  4777. _______________________________________
  4778. ¤ Guardian’s Alan Rusbridger on the
  4779. Inside Story of NSA Leaks ::
  4780.  
  4781. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  4782. _______________________________________
  4783. ¤ PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  4784.  
  4785. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  4786. _______________________________________
  4787. ¤ New Separate Internet Being Built by
  4788. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  4789.  
  4790. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  4791. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  4792. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  4793.  
  4794. ¤ New Separate Internet Will Not be
  4795. Under United States Control ::
  4796.  
  4797.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff
  4798. announces publicly the creation of a
  4799. world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  4800. US and Britain or “US-centric internet.”
  4801.  
  4802.  Not many understand that, while the
  4803. immediate trigger for the decision
  4804. (coupled with the cancellation of a
  4805. summit with the US president) was the
  4806. revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  4807. why Rousseff can take such a historic
  4808. step is that the alternative infrastructure:
  4809. The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  4810. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai,
  4811. India to Cape Town, South Africa to
  4812. Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and
  4813. it’s, actually, in its final phase of
  4814. implementation.
  4815.  
  4816.  “The global backlash is only beginning
  4817. and will get far more severe in coming
  4818. months,” said Sascha Meinrath, director
  4819. of the Open Technology Institute at the
  4820. Washington-based New America Foundation
  4821. think-tank. “This notion of national
  4822. privacy sovereignty is going to be an
  4823. increasingly salient issue around the
  4824. globe.”
  4825.  
  4826. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  4827. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  4828. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  4829. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  4830.  
  4831. ¤ The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  4832.  
  4833.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s
  4834. capacity, fibre optic cable system.
  4835.  
  4836. http://www.bricscable.com/
  4837.  
  4838. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  4839. _______________________________________
  4840. ¤ No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA
  4841. Metadata Collection Orders ::
  4842.  
  4843.  A newly declassified opinion from the
  4844. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4845. from this summer shows the court’s
  4846. interpretation of the controversial
  4847. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
  4848. that’s used to justify the National
  4849. Security Agency’s bulk telephone
  4850. metadata collections, and reveals
  4851. that none of the companies that have
  4852. been served with such orders has ever
  4853. challenged one.
  4854.  
  4855. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  4856. _______________________________________
  4857. ¤ Experts Worry About Long-Term Blowback
  4858. of NSA Revelations ::
  4859.  
  4860.  With all of the disturbing revelations